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Abstract
In the present paper, we apply the generalized user-revenue model (GURM)
presented by Homma (2009) to Japans banking industry and perform an
analysis fusing producer theory and industrial organization theory (applied
microeconomics) and nance (asset pricing theory). Basically, while basing
the approach on the GURM, we derived the generalized user-revenue prices
(GURPs) and the extended generalized Lerner indices (EGLIs), organized
their theoretical characteristics from an interdisciplinary analytical perspec-
tive, applied the GURM to Japanese city banks, and estimated the GURPs
and the EGLIs. These e¤orts provided material for thinking about the neces-
sity of risk-adjustment policies as part of the industrial organization policy in
the banking industry. Based on the EGLI estimation results, regarding the
components of the EGLIs (in terms of absolute value), the risk-adjustment
e¤ects are the largest, followed by the equity capital e¤ects, and the mar-
ket structure and conduct e¤ects are the smallest. This is the same as the
results for the GURPs, so there is pressure to review conventional compe-
tition policy, which considers primarily the market structure and conduct
e¤ects. It has been pointed out that switching from a competition policy to
a risk-adjustment policy is necessary, so specic measures in risk-adjustment
policy that have not yet been considered must be taken into account. Fur-
thermore, the injection of public funds dramatically improved (decreased)
the risk-adjustment e¤ects of the EGLI for long-term loans and dramatically
increased the degree of competition in the long-term loan market.
Keywords: Generalized user-revenue price; Risk-adjustment e¤ects; Extended
generalized Lerner index; Empirical generalized user-revenue model; Japanese
city banks
JEL classication: C33; C51; C61; D24; G21; L13
1 Introduction
The objective of the present study is to apply the generalized user-revenue
model (GURM) presented by Homma (2009) to Japans banking industry
and perform an analysis fusing producer theory and industrial organization
theory (applied microeconomics) and nance (asset pricing theory). Basi-
cally, while basing the approach on the GURM, we derived the generalized
user-revenue prices (GURPs) and the extended generalized Lerner indices
(EGLIs), organized their theoretical characteristics from an interdisciplinary
analytical perspective, applied the GURM to Japanese city banks, and esti-
mated the GURPs and the EGLI. These e¤orts provided material for think-
ing about the necessity of risk-adjustment policies as part of the industrial
organization policy in the banking industry.
The GURM of Homma (2009) directly incorporates the essence of the
consumption-based capital asset pricing model (CCAPM) into the conjec-
tural user-revenue model (CURM) presented by Homma and Souma (2005),
developing the CURM so that it can clearly take into account the impact of
the uctuation risk of short-run prot, which takes into account the balance
uctuation of nancial assets and liabilities (quasi-short-run prot) and the
impact of equity capital reecting the risk of the burden of nancial distress
costs. However, since the CURM was developed from the user-cost model
(UCM) for nancial rms presented by Hancock (1985, 1987, 1991), we can
conclude that the GURM was indirectly developed from the UCM.
If we compare the UCM and the GURM in order to bring out the charac-
teristics of the GURM, the GURM is a more general model that relaxes the
following ve assumptions that are implicitly assumed by the UCM. First,
nancial rms are risk-neutral. Second, no strategic interdependence exists
between nancial rms. Third, no asymmetric information exists in the mar-
ket for nancial assets and liabilities. Fourth, no uncertainty exists in holding
revenues and holding costs. Fifth, the utility function of nancial rms does
not depend on equity capital.
By relaxing these assumptions, the following outcomes are obtained by
the GURM. First, by relaxing the rst assumption (so that the impact of risk
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attitudes other than risk-neutral attitudes can also be taken into account),
the user-cost prices (UCPs) presented by Hancock (1985, 1987, 1991) are
extended to stochastic user-revenue prices (SURPs). More specically, the
subjective discount rate is extended to a stochastic discount rate. As a re-
sult, in the case that nancial rms have risk attitudes other than risk-neutral
(risk-averse or risk-loving) the discount rate depends on the quasi-short-run
prot in the current period and the next period through the inter-temporal
marginal rate of substitution, and we are able to take these impacts into
account. Moreover, by relaxing the second and third assumptions (so that
the impact of strategic interdependence and asymmetric information can be
taken into account), the SURPs are extended to conjectural user-revenue
prices (CURPs). Furthermore, the Lerner index is extended to the general-
ized Lerner index (GLI). More specically, the market structure and conduct
e¤ects expressed by market share, the price elasticity of demand, and the con-
jectural derivative are added. As a result, we are able to take into account
the impact of market structure and market conduct from the perspective
of industrial organization theory. In addition, by relaxing the fourth and
fth assumptions (introducing uncertainty to holding revenues and holding
costs and making the utility functions of nancial rms depend on equity
capital as well), the CURPs are extended to GURPs. Furthermore, the GLI
is extended to the EGLI. More specically, the risk-adjustment e¤ects ex-
pressed by the covariance of the uncertain or unpredictable components of
the stochastic endogenous holding-revenue rate (SEHRR) or the stochastic
endogenous holding-cost rate (SEHCR) and stochastic discount factors, and
the equity capital e¤ects expressed by the marginal rate of substitution of
the equity capital and the quasi-short-run prot are added. As a result of
these steps, we are able to take into account the impact of the uctuation
risk of quasi-short-run prots from the asset pricing theory perspective and
(although indirectly) the risk of the burden of nancial distress costs from
the banking theory perspective. From an academic perspective, it can be
said that this has opened up a path to interdisciplinary analysis of industrial
organization theory and nance (asset pricing theory).
In addition to Hancock (1985, 1987, 1991), outstanding studies that have
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performed an analysis based on the UCM of nancial rms or a model simi-
lar to the UCM include Barnett (1987), Fixler and Zieschang (1991, 1992a,
1992b, 1993, 1999), Fixler (1993), Barnett and Zhou (1994), Barnett and
Hahm (1994), and Barnett et al. (1995). Among these studies, Fixler and
Zieschang (1991, 1992a, 1992b, 1993, 1999) and Fixler (1993) examined the
measurement of nancial services in national economic accounting and the
measurement of productivity in the banking sector, and Barnett (1987), Bar-
nett and Zhou (1994), Barnett and Hahm (1994), and Barnett et al. (1995)
examined monetary aggregation, which has provided a number of insights
into the GURM. In Japan, Homma et al. (1996), O¯mori and Nakajima
(2000), and Nagano (2002) performed analyses based on the UCM of nan-
cial rms. Homma et al. (1996) was the rst analysis in Japan that applied
the UCM of nancial rms, and they used the panel data of private banks
in the high-growth era to estimate the stochastic prot frontier function and
analyze the relationship between prot e¢ ciency in Japans banking industry
and interventions in the nancial system, such as the manipulation of the de-
posit interest rate and branch regulation. Based on the same model, O¯mori
and Nakajima (2000) used data from 1987-1995 to measure the economies
of scope and total factor productivity (TFP) of 20 randomly selected pri-
vate banks. Taking into consideration the analysis of Fixler and Zieschang
(1991), Nagano (2002) used UCP in measurements of the nancial services
in national economic accounting.
Thus, although there have been few analyses based on the UCM of -
nancial rms, such analyses have been performed in Japan. However, no
analyses have yet been performed, either inside or outside of Japan, from an
interdisciplinary perspective combining producer theory, industrial organiza-
tion theory, and nance and based on the GURM, which is a development of
the UCM. The importance from an interdisciplinary analytical perspective
of the GURM, for which there have not yet been any examples of analysis, is
the derivation of the EGLI, an index of market performance. The traditional
index of market performance from the perspective of conventional industrial
organization theory comprises only factors that a¤ect the market structure
and conduct, whereas the EGLI was developed so that we could consider not
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only these factors, but also the impact of the risk-averse attitude of nan-
cial rms from a nancial perspective, the uctuation risk of quasi-short-run
prots, and equity capital (which reects the risk of the burden of nancial
distress costs). The magnitude of these impacts on an index of market perfor-
mance has not yet been ascertained, and revealing these impacts empirically
may provide important insights into the industrial organization policies of
the banking industry going forward. The present paper attempts to reveal
these impacts through the EGLIs of Japanese city banks and is expected to
provide material for thinking about the necessity of risk-adjustment policies
as part of the industrial organization policy in Japans banking industry.
If we focus on other approaches from broader perspectives in order to
meet this expectation, we notice that attempts to estimate an index of mar-
ket performance (degree of competition) in Japans nancial industry have
been gaining pace in recent years. Outstanding examples include Tsutsui
and Kamesaka (2005), Uchida and Tsutsui (2005), and Souma and Tsutsui
(2010), with Tsutsui and Kamesaka (2005) estimating the degree of com-
petition in the securities industry, Uchida and Tsutsui (2005) estimating
the degree of competition in the banking industry, and Souma and Tsutsui
(2010) estimating the degree of competition in the insurance industry. Al-
though these studies were based on the asset approach,1 they provided useful
references when examining the empirical results of the present study.
The remainder of the present paper is organized as follows. Section 2
explains the theoretical model of the GURM on which the present study
is based, and the empirical model is discussed in Section 3. Section 3 ex-
plains the endogenous state variables and their creation, the specications
of the utility function and the stochastic Euler equations, and the estima-
tion method and test method. A discussion of the SEHRR and SEHCR and
their creation, the specications of the endogenous components, the exoge-
nous state variables and their creation, and the specications of the variable
cost function and cost share equation are presented in the Appendix. Sec-
tion 4 presents an investigation of the empirical results, which examines the
estimation results for the stochastic Euler equations, the degree of relative
1For further details of the asset approach, see Berger and Humphrey (1992, pp.247-248).
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risk-aversion, the reference rate (risk-free rate), the GURPs and their com-
ponents, a factor analysis of the risk-adjustment e¤ects, and the EGLIs and
their components. A discussion of the estimation results for the endogenous
components of the SEHRR and SEHCR and the variable cost function is
presented in the Appendix. Finally, Section 5 summarizes the ndings and
presents the conclusions of the present study.
2 Theoretical Specication
The present study basically adopts the GURM of Homma (2009) as its theo-
retical model. However, we assume that the endogenous state variables com-
prise only nancial goods (nancial assets and liabilities) and real resource
xed inputs (physical capital or human capital) are not included. Further-
more, it is assumed that real resource xed inputs comprise physical capital
only, and they are treated as variable inputs that have been optimized within
a single period, in the same manner as labor and current goods. This step
was taken because the main focus of the analysis is nancial goods rather
than real resource xed inputs, and we wanted to narrow the analysis to
nancial goods. For this reason, it was necessary to treat real resource xed
inputs as simply as possible. Moreover, liabilities other than deposits (cer-
ticates of deposit and other liabilities2) are treated as variable inputs. This
is because it was conrmed that this approach would obtain more credible
estimation results in the ex ante estimate of the variable cost function.
Before presenting an explanation, in this section, the following prelimi-
nary assumptions are made. (i) Time is divided into discrete periods. (ii)
These periods are su¢ ciently short that variations in exogenous (state) vari-
ables within the period can be neglected. In other words, exogenous variables
are constant within each period but can change discretely at the boundaries
between periods. (iii) The process of adjustment is essentially instantaneous,
allowing stock adjustment problems to be ignored. These assumptions are
2Other liabilities include bonds, bills sold, payables under repurchase agreements, com-
mercial paper, due to foreign banks, due from foreign banks, corporate bonds, and con-
vertible bonds.
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made in order to facilitate empirical research, similar to Hancock (1985, 1987,
1991), Homma and Souma (2005), and Homma (2009), with the expectation
that the GURM may provide a consistent basis for such research.
2.1 Dynamic-Uncertainty Behavior and Stochastic Euler
Equations
The formulation of the decisions of a nancial rm as a stochastic dynamic
programming (SDP) problem is derived based on the same considerations
as in Homma (2009). Two specications of the problem exist, for which
the primary di¤erence is in the relative timing of decision-making periods
and the realization of uncertainty. In the rst specication, the decision is
made after the uncertainty is resolved, such that, in each period, the decision
maker chooses the state variable of the next period directly. In the second
specication, the decision is made before the uncertainty is resolved, in which
case, the decision maker chooses the control variable of the current period,
and the state variable of the next period then becomes a function of the
chosen control variable and the state variable of the current period. The
adjustment cost of stock variables is assumed to be zero, as mentioned above,
and more reliable information on the decision leads to a rise in the value of
the rm. The rst specication is therefore assumed to be similar to that in
Homma (2009), i.e., the nancial rm chooses the state variable of the next
period directly.
In the case of SDP, the state variables are classied as endogenous and
exogenous state variables. The endogenous state variable vectors qi;t (t  0)
are the vectors of real balances of nancial goods,3 i.e.,
qi;t = (qi;1;t;   ; qi;NA+NL;t)0 (t  0) .
The exogenous state variable vectors zi;t (t  0) are similarly dened as
zi;t =
 
zH0i;t 1; 
0
i;t; pG;t;p
0
i;t;  i;t
0
(t  0) ,
3As stated above, some liabilities other than deposits (certicates of deposit and other
liabilities) are not included. These are treated as one real resource variable input.
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where zHi;t 1 =
 
zH0i;1;t 1;   ; zH0i;NA+NL;t 1
0
(t  0) are the exogenous variable
vectors, which consist of the certain or predictable components of the SEHRR
and the SEHCR in the period t   1 (  1). At t = 0, zHi; 1 = zHi;0 = 
zH0i;1;0;   ; zH0i;NA+NL;0
0
. i;t =
 
 i;1;t;   ;  i;NA+NL;t
0
(t  0) are vectors of
the uncertain or unpredictable components of the SEHRR and the SEHCR,
and pG;t (t  0) are the general price indices.4 pi;t = (pi;1;t;   ; pi;M;t)0 (t  0)
are the vectors of factor prices,5 and  i;t (t  0) are the indices of exogenous
technical change. Among these exogenous state variables, the vectors of
the exogenous state variables with respect to the variable cost function are
dened as zCi;t =

p0i;t; z
Q0
i;t ;  i;t
0
(t  0), where zQi;t =

zQ0i;1;t;   ; zQ0i;NA+NL;t
0
(t  0) are the corresponding vectors that a¤ect the quality of nancial
goods.6 The vectors with respect to the quasi-short-run prot in period t
( 0) are dened as zi;t =
 
zH0i;t 1; 
0
i;t; pG;t 1; pG;t; z
C0
i;t
0
(t  0), and in the
case of t = 0, zi;0 =
 
zH0i;0; 
0
i;0; pG;0;p
0
i;0;  i;0
0
. The vectors with respect to
equity capital are dened as zei;t =
 
pG;t; z
C0
i;t
0
(t  0).
As in Homma (2009), in considering the uncertainties faced by the -
nancial rm, it is assumed that the stochastic process fzi;tgt0 follows a
stationary Markov process. Let (Z;BZ) be a measurable space, where Z is
a set of zi;t, and BZ is a -algebra of its subsets. In this case, the stochastic
properties of the exogenous state variables can be expressed as a stationary
transition function: Q : Z BZ ! [0; 1].7 The interpretation of this deni-
tion is that Q (zi;t; Ai;t+1) is the probability that the state of the next period
lies in the set Ai;t+1, given that the current state is zi;t. The product space of
(Z;BZ) is expressed as
 
Zt;BtZ

= (Z      Z;BZ     BZ), and zi;0
(2 Z) is given.
Denition 1 The probability measures on (Z;BZ), t (zi;0;  ) : BtZ ! [0; 1]
4For details regarding zHi;j;t and i;j;t, see Homma (2009, pp.6-9).
5Including the interest rate of certicates of deposit and other liabilities. However,
these are treated collectively as one interest rate.
6zQi;j;t is an element of z
H
i;j;t. For details regarding z
Q
i;j;t, see Homma (2009, pp.6-10).
7For further details regarding the stationary transition function, see Stokey and Lucas
(1989, p.212).
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(t  1), are dened as follows.8 For any rectangle Ati = Ai;1Ai;t 2 BtZ:
t
 
zi;0; A
t
i

=
Z
Ai;1

Z
Ai;t 1
Z
Ai;t
Q (zi;t 1;dzi;t)Q (zi;t 2;dzi;t 1)Q (zi;0;dzi;1) .
(1)
The probability measure t (zi;0;  ) satises the properties of measures
and t (zi;0; Zt) = 1.
As described in Homma (2009), the decision to be carried out in period
t can depend on the information that will be available at that time. This
information can be expressed as a sequence of vectors of the exogenous state
variables. Let zti = (zi;1;   ; zi;t) (2 Zt) denote the partial history in periods
1 through t, and let (Y;BY ) be a measurable space, where Y is a set of
vectors of the endogenous state variables qi;t, and BY is a -algebra of its
subsets. A plan qpi is then dened as the set of a value q
p
i;0 (2 Y ) and a
sequence of functions qpi;t : Z
t ! Y (t  1), where qpi;t (zti) is the value of
qi;t+1 that will be chosen in period t if the partial history of the exogenous
state variables in periods 1 through t is zti.
In the remainder of the present paper, as in Homma (2009), the nancial
rm is assumed to choose a plan that maximizes the expected value of the
discounted intertemporal utility of its prots stream. The intertemporal
utility function is also assumed to be additively separable.9 In this case, the
optimization problem of the i-th nancial rm is given by
max
qpi
ui
h
QSi
 
qi;0;q
p
i;0 (zi;0) ; z

i;0

; qpe;i
 
qpi;0 (zi;0) ; z
e
i;0
i
+ lim
T!1
XT
t=1
Z
Zt
ti  ui
h
QSi
 
qpi;t 1
 
zt 1i

;qpi;t
 
zti

; zi;t

;
qpe;i
 
qpi;t
 
zti

; zei;t

t
 
zi;0;dz
t
i

, (2)
where ui (; ) is the utility function, ti =
Yt 1
s=0
i;s =
Yt 1
s=0
1
1 + rDi;s
is the
8For a full account of the probability measures, see Stokey and Lucas (1989, pp.220-
225).
9For details regarding the utility function, see Homma (2009, pp.11-15).
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cumulative discount factor, and rDi;s is the subjective rate of time preference.
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Here, QSi
 
qpi;t 1
 
zt 1i

;qpi;t (z
t
i) ; z

i;t

(t  1) and QSi
 
qi;0;q
p
i;0 (zi;0) ; z

i;0

are the planned quasi-short-run prots, which are as follows:11
QSi
 
qpi;t 1
 
zt 1i

;qpi;t
 
zti

; zi;t

=
XNA+NL
j=1
bj 

1 + bC  hRi;j
 
Qpj;t 1; z
H
i;j;t 1

+  i;j;t
	  pG;t 1  qpi;j;t 1  zt 1i 
 pG;t  qpi;j;t
 
zti
  CVi  qpi;t  zti ; zCi;t (t  1), (3)
QSi
 
qi;0;q
p
i;0 (zi;0) ; z

i;0

=
XNA+NL
j=1
bj 

1 + bC  hRi;j
 
Qj;0; z
H
i;j;0

+  i;j;0
	  pG;0  qi;j;0
 pG;0  qpi;j;0 (zi;0)
  CVi  qpi;0 (zi;0) ; zCi;0 . (4)
The parameters and functions in Eqs.(3) and (4) are dened as follows.
 bj: Parameter used to distinguish between nancial assets and liabili-
ties: bj = 1 for assets (i.e., j = 1; : : : ; NA), and bj =  1 for liabilities
(i.e., j = NA + 1; : : : ; NA +NL).
 bC : Parameter used to distinguish cash from other nancial assets. In
other words, if qpi;j;t represents cash (i.e., j = 1), then bC = 0, whereas
if the nancial good is another type of nancial asset (i.e., j 6= 1), then
bC = 1.
 hRi;j
 
Qpj;t 1; z
H
i;j;t 1

: Planned certain or predictable component of the
SEHRR or the SEHCR.12
10For details regarding this optimization problem, see Stokey and Lucas (1989, pp.241-
254).
11For details regarding the quasi-short-run prot, see Homma (2009, pp.11-13). The
di¤erence from Homma (2009, pp.11-13) is that it is assumed here that real resource xed
inputs comprise physical capital only and are treated as a variable input that is optimized
within a single period, in the same manner as labor and current goods. Therefore, it is
assumed that real resource xed costs are zero.
12For details regarding this component, see Homma (2009, pp.6-9).
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 Qpj;t: Planned total assets or liabilities in the market.
 CVi
 
qpi;t (z
t
i) ; z
C
i;t

: Planned variable cost function.13
In addition, qpe;i
 
qpi;t (z
t
i) ; z
e
i;t

(t  0) is the planned equity capital, which is
given by
qpe;i
 
qpi;t
 
zti

; zei;t

=
NAX
j=1
pG;t  qpi;j;t
 
zti

+
MFX
j=1
pFi;j;t  xpF;i;j;t
 
qpi;t
 
zti

; zCi;t

 
NA+NLX
j=NA+1
pG;t  qpi;j;t
 
zti

(t  0), (5)
where pFi;j;t is the j-th real resource xed factor price, and x
p
F;i;j;t
 
qpi;t (z
t
i) ; z
C
i;t

is the conditional factor demand function for the j-th planned real resource
xed input.
As described in Homma (2009), the necessary conditions for stochastic op-
timization problems in sequence form can be found by adopting a variational
approach. Such conditions are represented by stochastic Euler equations,
which for the above optimization problem (2) are expressed as
  @u

i;t
@QSi;t

 
bj  pG;t +
@CV i;t
@qpi;j;t
!
+ bj  pG;t 
@ui;t
@qpe;i;t
+ i;t  bj  pG;t 
Z
Z
(
1 + bC 
 
hRi;j;t +
@hRi;j;t
@ ln qpi;j;t
!
+  i;j;t+1
)
 @u

i;t+1
@QSi;t+1
Q (zi;t;dzi;t+1) = 0; j = 1;   ; NA +NL, (6)
where qpi;j;t = q
p
i;j;t (z
t
i), 
QS
i;t = 
QS
i
 
qpi;t 1
 
zt 1i

;qpi;t (z
t
i) ; z

i;t

,
qpe;i;t = q
p
e;i
 
qpi;t (z
t
i) ; z
e
i;t

, ui;t = ui

QSi;t ; q
p
e;i;t

, CV i;t = C
V
i
 
qpi;t (z
t
i) ; z
C
i;t

,
and hRi;j;t = h
R
i;j
 
Qpj;t; z
H
i;j;t

.
As in Homma (2009), if the utility function ui;t is concave and continu-
13For details regarding this function, see Homma (2009, pp.9-11).
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ously di¤erentiable in qpi;t 1 and q
p
i;t and is integrable,
14 then if each of the
partial derivatives of ui;t with respect to q
p
i;t 1 are absolutely integrable,
15
then the stochastic Euler equations (6) with the transversality conditions
lim
t!1
ti 
Z
Z
@ui;t+1
@QSi;t+1
 @
QS
i;t+1
@qpi;j;t
 qpi;j;tQ (zi;t;dzi;t+1) = 0; j = 1;   ; NA+NL (7)
are su¢ cient conditions for an optimal plan qpi =
n
qpi;0;

qpi;t
	1
t=1
o
.
2.2 Risk Corrections and Generalized User-Revenue
Prices
The inuence of uncertainties in the SEHRR and the SEHCR is resolved
explicitly by transforming Eq.(6) into the form of an expression of risk cor-
rection. This is similar to the treatment in the CCAPM.
Theorem 1 Under the assumption that @ui;t
.
@QSi;t 6= 0 and E

 i;j;t+1
 zi;t =
0, Eq.(6) can be transformed into the form of an expression of risk correction
as follows:
  bj  pG;t  MCV i;j;t + bj  pG;t MRSe;i;t
+ i;t  bj  pG;t 

1 + bC 
 
hRi;j;t + 

i;j;t
	  E IMRS;i;t+1 jzi;t 
+ i;t  bj  pG;t 
cov

 i;j;t+1; @u

i;t+1
.
@QSi;t+1
 zi;t
@ui;t
.
@QSi;t
= 0;
j = 1;   ; NA +NL, (8)
where MCV i;j;t = @C
V 
i;t

@qpi;j;t , MRS

e;i;t =
 
@ui;t

@qpe;i;t
.
@ui;t
.
@QSi;t

16,
14The integrability of ui;t means that
R
Z
ui;tQ (zi;t 1;dzi;t) <1.
15The absolute integrability of
@ui;t
@qpi;j;t 1
is dened as
R
Z
 @ui;t@qpi;j;t 1  Q (zi;t 1;dzi;t) <1.
16This term is the marginal rate of substitution (MRS) of quasi short-run prots for
equity capital. This MRS is a measure of the rate at which the nancial rm is just willing
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i;j;t = @h
R
i;j;t

@ ln qpi;j;t , IMRS

;i;t+1 =

@ui;t+1
.
@QSi;t+1
.
@ui;t
.
@QSi;t

17,
and E [  jzi;t ] =
R
Z
Q (zi;t;dzi;t+1).
Proof. See Homma (2009, pp.23-24).
The fraction in the fth term on the left-hand side of Eq.(8),
cov

 i;j;t+1; @u

i;t+1
.
@QSi;t+1
 zi;t.@ui;t.@QSi;t  ,
i.e., the ratio of the covariance of uncertain components of the SEHRR and
the SEHCR with respect to the marginal utility of quasi-short-run prots in
period t+1 to the same marginal utility in period t, is a risk-adjustment term.
In the case that the risk attitude of nancial rms is averse, the marginal
utility of quasi-short-run prots is a decreasing function of its prots. There-
fore, cov

 i;j;t+1; 
QS
i;t+1
 zi;t is positive if cov i;j;t+1; @ui;t+1.@QSi;t+1  zi;t is
negative, and vice versa. In this case, the variance of quasi-short-run prots
in the next period increases if a nancial asset in the current period increases,
while the same variance decreases if a liability in the current period increases,
and vice versa. For example, if  (0 <  < 1) of the j-th nancial good in
period t increases, then from Eq.(3), the quasi-short-run prot in the next
period becomes QSi;t+1+bj 

1 + bC  hRi;j
 
Qj;t; z
H
i;j;t

+  i;j;t+1
	 pG;t . In this
case, its variance can be expressed as
var

QSi;t+1 + bj 

1 + bC  hRi;j
 
Qj;t; z
H
i;j;t

+  i;j;t+1
	  pG;t   zi;t
= var

QSi;t+1
 zi;t+ 2  bj  pG;t    cov i;j;t+1; QSi;t+1 zi;t
+(bj  pG;t  )2  var
 
 i;j;t+1
 zi;t . (9)
to substitute quasi short-run prots for equity capital, or in other words, a measure of the
opportunity costs of equity capital.
17This term represents the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution (IMRS) with
respect to quasi short-run prots, and is a measure of the rate at which the nancial rm
is just willing to substitute quasi short-run prots in period t for prots in period t + 1.
In the case that the nancial rm is risk-averse, the marginal utility of quasi short-run
prots is a decreasing function of quasi short-run prots. The IMRS therefore declines
if quasi short-run prots increase from the current period to the next period and rises if
prots decrease.
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Thus, if  is su¢ ciently small, then the third term on the right-hand side of
this equation is much smaller than the second term. The sign of the second
term, cov

 i;j;t+1; 
QS
i;t+1
 zi;t, determines whether this variance is greater
than var

QSi;t+1
 zi;t. Thus, in the case that the j-th nancial good is a
nancial asset (i.e., bj = 1), the variance is greater than var

QSi;t+1
 zi;t if
the sign of cov

 i;j;t+1; 
QS
i;t+1
 zi;t is positive. Similarly, in the case that the
j-th nancial good is a liability (i.e., bj =  1), this variance is greater than
var

QSi;t+1
 zi;t if the sign of cov i;j;t+1; QSi;t+1 zi;t is negative.
Equation (8) represents a stochastic Euler equation with respect to nan-
cial goods, extended from that in the original CURM to incorporate consider-
ation of the e¤ects of equity capital and the volatility risk of quasi-short-run
prots. By transforming these equations, the GURP is derived as an exten-
sion of the SURP and the CURP.
Corollary 1 Equation (8) can be expressed as follows:
MCV i;j;t = bj  pG;t 
 
bC  hRi;j;t   rFi;t
  
1 + rFi;t

+ bC  i;j;t
 
1 + rFi;t

+MRSe;i;t +$

i;j;t

; j = 1;   ; NA +NL, (10)
where rFi;t = 1

E

i;t  IMRS ;i;t+1 jzi;t
   1 and
$i;j;t = i;t 
cov

 i;j;t+1; @u

i;t+1
.
@QSi;t+1
 zi;t
@ui;t
.
@QSi;t
.
Proof. See Homma (2009, p.32).
The right-hand side of Eq.(10) is then the price of the j-th nancial good,
i.e., is equivalent to MC V i;j;t. From the perspective of producer theory, this
corrollary is thus used as the denition for the GURP.
Denition 2 The generalized user-revenue price of the i-th nancial rm
13
during period t, denoted by pGURi;j;t , is dened as
pGURi;j;t = bj  pG;t 
 
bC  hRi;j;t   rFi;t
  
1 + rFi;t

+ bC  i;j;t
 
1 + rFi;t

+MRSe;i;t +$

i;j;t

; j = 1;   ; NA +NL. (11)
As described in Homma (2009), the four terms on the right-hand side of
Eq.(11) represent the SURP, the market structure and conduct e¤ects, the
equity capital e¤ects, and the risk-adjustment e¤ects respectively.18
From Corollary 1 and Denition 2, the following remark follows immedi-
ately.
Remark 1 From Corollary 1 and Denition 2,
MCV i;j;t = p
GUR
i;j;t ; j = 1;   ; NA +NL (12)
holds, and thus the classication of nancial goods into inputs and outputs
based on the sign of each GURP is consistent with the classication based on
the sign of each partial derivative of the variable cost function with respect to
nancial goods. The sign of the partial derivative of the variable cost function
is the same as the sign of the GURP, indicating that a nancial good is an
output if positive and a xed input if negative.
As dened in the CURM, the SURP and the CURP are expressed as the
following denitions.
Denition 3 The stochastic user-revenue price of the i-th nancial rm
during period t, denoted by pSURi;j;t , is dened as
pSURi;j;t = bj  pG;t 
 
bC  hRi;j;t   rFi;t
  
1 + rFi;t

; j = 1;   ; NA +NL. (13)
Denition 4 The conjectural user-revenue price of the i-th nancial rm
18For details regarding the GURP, see Homma (2009, pp.32-36).
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during period t, denoted by pCURi;j;t , is dened as
pCURi;j;t = bj  pG;t 
 
bC  hRi;j;t   rFi;t
  
1 + rFi;t

+ bC  i;j;t
 
1 + rFi;t

= pSURi;j;t + bj  pG;t  bC  i;j;t
 
1 + rFi;t

; j = 1;   ; NA +NL. (14)
From Denition 2, 3, and 4, the following remark follows immediately.
Remark 2 Using the SURP or the CURP, the GURP can be then expressed
as
pGURi;j;t = p
SUR
i;j;t + bj  pG;t 

bC  i;j;t
 
1 + rFi;t

+MRSe;i;t +$

i;j;t

= pCURi;j;t + bj  pG;t 

MRSe;i;t +$

i;j;t

; j = 1;   ; NA +NL. (15)
This equation shows that the GURP takes into account the SURP, as
well as market structure and conduct e¤ects, equity capital e¤ects, and risk-
adjustment e¤ects. The GURP is therefore equivalent to the CURP with the
addition of equity capital e¤ects and risk-adjustment e¤ects, i.e., the exten-
sion SURP includes explicit consideration of market structure and conduct
e¤ects, equity capital e¤ects, and risk-adjustment e¤ects. If the equity cap-
ital e¤ects and risk-adjustment e¤ects are zero, i.e., if the e¤ects cancel or
are both zero, then the GURP is fully equivalent to the CURP. If the market
structure and conduct e¤ects are zero, then the GURP is fully equivalent to
the SURP. As described in the CURM, if the nancial rm is risk-neutral,
then the GURP corresponds to the UCP of the UCM.
2.3 Extended Generalized Lerner Indices
The EGLI, an extension of the GLI in the CURM, can be derived using
Eqs.(10) and (12), which represent the relationship between the GURP and
marginal variable costs, and Eq.(15), which gives the relationships between
the SURP, the CURP, and the GURP. In concrete terms, as in the CURM,
dividing the discrepancy between the SURP and the marginal variable costs
by the SURP of Eq.(13) gives the EGLI. The SURP is a price in which mar-
15
ket structure and conduct e¤ects, equity capital e¤ects, and risk-adjustment
e¤ects are assumed to be zero. The discrepancy between the SURP and mar-
ginal variable costs therefore takes these e¤ects into account. In this section,
the case of a positive SURP and positive marginal variable costs is considered
with respect to the j-th nancial good as an output.
Remark 3 From Eqs.(12) and (15), the discrepancy between the SURP and
marginal variable costs can be expressed as
pSURi;j;t  MCV i;j;t =  bj pG;t
 
i;j;t +MRS

e;i;t +$

i;j;t

; j = 1; ; NA+NL, (16)
where
i;j;t = bC  i;j;t
 
1 + rFi;t

; j = 1;   ; NA +NL. (17)
The EGLI is dened by dividing both sides of Eq.(16) by the SURP given
by Eq.(13).
Denition 5 The extended generalized Lerner index of the j-th nancial
good of the i-th rm in period t, denoted by EGLIi;j;t, is dened as
EGLIi;j;t =
pSURi;j;t  MCV i;j;t
pSURi;j;t
=  bC  

i;j;t +
 
MRSe;i;t +$

i;j;t
   1 + rFi;t 
bC  hRi;j;t   rFi;t
;
j = 1;   ; NA +NL. (18)
Under the assumption that the j-th nancial good is an output, the sign
of bC  hRi;j;t   rFi;t is positive if the j-th nancial good is a nancial asset
other than cash, and negative if the j-th nancial good is a liability. If the
sign of i;j;t is determined by the sign of the elasticity of the collected or
paid interest rate of the SEHRR or the SEHCR with respect to the total
balance in the market, then the sign of i;j;t is negative if the j-th nan-
cial good is a nancial asset and positive if the j-th nancial good is a
liability.19 From Eq.(8), the sign of MRSe;i;t is positive, and from Eq.(10),
19For details regarding i;j;t, see Homma (2009, pp.33-34).
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the sign of $i;j;t can be either positive or negative. From the denitional
identity of $i;j;t in Eqs.(9) and (10), if the j-th nancial good is a nan-
cial asset and the risk (variance) of the quasi-short-run prot increases due
to its increase, then (cov

 i;j;t+1; 
QS
i;t+1
 zi;t > 0), and if the nancial rm
is risk-averse, the sign of $i;j;t is negative, whereas if the risk (variance)
of the quasi-short-run prot decreases, then (cov

 i;j;t+1; 
QS
i;t+1
 zi;t < 0),
and if the nancial rm is still risk-averse, the sign of $i;j;t is positive.
On the other hand, if the j-th nancial good is a liability and the risk
(variance) of the quasi-short-run prot increases due to its increase, then
(cov

 i;j;t+1; 
QS
i;t+1
 zi;t < 0), and if the nancial rm is risk-averse, the sign
of $i;j;t is positive, whereas if the risk (variance) of the quasi-short-run prot
decreases, then (cov

 i;j;t+1; 
QS
i;t+1
 zi;t > 0), and if the nancial rm is still
risk-averse, the sign of $i;j;t is negative.
From Denition 5, we can see that the factors that have an impact on
the degree of competition are not only the factors that a¤ect the market
structure and conduct (i;j;t) from the perspective of conventional indus-
trial organization theory. From a nancial perspective, the risk-averse atti-
tude of nancial rms (rFi;t ), the uctuation risk of quasi-short-run prots
($i;j;t), and equity capital (which reects the risk of the burden of nan-
cial distress costs) (MRSe;i;t) also have an impact. According to Homma
(2009), these impacts can be organized into the following three e¤ects: mar-
ket structure and conduct e¤ects ( bC  i;j;t
 
bC  hRi;j;t   rFi;t

), equity cap-
ital e¤ects ( MRSe;i;t 
 
1 + rFi;t
  
bC  hRi;j;t   rFi;t

), and risk-adjustment
e¤ects ( $i;j;t 
 
1 + rFi;t
  
bC  hRi;j;t   rFi;t

). Consequently, the following
two propositions can be derived.
Proposition 1 In the case that nancial rms are risk-averse, an increase
in equity capital increases the EGLI of nancial assets other than cash (de-
creases the degree of competition) and decreases the EGLI of liabilities (raises
the degree of competition).
Proof. From Eq.(8), MRSe;i;t =
 
@ui;t

@qpe;i;t
.
@ui;t
.
@QSi;t

> 0. Fur-
thermore, if the j-th nancial good is an output and a nancial asset other
than cash, then bC  hRi;j;t   rFi;t > 0, and, in the same manner, if the j-th
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nancial good is a liability bC  hRi;j;t   rFi;t < 0. Therefore, if the j-th -
nancial good is an output and a nancial asset other than cash, then the
equity capital e¤ects ( MRSe;i;t 
 
1 + rFi;t
  
bC  hRi;j;t   rFi;t

) are negative,
and if the j-th nancial good is a liability, then these e¤ects are positive.
Here, we can show that MRSe;i;t is a decreasing function of equity capital
(qpe;i;t) as follows. In other words, from Eq.(5), equity capital in the current
period (time t) increases (decreases) due to the increase (reduction) of -
nancial assets or the reduction (increase) of liabilities in the current period.
From Eq.(3), at this time the quasi-short-run prot for the current period
decreases (increases). Furthermore, if the nancial rm is risk-averse, then
the marginal utility of the equity capital in the current period (@ui;t

@qpe;i;t )
is a decreasing function of the equity capital and the marginal utility of the
quasi-short-run prot in the current period (@ui;t
.
@QSi;t ) is a decreasing
function of the quasi-short-run prot. Therefore, as the equity capital in
the current period grows larger (smaller), the denominator of MRSe;i;t grows
larger (smaller) and the numerator grows smaller (larger), and as a result
MRSe;i;t grows smaller (larger). Thus, MRS

e;i;t is a decreasing function of
equity capital, so that if the j-th nancial good is an output and a nan-
cial asset other than cash, then when the equity capital grows larger, the
equity capital e¤ects ( MRSe;i;t 
 
1 + rFi;t
  
bC  hRi;j;t   rFi;t

) grow larger,
and the EGLI of the j-th nancial good increases (the degree of competition
decreases). On the other hand, if the j-th nancial good is an output and
a liability, then the equity capital e¤ects grow smaller and the EGLI of the
j-th nancial good decreases (the degree of competition increases).
Proposition 2 Under the assumption that the risk (variance) of quasi-short-
run prot increases due to an increase in nancial assets other than cash and
liabilities, if the nancial rm is risk-averse, then the EGLI increases (the
degree of competition decreases), whereas if it is assumed that the risk (vari-
ance) decreases, then the EGLI decreases (the degree of competition increases)
if the nancial rm is risk-averse.
Proof. As stated above, under the assumption that the risk (variance) of
quasi-short-run prot increases due to increases in nancial assets, if the -
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nancial rm is risk-averse, then the sign of $i;j;t is negative, whereas if we
assume that the risk (variance) decreases, then the sign is positive if the -
nancial rm is risk-averse. On the other hand, under the assumption that
the risk (variance) of quasi-short-run prot increases due to increases in lia-
bilities, if the nancial rm is risk-averse, then the sign of $i;j;t is positive,
whereas if we assume that the risk (variance) decreases, then the sign is neg-
ative if the nancial rm is risk-averse. Furthermore, under the assumption
that the j-th nancial good is an output and a nancial asset other than cash,
bC hRi;j;t  rFi;t > 0, and, in the same way, if the j-th nancial good is a liabil-
ity, then bC  hRi;j;t   rFi;t < 0. Therefore, under the assumption that the risk
(variance) of quasi-short-run prot increases due to an increase in nancial
assets other than cash and liabilities, if the nancial rm is risk-averse, then
the sign of the risk-adjustment e¤ects ( $i;j;t 
 
1 + rFi;t
  
bC  hRi;j;t   rFi;t

)
is positive and the EGLI increases (the degree of competition decreases). On
the other hand, if we assume that the risk (variance) decreases, then the sign
of the risk-adjustment e¤ects is negative if the nancial rm is risk-averse
and the EGLI decreases (the degree of competition increases).
In this way, the EGLI comprises market structure and conduct e¤ects,
equity capital e¤ects, and risk-adjustment e¤ects, but the market structure
and conduct e¤ects are the same as the GLI dened in the CURM. For the
subsequent empirical analysis, the denition of the GLI is given below.
Denition 6 The generalized Lerner index of the j-th nancial good of the
i-th rm in period t, denoted by GLIi;j;t, is dened as
GLIi;j;t =  
bC  i;j;t
bC  hRi;j;t   rFi;t
; j = 1;   ; NA +NL. (19)
Consequently, the following remark is established.
Remark 4 Using the GLI, the EGLI can be expressed as
EGLIi;j;t = GLIi;j;t 
 
MRSe;i;t +$

i;j;t
   1 + rFi;t 
bC  hRi;j;t   rFi;t
; j = 1; ; NA+NL. (20)
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The EGLI thus represents an extension of the GLI to include the consid-
eration of equity capital e¤ects and risk-adjustment e¤ects in the discrepancy
between the SURP and marginal variable costs. If these e¤ects cancel or are
both zero, then the EGLI is fully equivalent to the GLI.
From Remark 4, the following two propositions are established.
Proposition 3 Under the assumption that the j-th nancial good is a -
nancial asset other than cash, the risk (variance) of quasi-short-run prot
increases due to an increase in nancial assets and at the same time the
nancial rm is risk-averse (as a result of both of these factors, $i;j;t <
0), and if the risk-adjustment e¤ects ( $i;j;t 
 
1 + rFi;t
  
bC  hRi;j;t   rFi;t

)
are larger than the absolute value of the equity capital e¤ects ( MRSe;i;t  
1 + rFi;t
  
bC  hRi;j;t   rFi;t

) (i.e., MRSe;i;t + $

i;j;t < 0), then the EGLI is
higher than the GLI. On the other hand, even under the assumption that the
risk (variance) of quasi-short-run prot decreases due to the increase in -
nancial assets other than cash and either the nancial rm is risk-averse (as
a result of both of these factors, $i;j;t > 0) or the risk (variance) increases
and the nancial rm is risk-averse (as a result of both of these factors,
$i;j;t < 0), if the risk-adjustment e¤ects are smaller than the absolute value
of the equity capital e¤ects (i.e., MRSe;i;t+$

i;j;t > 0), then the EGLI is lower
than the GLI.
Proposition 4 Under the assumption that the j-th nancial good is a liabil-
ity, the risk (variance) of quasi-short-run prot increases due to an increase
in liabilities and, at the same time, the nancial rm is risk-averse (case in
which $i;j;t > 0 as a result of both of these factors) or even if the risk (vari-
ance) decreases and the nancial rm is risk-averse (case in which $i;j;t < 0
as a result of both of these factors), if the absolute value of the risk-adjustment
e¤ects ( $i;j;t
 
1 + rFi;t
  
bC  hRi;j;t   rFi;t

) is smaller than the equity capital
e¤ects ( MRSe;i;t 
 
1 + rFi;t
  
bC  hRi;j;t   rFi;t

) (i.e., MRSe;i;t +$

i;j;t > 0),
then the EGLI is higher than the GLI. On the other hand, if the risk (vari-
ance) of quasi-short-run prot decreases due to an increase in liabilities and,
at the same time, the nancial rm is risk-averse, and the absolute value
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of the risk-adjustment e¤ects is larger than the equity capital e¤ects (i.e.,
MRSe;i;t +$

i;j;t < 0), then the EGLI is lower than the GLI.
Based on Remark 4 and Propositions 3 and 4, we understand that, as
long as MRSe;i;t + $

i;j;t = 0 is not true, when estimating the degree of
competition while considering only market structure and conduct e¤ects from
the perspective of traditional industrial organization theory (GLI), we will
arrive at an overestimation or an underestimation of the more realistic degree
of competition (EGLI) that takes into account the equity capital e¤ects and
the risk-adjustment e¤ects. The problem is the extent of the di¤erence that
emerges, or, in other words, the magnitude of the absolute values of the
equity capital e¤ects and the risk-adjustment e¤ects, but this is an extremely
empirical problem, and must be claried by estimating the GLI and EGLI.
3 Empirical Application
In order to apply the GURM described in Section 2 to Japanese city banks
and estimate the GURM, we must specify the model and create the data,
and, at the same time, we must consider the estimation method and the
test method for that specied model (the empirical generalized user-revenue
model, EGURM). These points are discussed in this section.
The EGURM is created according to the following procedure. First, the
endogenous state variable is specied, and its data are created. Second, the
exogenous state variable excluding the uncertain or unpredictable compo-
nents of the SEHRR and SEHCR is specied, and its data are created. Third,
the components of the SEHRR and SEHCR are specied and estimated, and
their data are created. Fourth, the variable cost function is specied and
estimated, and the data for the marginal variable costs are created. Fifth,
the utility function and the stochastic Euler equations are specied. Unfor-
tunately, due to space restrictions, only the most important points, namely,
the rst and fth points, are discussed in this section. The other points are
discussed in the Appendix.
The 15 city banks considered in the analysis are as follows: Shinsei Bank,
21
Aozora Bank, Mizuho Bank, Sakura Bank, Mizuho Corporate Bank, Bank of
Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ, Asahi Bank, UFJ Bank, Sumitomo Mitsui Banking
Corporation, Resona Bank, Tokai Bank, Hokkaido Takushoku Bank, Taiyo
Kobe Bank, Bank of Tokyo, and Saitama Bank. (The three long-term credit
banks, Industrial Bank of Japan, Long-Term Credit Bank of Japan, and
Nippon Credit Bank, are not included.) The period covered by the analysis
is from scal year 1975 to scal year 2007. However, as stated below, the
EGURM includes lag variables for the previous period and the next period,
so the data period in the estimate is from scal year 1974 to scal year 2008.
3.1 Empirical Model Specication
3.1.1 Endogenous State Variables
According to Homma (2009, p.16), the endogenous state variables comprise
nancial goods and real resource xed inputs (physical capital or human
capital). However, as stated at the beginning of Section 2, the focus of
the analysis is narrowed to nancial goods, and it is assumed that the real
resource xed inputs comprise physical capital only. These inputs are treated
as variable inputs, which have been optimized within a single period, in
the same manner as labor and current goods. In other words, only the
endogenous state variables are assumed to be nancial goods.
Financial goods are classied into nancial assets and liabilities. Cash
is di¤erent from other nancial assets, and its SEHRR comprises only un-
certain or unpredictable components ( i;j;t+1).
20 Therefore, nancial assets
are divided into cash and nancial assets other than cash. Ideally, nan-
cial assets other than cash should be classied while considering the basic
functions of banks (the settlement of accounts function, credit creation func-
tion, nancial intermediation function, and information production function).
However, due to data restrictions and gaps in the data creation theory, such
classications cannot be made easily. Here, the classication is made with
reference to O¯mori and Nakajima (2000, pp.242-244), which broadly catego-
rized the inherent operations of the banking industry into settlement services
20See Homma (2009, pp.7-8).
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and nancial intermediation services. First, loans are divided into short-
term loans (loans for a period of one year or less, or with no loan period
stipulated) and long-term loans (loans for a period in excess of one year).
Furthermore, nancial assets other than these loans and cash are divided
into three categories: securities, due from banks and call loans, and other
nancial assets (nancial assets other than the rst two types) (= money
held in trust + foreign exchange-debit + other assets). According to O¯mori
and Nakajima (2000, pp.242-244), long-term loans provide a nancial inter-
mediation service, whereas short-term loans provide primarily a settlement
service. Furthermore, they stated that other nancial assets, such as money
held in trust and foreign exchange-debit, provide a nancial intermediation
service, whereas due from banks and call loans provide primarily a settle-
ment service. In particular, the following explanation is given regarding the
fact that short-term loans provide a settlement service. They reported, for
example, that in the case in which the balance is insu¢ cient in the account
of a party with an overdraft contract, the overdraft is used, and in the same
way, short-term loans are used when an economic unit such as a corporation,
which holds a deposit account, has insu¢ cient daily working funds (partic-
ularly, in the case that there are no problems with the business condition
of the economic unit). Furthermore, with regard to individuals, in the case
that their ordinary deposit balance is insu¢ cient due to a combined bank
account, for example, short-term loans with nancial assets, such as time
deposits, as the collateral are provided.
Although the above discussion is related to the classication of nancial
assets other than cash, here, liabilities are also classied with reference to
O¯mori and Nakajima (2000, pp.242-244). First, deposits are divided into
demand deposits (= current deposits + ordinary deposits + other deposits)
and time deposits.21 Furthermore, the liabilities other than these deposits
are divided into the two categories of call money and borrowed money, and
21In O¯mori and Nakajima (2000, pp. 242-244), time deposits with a period of less
than six months for which the depositor is not an individual are considered to be the
management of funds used for the settlement of accounts within a comparatively short
term and are distinguished from other time deposits. Unfortunately, this type of distinction
cannot be made in the present paper due to restrictions on the available data.
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certicates of deposit and other liabilities. According to O¯mori and Nakajima
(2000, pp.242-244), demand deposits provide a settlement service, whereas
time deposits (excluding time deposits with a period of less than six months
for which the depositor is not an individual) provide a nancial interme-
diation service.22 Furthermore, they stated that call money and borrowed
money provide a settlement service, whereas certicates of deposit and other
liabilities provide a nancial intermediation service. However, as stated at
the beginning of Section 2, certicates of deposit and other liabilities are
treated as the fourth (variable) input, in the same manner as labor, current
goods, and physical capital. The reason for this is stated at the beginning of
Section 2.
From the above discussion, it is assumed that the endogenous state vari-
able vector of qi;t+1 the i-th bank at the end of scal year t (= the beginning of
scal year t+1) comprises short-term loans qSL;i;t+1, long-term loans qLL;i;t+1,
securities qS;i;t+1, cash qC;i;t+1, due from banks and call loans qCL;i;t+1, other
nancial assets qA;i;t+1, demand deposits qDD;i;t+1, time deposits qTD;i;t+1, and
call money and borrowed money qCM;i;t+1.
Consequently, qi;t+1 is expressed as follows:
qi;t+1 = (qSL;i;t+1; qLL;i;t+1; qS;i;t+1; qC;i;t+1; qCL;i;t+1; qA;i;t+1;
qDD;i;t+1; qTD;i;t+1; qCM;i;t+1)
0 . (21)
The data for nancial goods that is used, as well as the creation of that
data and the sources of the data, are described in Table 3.1.
<<Insert Table 3.1 about here>>
3.1.2 Utility Function and Stochastic Euler Equations
It is necessary to specify the utility function that appeared in Eq.(2) and
Eq.(6) to Eq.(8), as described in Section 2, while taking into account the
22O¯mori and Nakajima (2000) stated that time deposits with a period of less than six
months for which the depositor is not an individual provide a settlement of accounts
service.
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problems related to estimation. In the case of a static model assuming tem-
poral optimization, it is possible to apply duality theory to estimate the
indirect utility function and the minimum expenditure function.23 However,
with the establishment of the dynamic-uncertainty model discussed in Sec-
tion 2, it is di¢ cult to derive the same types of functions. For this reason,
we estimate the parameter indirectly through a stochastic Euler equation,
clearly stating the risk-adjustment term in Eq.(8). As shown in the macro-
econometric model and the calibration approach, estimation of the stochas-
tic Euler equation is not di¢ cult if a quadratic form or logarithm form is
assumed for the utility function, or a variety of linearization processing is
applied. However, in most cases, a signicant degree of theoretical exibility
is lost. Here, we consider parameterizing the utility function without taking
these types of approaches.
Unlike with specication of a variable cost function, assuming that a di-
rect estimate will be made, the specication of a utility function that does
not have a direct estimation equation cannot go beyond the necessary mini-
mum parameterization. For this reason, we specify this utility function as a
Box-Cox form:
u

QSi;t ; qe;i;t

=

QSi;t + 

  1

+ e  (qe;i;t + e)
   1

, (22)
where  and e (> 0) are parameters established taking into account the
possibility that the quasi-short-run prot and the equity capital become neg-
ative. Here, e indicates the degree of relative inuence of equity capital
based on the impact of the quasi-short-run prot. If e is larger (smaller)
than 1, then the impact is larger (smaller) on utility than quasi-short-run
prot. Taking into account the possibility that e varies depending on the
period, we specify e as follows:
e =
X
s
e;s DY Bs , (23)
23See Hughes, Lang, Mester, and Moon (1995).
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where DY Bs is the period dummy variable in the case that the period covered
by the analysis is split into several sub-periods (the dummy variable equals
1 in period s and 0 in other periods). Furthermore,  is the risk attitude
parameter, and taking into account the possibility that  varies depending
on the period, just as we did for e, we specify  as follows:
 =
X
s
s DY Bs . (24)
In this case, 1   s indicates the degree of relative risk-aversion, which is
expressed as follows:
1  s =  QSi;t 
@2u
@QS2i;t
,
@u
@QSi;t
=  qe;i;t  @
2u
@q 2e;i;t

@u
@qe;i;t
. (25)
Here, 0  s < 1 (= 1, > 1), 1   s > 0 (= 0, < 0) indicates risk-averse
(risk-neutral or risk-loving).
For the subjective rate of time preference (SRTP) rDi;t, which appears
directly in Eq.(2) and indirectly in Eq.(8), rather than using the existing in-
terest rate data a priori, we consider estimating the SRTP indirectly through
the stochastic Euler equation in Eq.(8), just as we did with the utility func-
tion. The reason for this is that, as we can see from Eqs.(10) through (12),
the SRTP plays an important role in classifying nancial goods as outputs
or inputs, so that estimating the SRTP that is most suitable for the GURM
is more desirable than trying to forcibly relate the existing interest rate data
to our purposes. Here, we specify the SRTP as follows, assuming that it is
identical for all of the city banks:
rDt = 
S  rCRt , (26)
where S is the parameter to be estimated, and rCRt is the uncollateralized
overnight call rate.
The stochastic Euler equation in Eq.(8) of Theorem 1 is expressed with
an expectation operator or integral sign, so that it is extremely di¢ cult to
estimate this equation as is. For this reason, we consider deriving an estima-
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tion equation in a form that does not depend on an expectation operator or
integral sign. First, transform Eq.(8) in Theorem 1 as follows:
1 =
1 + bC 
 
hRi;j;t + 

i;j;t

1 + (bj  pG;t) 1 MC V i;j;t  MRSe;i;t
 i;t 
E
h
@ui;t+1
.
@QSi;t+1
 zi;ti
@ui;t
.
@QSi;t
+ i;t 
cov

 i;j;t+1; @u

i;t+1
.
@QSi;t+1
 zi;t
@ui;t
.
@QSi;t

 1 + (bj  pG;t) 1 MC V i;j;t  MRSe;i;t
(j = 1;   ; NA +NL) . (27)
Here, E
h
@ui;t+1
.
@QSi;t+1
 zi;ti = RZ @ui;t+1.@QSi;t+1 Q (zi;t;dzi;t+1) and
cov

 i;j;t+1; @u

i;t+1
.
@QSi;t+1
 zi;t = Z
Z
 
 i;j;t+1   E

 i;j;t+1
 zi;t


@ui;t+1
.
@QSi;t+1   E
h
@ui;t+1
.
@QSi;t+1
 zi;tiQ (zi;t;dzi;t+1) ,
so Eq.(27) is expressed as follows:
Z
Z
24 1 + bC   hRi;j;t + i;j;t
1 + (bj  pG;t) 1 MC V i;j;t  MRSe;i;t
 i;t 
@ui;t+1
.
@QSi;t+1
@ui;t
.
@QSi;t
+ i;t

 
 i;j;t+1   E

 i;j;t+1
 zi;t  @ui;t+1.@QSi;t+1   E h@ui;t+1.@QSi;t+1  zi;ti
@ui;t
.
@QSi;t

 1 + (bj  pG;t) 1 MC V i;j;t  MRSe;i;t
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Q (zi;t;dzi;t+1) = 0 (j = 1;   ; NA +NL) . (28)
Consequently, we consider making the expression inside the brackets the esti-
mation equation. In this case, the problem is the treatment of E

 i;j;t+1
 zi;t
and E
h
@ui;t+1
.
@QSi;t+1
 zi;ti. Based on Theorem 1 in Section 2, we assume
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that E

 i;j;t+1
 zi;t is zero. Regarding E h@ui;t+1.@QSi;t+1  zi;ti, we assume
E
h
@ui;t+1
.
@QSi;t+1
 zi;ti =  X
i
aMUi DBi + bMU 0  zi;t
!


@ui;t
.
@QSi;t

,
(29a)
@ui;t+1
.
@QSi;t+1  
 X
i
aMUi DBi + bMU 0  zi;t
!


@ui;t
.
@QSi;t

= "MUi;t+1,
(29b)
where "MUi;t+1 is an ordinary error term, D
B
i is a dummy variable for an in-
dividual bank (bank-xed e¤ect), zi;t is the exogenous state variable vector,
and bMU is the corresponding coe¢ cient vector.24
Taking into account the above considerations, the estimation equation
inside the brackets is expressed as follows:
1 + bC 
 
hRj;i;t + j;i;t

1 + (bj  pG;t) 1 MC Vj;i;t  MRSe;i;t
 i;t 
@ui;t+1
.
@QSi;t+1
@ui;t
.
@QSi;t
+ i;t

j;i;t+1 
"
@ui;t+1
.
@QSi;t+1  
 X
i
aMUi DBi + bMU 0  zi;t
!


@ui;t
.
@QSi;t
#

@ui;t
.
@QSi;t

 1 + (bj  pG;t) 1 MC Vj;i;t  MRSe;i;t
  1 = "EUj;i;t+1 (j = SL;LL; S; C; CL;A;DD; TD;CM) , (30a)
where "EUj;i;t+1 is the error term. In order to simplify the notation, the  sym-
bols have been omitted. Moreover, in accordance with the notation in the
present section, the order of subscripts i and j has been reversed. Further-
24For more details about the specic exogenous state variables see Section 4.1.
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more, from Appendix 6.2, hRj;i;t is
hRj;i;t =
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
rRj;i

Qj;t; z
RQ
L;i;t

+ rQj;i

zRQL;i;t

+ hSj;i;t   hDj;i
 
zDL;i;t

(j = SL;LL)
rj;i;t + h
S
j;i;t + h
C
j;i;t   hDj;i;t (j = S;A)
0 (j = C)
rj;i;t (j = CL;CM)
rRj;i

Qj;t; z
RQ
D;i;t

+ rQj;t

zRQD;i;t

+ hIj;i;t + r
D
i;t  j;i;t   hSj;i;t (j = DD;TD)
.
(30b)
Moreover, from Appendix 6.2, j;i;t is
j;i;t =
@hRj;i;t
@ ln qj;i;t
=
qj;i;t
Qj;t
 @h
R
j;i;t
@ lnQj;t


1 +
XNF
k 6=i
@qj;k;t
@qj;i;t

=
(
qj;i;t
Qj;t

X
s
Rj;s DY As



1 +
X
s
j;s DY Bs

(j = SL;LL;DD; TD)
0 (j = S;A;C;CL;CM)
.(30c)
Here,
X
s
j;s  DY Bs is the parameterization of the conjectural derivative
(
XNF
k 6=i
@qj;k;t
@qj;i;t
). Furthermore, we impose the restriction that  1  j;s  2:95,
so that j;s does not take on a value smaller than  1, which means perfect
competition, or a dramatically large value (in this case, a value of 2.95 or
greater)25. Basically, we assume that
j;s =  1 + 3:95  
 
j;s

; (30d)
where  () is the standard normal distribution function, and j;s is the pa-
rameter to be estimated. Essentially, the conjectural derivative di¤ers for
each individual bank and for each scal year. However, with a simple para-
meterization, making this type of estimate is impossible. For this reason, we
assume that the conjectural derivative is identical for all of the banks and
that it is identical in each of the several sub-periods split from the period cov-
ered by the analysis. In the case that these types of assumptions are made,
the number of parameters to be estimated j;s is limited to the number of
25In the nonlinear estimation, among the values that successfully converged, 2.95 is the
value for which the estimation results for the overall model were the best.
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sub-periods. Moreover, from Eq.(22), we have
@ui;t
@QSi;t
=

QSi;t + 
 1
; (30e)
@ui;t+1
@QSi;t+1
=

QSi;t+1 + 
 1
(30f)
and
MRSe;i;t =
@ui;t /@qe;i;t
@ui;t
.
@QSi;t
= e 
 
qe;i;t + e
QSi;t + 
! 1
. (30g)
In addition, from Eq.(6.3.1a) in Appendix 6.3, we have
MC Vj;i;t =
@CVi;t
@qj;i;t
=
C^Vi;t
qj;i;t
 @ ln
 
CVi;t

pV;i;t

@ ln qj;i;t
=
C^Vi;t
qj;i;t
 Qj;i;t. (30h)
Here, the estimates C^Vi;t of the variable cost function and the elasticity of the
variable cost function with respect to the nancial good Qj;i;t are as follows:
C^Vi;t = exp
24X
i
ai
 
DMAi ; 

t
 DBi + X
j2fSL;LLg
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
zRQGL;i;t

 ln qj;i;t
+
X
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
zRQGD;t

 ln qj;i;t +
X
j2fS;C;CL;A;CMg
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+
X
j2fL;K;Bg
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
zRQG;i;t

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+
1
2

XX
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+
1
2

X X
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 
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+
XX
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 
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j2fSL;LL;S;C;CL;A;DD;TD;CMg;h2fL;K;Bg
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X
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j2fSL;LL;S;C;CL;A;DD;TD;CMg
+
X
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bjT  ln
 
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
, (30i)
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Qj;i;t = aj

zRQGL;i;t

+
X
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X
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Qj;i;t = aj +
X
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
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
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X
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+
X
h2fL;K;Bg
bjh  ln
 
ph;i;t

pV;i;t + h

+bjT   t (j = DD;TD) . (30l)
Furthermore, from Eq.(26), the subjective discount factor i;t is obtained as
follows:
i;t = t =
1
1 + rDt
=
1
1 + S  rCRt
. (30m)
Finally, from Appendix 6.2, the uncertainty factor j;i;t+1 is obtained as fol-
lows:
j;i;t+1 =
8>>>><>>>>:
Rj;i;t+1 + 
Q
j;i;t+1 + 
S
j;i;t+1   Dj;i;t+1 (j = SL;LL)
Sj;i;t+1 + 
C
j;i;t+1   Dj;i;t+1 (j = S;A)
0 (j = C;CL;CM)
Rj;i;t+1 + 
Q
j;i;t+1 + 
I
j;i;t+1   Sj;i;t+1 (j = DD;TD)
. (30n)
3.2 Estimation and Test Procedure
The estimate is made in three stages. In the rst stage, as in Eq.(6.2.1.1) in
the Appendix, the actual holding-revenue rate or holding-cost rate (Hj;i;t+1)
at the end of scal year t (= the beginning of scal year t + 1) is broken
down into the certain or predictable components at the beginning of scal
year t (hRj;i;t) and the uncertain or unpredictable components at the end of
scal year t (j;i;t+1). Basically, H
k
j;i;t+1 (k = R;Q; j = SL;LL;DD; TD)
and HDj;i;t+1 (j = SL;LL) are respectively estimated using multivariate re-
gression analyses of Eqs.(6.2.3.1.6a) and (6.2.3.1.6b), Eqs.(6.2.3.1.7a) and
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(6.2.3.1.7b), and Eq.(6.2.3.2.3) in the Appendix,26 and broken down into the
certain or predictable components of the independent variable and the uncer-
tain or unpredictable components of the error term. The other components
of Hj;i;t+1 are broken down into hRj;i;t and j;i;t+1, as shown in Section 6.2.1 of
the Appendix.
In the second stage, we estimate the marginal variable cost (MC Vj;i;t) in
Eq.(30h). For this reason, we perform a nonlinear simultaneous estimation
of Eqs.(6.3.1a) and (6.3.2) in the Appendix using the generalized method of
moments (GMM).27 The GMM estimates take into account the conditional
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of the error term. In particular, re-
garding the autocorrelation of the error term, when including the moving
average of the error term in the estimate of the covariance matrix of the
orthogonality conditions, we use Bartretts spectral density kernel proposed
by Newey and West (1987) in order to guarantee that the estimate of the
covariance matrix is a positive denite matrix. Furthermore, it is assumed
that the degree of the moving average is three. When making a nonlinear
estimation, we use the Gauss-Newton method to approximate the Hessian
matrix required in the iterative computation of the parameter estimation.
In the third stage, we use the hRj;i;t term and the j;i;t+1 term estimated in
the rst stage and the MC Vj;i;t term estimated in the second stage to obtain
a nonlinear simultaneous estimation of Eqs.(29b) and (30a) using the GMM.
The estimate of the GMM is made taking into account the conditional het-
eroskedasticity and autocorrelation of the error term, just as in the second
stage. However, due to the small sample size and large number of instru-
mental variables, if a simultaneous estimation of Eq.(30a) is obtained for
all of the nancial goods (j = SL;LL; S; C; CL;A;DD; TD;CM), then an
estimate incorporating the conditional heteroskedasticity of the error term
is impossible. Therefore, we obtain a simultaneous estimate of Eqs.(29b)
and (30a) regarding short-term and long-term loans (j = SL;LL), demand
deposits (j = DD), and time deposits (j = TD).
26For the equation for short-term loans, i.e., Eq.(6.2.3.1.6a), and Eq.(6.2.3.2.3), since
the sample is the same, simultaneous estimation is used. For the other equations, the
sample di¤ers so single-equation estimation is used.
27For details regarding the GMM see Hansen (1982) and Hansen and Singleton (1982).
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Generally, with the GMM, the multiple of the minimum value of the
value function (which is the covariance of the orthogonality conditions) and
the sample size (amount of data) yield the test statistic of the overidentifying
restriction.28 The test statistic is expressed as TJ . If the model is correctly
specied and the instrumental variables are appropriate, then TJ asymptot-
ically follows a 2 distribution. Therefore, given appropriate instrumental
variables, this test is useful for investigating misspecication of the model.
Furthermore, TJ is also used when testing the parameter restrictions. In
other words, the test uses the same approach as the likelihood ratio test and
is based on the fact that the TJ obtained by subtracting the TJ of the unre-
stricted model from the TJ of the restricted model follows a 2 distribution
with the number of restrictions being the same as its number of degrees of
freedom. Based on this concept, we perform a test of the overidentifying
restriction in order to investigate misspecication of the model. If the null
hypothesis of overidentifying is rejected, then (under the assumption that the
instrumental variables are appropriate) there is a high likelihood that there
is an error in the specication of the model.
4 Estimation Results
In this section, while examining the estimation results of the stochastic Euler
equations, we prioritize the following issues based on the estimation results of
the EGURM. First, we verify the risk attitudes of bank managers. As stated
in Homma and Souma (2005), risk attitudes other than risk-neutral are the
most fundamental causes of the di¤erence between conventional UCPs and
SURPs (constituting GURPs) and the di¤erence between the conventional
Lerner index and the GLI (constituting the EGLI). Therefore, clarifying these
attitudes is the highest-priority issue. The questions examined when verifying
these attitudes are whether the risk attitudes of bank managers are averse,
rather than neutral, and whether the extent of their risk-aversion di¤ers
depending on the period, and, in particular, whether the extent of their
28Regarding this point see Davidson and MacKinnon (1993, pp.232-237, 614-621, 665).
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risk-aversion varies greatly between bubble periods and other periods. For
the specic analysis, we estimate the degree of relative risk-aversion in each
period and determine whether there is a signicant di¤erence from zero (null
hypothesis: bank managers are risk neutral).
Second, we compare the reference rate (risk-free rate) and the call rate.
The reference rate is the risk-free rate (rFi;t ) of Corollary 1 in Section 2, and
based on Denition 3, the reference rate is an important factor that impacts
the determination of the sign of the SURPs. If bank managers have risk-
neutral attitudes, then rFi;t = 1

i;t   1 and, as dened, in Hancock (1985,
1987, 1991) the reference rate is an important factor having that impacts the
determination of the sign of the UCPs. O¯mori and Nakajima (2000) used the
call rate as a proxy variable for the reference rate, and clarifying the validity
of this technique had a lower priority. The question is whether the reference
rate and the call rate di¤er greatly and thus whether it is appropriate to
use the latter as the former. For the specic analysis, we compare the two
rates for the entire period and for each sub-period to reveal their di¤erences.
Furthermore, by comparing the magnitudes of the two rates, we reveal the
direction of the bias in the UCPs and SURPs in the case that the call rate
is used as the reference rate.
Third, we estimate the SURPs, CURPs, and GURPs (= marginal vari-
able costs) and compare them and quantitatively reveal the magnitude of
each constituent element of the GURPs. In particular, the important step
from the perspective of industrial organization theory is the comparison of
the conventional market structure and conduct e¤ects with the equity capital
e¤ects and risk-adjustment e¤ects, and, in the case that the equity capital
e¤ects and risk-adjustment e¤ects are larger than the market structure and
conduct e¤ects, there may be pressure to review conventional industrial orga-
nization policy, which considers primarily the market structure and conduct
e¤ects. These points are important from an analytical perspective. For the
specic analysis, by comparing the SURPs, CURPs, and GURPs (= mar-
ginal variable costs) for short-term loans, long-term loans, demand deposits,
and time deposits, we quantitatively reveal the size of the market structure
and conduct e¤ects, equity capital e¤ects, and risk-adjustment e¤ects for the
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entire period and for each sub-period.
Fourth, we reveal the important factors having an impact on the risk-
adjustment e¤ects as the most important components of the GURPs that
are not SURPs. As stated below, the risk-adjustment e¤ects are the largest
components of the GURPs that are not SURPs, and they have a large im-
pact on the GURPs and the EGLIs. Therefore, revealing the factors that
have an impact on the GURPs and the EGLIs is important from a policy
perspective. In particular, the impacts of the interest rate, injection of pub-
lic funds, the reserve requirement ratio, and the deposit insurance rate are
extremely important when ascertaining the impact of conventional mone-
tary policy. The impact of cost e¢ ciency cannot be ignored either. This is
because it is thought that screening and monitoring of borrower rms and
nely tuned responses to depositors have an impact on the risk-adjustment
e¤ects through cost e¢ ciency. The above points are important analytical
perspectives. For the specic analysis, we use the GMM to simultaneously
estimate a regression equation with the risk-adjustment e¤ects of short-term
loans, long-term loans, demand deposits, and time deposits as the depen-
dent variables and the interest rate, a proxy variable for public funds, the
reserve requirement ratio, the deposit insurance rate, and cost e¢ ciency, for
example, as the independent variables.
Fifth, we estimate the EGLI to quantitatively reveal the market struc-
ture and conduct e¤ects, equity capital e¤ects, and risk-adjustment e¤ects
that it comprises. In the same manner as with the estimate of the SURPs,
CURPs, and GURPs (= marginal variable costs), the important step from
the perspective of industrial organization theory is the comparison of the
conventional market structure and conduct e¤ects with the equity capital
e¤ects and risk-adjustment e¤ects. In the case that the equity capital ef-
fects and risk-adjustment e¤ects are larger than the market structure and
conduct e¤ects, there may be pressure to review conventional competition
policy, which considers primarily the market structure and conduct e¤ects.
Furthermore, this situation hints at the need for risk-adjustment policies that
have not been considered before, and there may be pressure to switch from a
competition policy to a risk-adjustment policy. These points are important
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analytical perspectives. For the specic analysis, based on the signs of the
GURPs, we reveal the magnitudes of the EGLI and the market structure
and conduct e¤ects, equity capital e¤ects, and risk-adjustment e¤ects that it
comprises for short-term loans, long-term loans, and demand deposits, which
are judged to be outputs, over the entire period and for each sub-period.
As stated at the beginning of the preceding section, the period covered
by the analysis is from scal year 1975 to scal year 2007, but this period
is divided into ve sub-periods for the purposes of the analysis: Period I
(before the bubble period: scal year 1975 to scal year 1986), Period II
(bubble period: scal year 1987 to scal year 1989), Period III (from after
the bubble period to before the nancial crisis and nancial big bang period:
scal year 1990 to scal year 1995), Period IV (nancial crisis and nancial
big bang period: scal year 1996 to scal year 2001), and Period V (after the
nancial crisis and nancial big bang period: scal year 2002 to scal year
2007). Note that, with the exception of the stochastic Euler equations, the
estimation results of the EGURM are given in Appendix 7.
4.1 Stochastic Euler Equations
In order to estimate Eqs.(29b) and (30a) simultaneously using the GMM, we
must specify the elements of the exogenous state variable vector (zi;t) and
the instrumental variables. We assume that the exogenous state variable
vector (zi;t) comprises the long-term prime rate (z
RQ
L;1;i;t), the capital ratio of
borrower rms (zRQL;2;i;t), the loan loss provision rate (z
RQ
L;4;i;t), the logarithm
of loans per case (ln zRQL;5;i;t), the proportion of loans for small and medium
rms (zRQL;6;i;t), the Herndahl index of loan proportions classied by indus-
try (zRQL;7;i;t), the Herndahl index of loan proportions classied by mortgage
(zRQL;8;i;t), the proportion of loans for real estate business (z
RQ
L;9;i;t), the propor-
tion of loans secured by real estate (zRQL;10;i;t), the proportion of loans without
collateral and without warranty (zRQL;11;i;t), the logarithm of depositors in-
come (ln zRQD;1;t), the yield on government bonds (z
RQ
D;2;t), the interest rate of
postal savings certicates (zRQD;3;t), the benchmark index of Japanese stock
investment trust (TOPIX, zRQD;4;t), the interest rate of securities (rS;i;t), the
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interest rate of due from banks and call loans (rCL;i;t), the interest rate of
other nancial assets (rA;i;t), the interest rate of call money and borrowed
money (rCM;i;t), the interest rate of certicates of deposit and other liabil-
ities (pB;i;t), the insurance rate of time deposits (hITD;t 1), and the reserve
requirement ratio for time deposits (TD;t 1).
Consequently, zi;t and bMU are expressed as follows:
zi;t =

zRQL;1;i;t; z
RQ
L;2;i;t; z
RQ
L;4;i;t; ln z
RQ
L;5;i;t; z
RQ
L;6;i;t; z
RQ
L;7;i;t; z
RQ
L;8;i;t; z
RQ
L;9;i;t; z
RQ
L;10;i;t;
zRQL;11;i;t; ln z
RQ
D;1;t; z
RQ
D;2;t; z
RQ
D;3;t; z
RQ
D;4;t; rS;i;t; rCL;i;t; rA;i;t; rCM;i;t;
pB;i;t; h
I
TD;t 1; TD;t 1
0
, (31a)
bMU =
 
bMUL;1 ; b
MU
L;2 ; b
MU
L;4 ; b
MU
L;5 ; b
MU
L;6 ; b
MU
L;7 ; b
MU
L;8 ; b
MU
L;9 ; b
MU
L;10; b
MU
L;11; b
MU
D;1 ; b
MU
D;2 ;
bMUD;3 ; b
MU
D;4 ; b
MU
S ; b
MU
CL ; b
MU
A ; b
MU
CM ; b
MU
CD ; b
MU
I ; b
MU

0
. (31b)
To improve the precision of estimation, we use di¤erent instrumental
variables for each equation. More specically, the instrumental variables
that we use are as follows:
 Instruments for all the equations: DBi ,DY Bs (s = 7586; 8789; 9095; 9601; 0207),
rCL;i;t, hITD;t, TD;t, rCM;i;t, pB;i;t, z
RQ
L;1;i;t, z
RQ
L;2;i;t, ln z
RQ
L;5;i;t 1, z
RQ
L;j;i;t 1
(j = 4; 6; 7; 8; 9; 10; 11), ln zRQD;1;t, z
RQ
D;j;t (j = 2; 3; 4), rS;i;t, rA;i;t, r
CR
t ,
and rCRt 1, and
 Instruments for the (respective) stochastic Euler equations: MC Vj;i;t
(j = SL;LL;DD; TD), qj;i;t 1 /Qj;t 1 (j = SL;LL;DD; TD), DRY Aj;t
(j = SL;LL;DD; TD), hRj;i;t (j = SL;LL), j;i;t (j = SL;LL),
rRj;i

Qj;t; z
RQ
D;t

(j = DD;TD), Rj;i;t (j = DD;TD), r
Q
j;i

zRQD;t

(j =
DD;TD), Qj;i;t (j = DD;TD), h
S
j;i;t (j = DD;TD), 
S
j;i;t (j = DD;TD),
hIDD;t, and DD;t,
where qj;i;t 1 /Qj;t 1 is the market share of the j-th nancial good in the
period t   1, DRY Aj;t 1 =
X
s
Rj;s  DY As ,29 rRj;i

Qj;t; z
RQ
D;t

is the certain or
29For details regarding this equation, see Eqs.(6.2.3.1.4a) and (6.2.3.1.5a) in Section
6.2.3.1 of the Appendix.
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predictable component of the paid interest rate for demand or time deposits,30
Rj;i;t is the uncertain or unpredictable component of the paid interest rate for
demand or time deposits,31 rQj;i

zRQD;t

is the certain or predictable component
of the unpaid interest rate for demand or time deposits,32 Qj;i;t is the uncertain
or unpredictable component of the unpaid interest rate for demand or time
deposits,33 hSj;i;t is the certain or predictable component of the service charge
rate for demand or time deposits,34 Sj;i;t is the uncertain or unpredictable
component of the service charge rate for demand or time deposits,35 hIDD;t is
the insurance rate of demand deposits, and DD;t is the reserve requirement
ratio for demand deposits.
The estimation results of Eqs.(29b) and (30a) are shown in Table 4.1.
From this table, the following ve points can be inferred. First, the test
statistic of the overidentifying restriction is not signicant at the 99% level.
Therefore, the null hypothesis of overidentifying is not rejected. This means
that there is a very low likelihood that there is an error in the specication
of Eqs.(29b) and (30a). Second, parameter s, which shows the risk attitude
parameter in period s, is positive, signicant at the 1% level, and less than
1 in all of the periods, so we know that there is a high likelihood that the
managers of the city banks were risk-averse for the entire period. However,
more exactly, 1 s, which shows the degree of relative risk-aversion in period
s, needs to be examined. Details will be presented in the following section.
Furthermore, parameter e;s, which shows the degree of relative inuence of
equity capital on utility based on the impact of the quasi-short-run prot, is
positive and signicant at the 1% level in all periods except Period II (bubble
30For details regarding this function, see Eq.(6.2.3.1.5a) in Section 6.2.3.1 of the Appen-
dix.
31For details regarding this instrumental variable, see Eq.(6.2.1.3) in Section 6.2.1 of the
Appendix.
32For details regarding this function, see Eq.(6.2.3.1.5b) in Section 6.2.3.1 of the Ap-
pendix.
33For details regarding this instrumental variable, see Eq.(6.2.1.5) in Section 6.2.1 of the
Appendix.
34For details regarding this instrumental variable, see Eqs.(6.2.1.6) and (6.2.1.7) in Sec-
tion 6.2.1 of the Appendix.
35For details regarding this instrumental variable, see Eqs.(6.2.1.6) and (6.2.1.10) in
Section 6.2.1 of the Appendix.
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period: scal year 1987 to scal year 1989) and Period IV (nancial crisis and
nancial big bang period: scal year 1996 to scal year 2001). During Period
II, city banks had su¢ cient equity capital, and during Period IV, public
funds were injected. If we exclude these periods, during which there were
special circumstances, city bank managers placed importance on the role of
equity capital. Third, parameter S, which shows the ratio of the subjective
rate of time preference to the uncollateralized overnight call rate, is positive,
signicant at the 1% level, and much less than 1, so the subjective rate of
time preference is much smaller than the call rate. Therefore, if we use the
call rate as a proxy variable for the subjective rate of time preference instead
of estimating it, we will end up overestimating the subjective rate of time
preference. Fourth, parameters bMUL;7 , b
MU
L;8 , b
MU
L;9 , b
MU
D;3 , and b
MU
A are positive
and signicant at the 10% level,36 so the Herndahl index of loan proportions
classied by industry, the Herndahl index of loan proportions classied by
mortgage, the proportion of loans for real estate business, the interest rate of
postal savings certicates, and the interest rate of other nancial assets had
the e¤ect of increasing the conditional expected value of the intertemporal
marginal rate of substitution (IMRS) with respect to quasi-short-run prots.
On the other hand, parameters bMUL;6 , b
MU
D;1 , b
MU
CD , and b
MU
 are negative and
signicant at the 5% level,37 so the proportion of loans for small and medium
rms, the logarithm of depositors income, the interest rate of certicates
of deposit and other liabilities, and the reserve requirement ratio for time
deposits in period t  1 had the e¤ect of decreasing the conditional expected
value of the IMRS. Furthermore, parameter aMUi , which shows the dummy
coe¢ cient for individual banks, is positive and signicant at the 1% level for
all Japanese city banks, so that the conditional expected value of the IMRS
has the individual constant terms. Fifth, parameter j;s, which shows the
conjectural derivative of the j-th nancial good in period s, is not signicant,
except for the conjectural derivative of time deposits in the period 1985-1989,
36More specically, parameters bMUL;8 and b
MU
L;9 are signicant at the 1% level and para-
meters bMUL;7 , b
MU
D;3 , and b
MU
A are signicant at the 10% level.
37More specically, parameters bMUL;6 , b
MU
D;1 , and b
MU
 are signicant at the 5% level and
parameter bMUCD is signicant at the 1% level.
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so that the null hypothesis that Japanese city banks are Cournot rms in the
market for the short-term loans, long-term loans, demand deposits, and time
deposits is not rejected.
<<Insert Table 4.1 about here>>
4.2 Risk Attitude and Reference Rate (Risk-Free Rate)
As stated in the explanation of Eq.(25), 1   s shows the degree of relative
risk-aversion. A value of 1   s of greater than zero indicates a risk-averse
attitude. A value of 1  s of zero indicates a risk-neutral attitude. Finally,
a value of 1 s of less than zero indicates a risk-loving attitude. Table 4.2.1
shows the results for the estimates of the degree of relative risk-aversion for
each sub-period. From this table, the following three points can be inferred.
First, the estimate for degree of relative risk-aversion for the entire period
is positive and signicant, so that the managers of the city banks were risk-
averse for the entire period. Second, however, in Period II (bubble period:
scal year 1987 to scal year 1989), 1 s was small, so that, compared to the
other periods, managers were in a state closer to the risk-neutral attitude.
Third, the degree of relative risk-aversion was greatest in the recent Period
V (after the nancial crisis and nancial big bang period: scal year 2002
to scal year 2007), so that the tendency toward risk-averseness is strength-
ening. These results show the limits of the conventional UCM, which is
implicitly based on a risk-neutral attitude, and reveal the necessity of using
the GURM, which develops the UCM further so that risk attitudes other
than the risk-neutral attitude can be treated.
<<Insert Table 4.2.1 about here>>
As stated at the beginning of this section, the reference rate (risk-free
rate) is an important factor having an impact on the determination of the
sign of the SURPs, and if bank managers have a risk-neutral attitude then
the reference rate is one of the important factors having an impact on the
determination of the sign of the UCPs. Table 4.2.2 shows the results for the
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estimates of this rate for each sub-period, and, for the purposes of compar-
ison, the values of the call rate are also shown. Based on this table, the
following three points can be inferred. First, the reference rate is smaller
than the call rate in all periods except Period IV (nancial crisis and -
nancial big bang period: scal year 1996 to scal year 2001). Therefore,
if we use the call rate as a proxy variable for the reference rate instead of
estimating the reference rate, as was done by O¯mori and Nakajima (2000),
we end up underestimating the UCPs, SURPs, CURPs, and GURPs of the
nancial assets and overestimating the UCPs, SURPs, CURPs, and GURPs
of the liabilities. Second, Period IV (nancial crisis and nancial big bang
period: scal year 1996 to scal year 2001) includes a period of zero inter-
est rate policy (scal year 1999 to scal year 2001), so that the call rate is
even smaller than the reference rate. Third, the reference rate in the recent
Period V (after the nancial crisis and nancial big bang period: scal year
2002 to scal year 2007) is negative but not signicantly di¤erent from zero,
and can be regarded as approximately zero. These results show the necessity
of estimating the reference rate and also indicate that there is a high likeli-
hood that monetary policy in recent years (the zero interest rate policy and
quantitative easing policy) has dramatically lowered the reference rate.
<<Insert Table 4.2.2 about here>>
4.3 SURPs, CURPs, and GURPs
Table 4.3.1 shows the results for the estimates of the SURPs (Eq.(13)),
CURPs (Eq.(14)), and GURPs (Eq.(11)) of the short-term loans, long-term
loans, demand deposits, and time deposits over the entire period. Conse-
quently, the following ve points can be inferred. First, the signs of the
GURPs are all positive, except for the GURP for time deposits, so that
short-term and long-term loans and demand deposits are considered to be
outputs, whereas time deposits are considered to be a xed factor. In most
conventional studies, deposits are assumed to be input factors, but if de-
posits are divided into demand deposits and time deposits, then demand
deposits tend to provide a settlement service more strongly and are consid-
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ered to be an output. Second, the e¤ects that account for the largest share
(in terms of absolute value) with regard to the components of the GURPs
that are not SURPs are the risk-adjustment e¤ects, and compared to this
share, the share of the market structure and conduct e¤ects is smaller except
for time deposits. These results are important from the perspective of indus-
trial organization theory, and there may be pressure to review conventional
industrial organization policy, which considers primarily the market struc-
ture and conduct e¤ects. Third, as a consequence of the second result, the
di¤erences between the SURPs and CURPs are small for all of the nancial
goods, whereas the di¤erences between the CURPs and GURPs are large
for the long-term loans and the time deposits. Regarding the short-term
loans and the demand deposits, the risk-adjustment e¤ects and the equity
capital e¤ects are cancelled out, so the di¤erences are not as large as for
the long-term loans and time deposits. This indicates the necessity of using
the GURM rather than the CURM when placing more importance on long-
term nancial goods than short-term nancial goods. Fourth, the sign of
the risk-adjustment e¤ects of short-term and long-term loans is signicantly
negative, so increases in these nancial goods increase the risk (variance) of
quasi-short-run prot. In contrast, the sign of the risk-adjustment e¤ects
of demand and time deposits is signicantly positive, so increases in these
nancial goods decrease the risk (variance) of quasi-short-run prot. This
indicates that, for city bank management, loans are risky assets whereas de-
posits are safe liabilities. Furthermore, the results indicate that a decline
in the ratio of loans to deposits may lower protability while reducing risk.
Fifth, the equity capital e¤ects are signicant at the 1% level, so that city
bank managers place importance on the role of equity capital. These results
indicate that the burden of the nancial-distress cost may be large and that
equity capital, which plays a role in alleviating that burden, has an impact
on the utility of city bank managers.
<<Insert Table 4.3.1 about here>>
Tables 4.3.2 through 4.3.5 show the estimation results by period of the
SURPs, CURPs, and GURPs for short-term loans, long-term loans, demand
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deposits, and time deposits, respectively. Based on these tables, the follow-
ing ve points can be inferred. First, looking at the sign of the GURPs,
the sign is identical in all of the periods except in the case of demand de-
posits. Namely, the GURPs are always positive for short-term and long-term
loans and are always negative for time deposits. Short-term and long-term
loans are consistently considered to be outputs, whereas time deposits are
consistently considered to be an input (xed factor). For demand deposits
the sign of the GURP is positive in all periods except Period I (before the
bubble period: scal year 1975 to scal year 1986) and Period V (after the
nancial crisis and nancial big bang period: scal year 2002 to scal year
2007), and the demand deposits are therefore considered to be an output
in these periods. However, in Periods I and V, the sign is negative and de-
mand deposits are considered to be a xed factor. A particularly important
point is that in the recent Period V, the sign changed to negative after being
positive in Period IV (nancial crisis and nancial big bang period: scal
year 1996 to scal year 2001). As shown in Table 4.2.2, the main reason for
this is that the reference rate became negative (or almost zero) in Period
V. This indicates the high likelihood that the low-interest policy and quan-
titative easing policy in recent years has changed demand deposits from an
output to a xed factor. Second, except for short-term loans in Period I and
time deposits in Periods IV and V, the e¤ects that account for the largest
share of the GURPs (in terms of absolute value) with regard to the com-
ponents of the GURPs that are not SURPs were the risk-adjustment e¤ects
for all of the nancial goods and periods, and compared to this share, the
share of market structure and conduct e¤ects is smaller. This reinforces the
results obtained in Table 4.3.1, and it is necessary to rethink conventional in-
dustrial organization policy, which considers primarily market structure and
conduct e¤ects. However, for time deposits in Periods IV and V (in terms
of absolute value), the market structure and conduct e¤ects were greater
than the risk-adjustment e¤ects, which hints at the possibility that, in re-
cent years, conventional industrial organization policy has gained importance
in the time deposits market. Third, as a consequence of the second result,
except for time deposits in Periods IV and V, the di¤erences between the
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SURPs and the CURPs were small for all of the nancial goods and periods,
whereas the di¤erences between the CURPs and the GURPs were large, ex-
cept for demand deposits and time deposits in Periods IV and V. Except for
the demand deposits and time deposits for recent years, this indicates the
necessity of using the GURM rather than the CURM. Regarding demand
deposits and time deposits in Periods IV and V, the risk-adjustment e¤ects
are dramatically smaller (in terms of absolute value), so the di¤erences be-
tween the CURPs and the GURPs were not as large as for short-term and
long-term loans. Fourth, the risk-adjustment e¤ects of short-term loans were
signicantly negative, except in Periods I and IV, and in Periods I and IV
they were signicantly positive. In the valuation for the entire period in
Table 4.3.1, the risk-adjustment e¤ects of short-term loans were signicantly
negative. However, looking at each sub-period, we can see that periods in
which the risk-adjustment e¤ects of short-term loans were signicantly posi-
tive also exist. Of particular importance is that Period IV is positive, which
raises the question as to why the risk-adjustment e¤ects of short-term loans
became positive during this period, which includes the time of the nancial
crisis. We perform a detailed study in the following section, but the high
likelihood that public funds injection had an impact is shown in the analysis
below (Section 4.4). The risk-adjustment e¤ects of long-term loans were sig-
nicantly negative, except in Periods IV and V, and in Periods IV and V they
were signicantly positive. In the same manner as in the case of short-term
loans, the valuation for the entire period in Table 4.3.1 was signicantly
negative, but looking at each sub-period reveals that, in recent years, the
valuation has become signicantly positive. In particular, the positive value
in Period IV is large compared to Period V, and in the same manner as in
the case of short-term loans, the high likelihood that public funds injection
had an impact is shown in the analysis below (Section 4.4). Note that, in
Period V, the value was small but positive and signicant, which is di¤erent
from short-term loans. This means that, triggered by the injection of pub-
lic funds, the increase in long-term loans in recent years has decreased the
risk (variance) of quasi-short-run prot and indicates that long-term loans
have changed from risky assets to safe assets. The risk-adjustment e¤ects of
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demand deposits were signicantly positive except in Period I, during which
they were signicantly negative. The sign of the risk-adjustment e¤ects was
consistently positive, except in Period I. In other words, this means that the
increase in demand deposits decreased the risk (variance) of quasi-short-run
prot and indicates that demand deposits are safe liabilities. However, in
Periods IV and V the value was dramatically smaller, so we know that the
quasi-short-run prot stabilization e¤ects of the demand deposits declined
substantially. The risk-adjustment e¤ects of time deposits were signicantly
positive, except in Period IV, during which they were signicantly negative.
In all but Period IV, there was a quasi-short-run prot stabilization e¤ect in
time deposits in the same manner as for demand deposits, which shows that
time deposits are safe liabilities. Considering the risk-adjustment e¤ects of
time deposits were signicantly negative in Period IV and signicantly pos-
itive in Period V, although having a small value, the high likelihood that
public funds injection had an impact is indicated in the analysis below (Sec-
tion 4.4), just as for short-term and long-term loans. Fifth, the equity capital
e¤ects were signicant at the 1% level for all of the nancial goods, except
in Periods II and IV, which reinforces the results obtained in Table 4.3.1.
Period II was a bubble period, during which city banks had su¢ cient equity
capital, and public funds were injected during Period IV. If we exclude these
times, which are considered to be special circumstances, we can see that city
bank managers placed importance on the role of equity capital. As stated in
Table 4.3.1, these results indicate that equity capital, which plays a role in
alleviating nancial-distress cost, has an impact on the utility of city bank
managers.
<<Insert Table 4.3.2 about here>>
<<Insert Table 4.3.3 about here>>
<<Insert Table 4.3.4 about here>>
<<Insert Table 4.3.5 about here>>
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4.4 Factors in the Risk-Adjustment E¤ects
As indicated by the second result for Table 4.3.1 and Tables 4.3.2 through
4.3.5, the e¤ects that account for the largest share (in terms of absolute
value) with regard to the components of the GURPs that are not SURPs
are the risk-adjustment e¤ects, and exploring these factors is important not
only from the perspective of industrial organization policy but also from the
perspective of monetary policy. In particular, the fact that from Period III
(from after the bubble period to before the nancial crisis and nancial big
bang period: scal year 1990 to scal year 1995) to Period IV (nancial cri-
sis and nancial big bang period: scal year 1996 to scal year 2001) the
risk-adjustment e¤ects dramatically increased for short-term and long-term
loans, while decreasing dramatically for time deposits, suggests the high like-
lihood that public funds injections carried out from 1998 to 2000 had an
impact. This is revealed by the rst priority issue of this section. Further-
more, in addition to this injection of public funds, the impacts of the interest
rate, the reserve requirement ratio, and the deposit insurance rate are also
extremely important when ascertaining the impact of conventional monetary
policy. The impact of cost e¢ ciency cannot be ignored either. As stated
at the beginning of Section 4, this is because screening and monitoring of
borrower rms and nely tuned responses to depositors is thought to have
an impact on the risk-adjustment e¤ects through cost e¢ ciency. From this
perspective, in this section, we use the GMM to simultaneously estimate a
regression equation with the risk-adjustment e¤ects of short-term loans, long-
term loans, demand deposits, and time deposits as the dependent variables
and the interest rate, a proxy variable for public funds, the reserve require-
ment ratio, the deposit insurance rate, and cost e¢ ciency, for example, as
the independent variables.38
38In the same manner as in Eqs.(6.3.1a) and (6.3.2) in the Appendix and Eqs.(29b)
and (30a) in the present paper, the GMM estimate takes into account the conditional
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of the error term. The instrumental variables are
as follows: the individual dummy, the short-term prime rate, the long-term prime rate, the
borrower rm equity capital ratio, the rank variable for the loan loss provision rate, the
rank variable for the loan per case, the rank variable for the proportion of loans for small
and medium rms, the rank variable for the Herndahl index of loan proportions classied
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The specic estimation equation is as follows:
RAEj;i;t = j +
X
s
CCRCBj;s DYs

 CCRCBi;t + Ej  EFi;t + Rj  rj;t
+"Aj;i;t (j = SL;LL;DD; TD) , (32)
RAEj;i;t = j +
X
s
CCRCBj;s DYs

 CCRCBi;t + Ej  EFi;t + Xj Xj;t
+Yj  Yj;t + "Bj;i;t (j = SL;LL;DD; TD) , (33)
where "Aj;i;t and "
B
j;i;t are the error terms. The dependent variables and in-
dependent variables are as follows. RAEj;i;t is the risk-adjustment e¤ect of
the j-th nancial good, and DYs is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 in
period s and 0 in other periods. As stated at the beginning of Section 4,
there are ve periods: s = 1 (Period I: scal year 1975 to scal year 1986),
s = 2 (Period II: scal year 1987 to scal year 1989), s = 3 (Period III: scal
year 1990 to scal year 1995), s = 4 (Period IV: scal year 1996 to scal year
2001), and s = 5 (Period V: scal year 2002 to scal year 2007). CCRCBi;t
is the total of the capital stock, the capital surplus reserve, and the corporate
bonds, and is a proxy variable for public funds injection. From 1998 to 2000,
the injection of public funds was carried out in the form of purchases of pre-
ferred stock and subordinated debentures by the government. For city banks,
purchases of preferred stock by the government have the e¤ect of increasing
their capital stock or capital surplus reserve, and purchases of subordinated
debentures by the government lead to increases in corporate bonds. For this
reason, we use the total of the capital stock, the capital surplus reserve, and
the corporate bonds as the proxy variable for public funds injection. EFi;t is
by industry, the rank variable for the Herndahl index of loan proportions classied by
mortgage, the rank variable for the proportion of loans for real estate business, the rank
variable for proportion of loans secured by real estate, the rank variable for the proportion
of loans without collateral and without warranty, the yield on government bonds, TOPIX,
the logarithm of depositors income, the interest rate of ordinary savings, the insurance rate
of demand deposits, the reserve requirement ratio for demand deposits, the interest rate
of postal savings certicates, the insurance rate of time deposits, the reserve requirement
ratio for time deposits, the rank variable for EFi;t, the period dummy, and the product of
the rank variable for CCRCBi;t and the period dummy. In order to improve the precision
of the estimate, we do not use identical instrumental variables in all of the estimate
equations. Instead, we use the set of instrumental variables suitable for each individual
estimate equation.
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cost e¢ ciency, and its specic denition is as follows:
EFi;t = exp
hn
min
i
ai
 
DMAi ; 

t
o  ai  DMAi ;  t i , (34)
where ai
 
DMAi ; 

t

is the individual dummy coe¢ cient in equation (6.3.1b) in
the Appendix, and mini ai
 
DMAi ; 

t

is the minimum value of ai
 
DMAi ; 

t

in scal year t. EFi;t is the ratio of the frontier cost with respect to the
actual cost in the case that the factor prices, each type of nancial good,
and technical progress are identical in all of the samples. This denition is
the same in Schmidt and Sickles (1984), Kumbhakar (1989), and Cornwell,
Schmidt, and Sickles (1990), and is a denition method that enables us to
handle the endogeneity problem or the simultaneous problem with an esti-
mate using the GMM, while also estimating cost e¢ ciency. Moreover, rj;t is
the variable for each type of interest rate, rSL;t is the short-term prime rate,
rLL;t is the long-term prime rate, rDD;t is the interest rate of ordinary savings,
and rTD;t is the yield on government bonds (10-year bonds). These variables
have a positive impact on the short-term loan interest rate, long-term loan
interest rate, demand deposit interest rate, and time deposit interest rate,
respectively, and are alternative interest rates for these interest rates. In the
GURM, these interest rates are endogenous variables, so we use the interest
rates of exogenous variables, which are in an alternative relationship with
these interest rates for the independent variables. Xj;t and Yj;t are the vari-
ables other than public funds, cost e¢ ciency, and interest rates, which have
an impact on the risk-adjustment e¤ects, XSL;t and XLL;t are the loan loss
provision rates, YSL;t and YLL;t are the proportions of loans for small and
medium rms, XDD;t is the reserve requirement ratio for demand deposits,
XTD;t is the reserve requirement ratio for time deposits, YDD;t is the insurance
rate of demand deposits, and YTD;t is the insurance rate of time deposits.
Furthermore, for the interpretation of the impact of cost e¢ ciency, we
use the GMM to estimate a regression equation with cost e¢ ciency as the
dependent variable and the ratio of loans and discounts for small business to
the number of small business borrowers and the ratio of the total number of
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employees at term-end to the number of o¢ ces as the independent variables.39
The ratio of loans and discounts for small business to the number of small
business borrowers is a proxy variable for the screening and monitoring of the
borrower rm. If this variable is larger, then we can conclude that screening
and monitoring are being carried out more vigorously. Furthermore, the ratio
of the total number of employees at term-end to the number of o¢ ces is a
proxy variable for whether nely tuned responses are being o¤ered primarily
in regard to deposit operations. If this variable is larger, then we can conclude
that more nely tuned responses are being o¤ered. The specic estimation
equation is as follows:
EFi;t = 
LSMFC + LSMFC  LSMFCi;t + "LSMFCi;t , (35)
EFi;t = 
EB + EB  EBi;t + "EBi;t , (36)
EFi;t = 
LE + LE  LSMFCi;t + LE  EBi;t + "LEi;t , (37)
where "LSMFCi;t , "
EB
i;t , and "
LE
i;t are the error terms, and the dependent variables
and independent variables are EFi;t, which is the cost e¢ ciency in Eq.(34),
LSMFCi;t, which is the ratio of loans and discounts for small business to the
number of small business borrowers (one million yen/case), and EBi;t, which
is the ratio of the total number of employees at term-end to the number of
o¢ ces (employees/o¢ ces).
Table 4.4.1 shows the estimation results of Equations (35) through (37).
Consequently, the following two points can be inferred. First, parameters
LSMFC and LE are negative and signicant at the 1% level, so we know
that more cost e¢ cient city banks give smaller loans per case to small and
medium rms. This can be interpreted as indicating that when the loan per
case to small and medium rms is smaller, the screening and monitoring costs
are smaller, so that the banks become more cost e¢ cient. Second, parameters
39In the same manner as in Eqs.(6.3.1a) and (6.3.2) in the Appendix and Eqs.(29b)
and (30a) in the present paper, the GMM estimate takes into account the conditional
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of the error term. The instrumental variables are
as follows: the individual dummy, the rank variable for the ratio of loans and discounts
for small business to the number of small business borrowers, and the rank variable for
the ratio of the total number of employees at term-end to the number of o¢ ces.
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EB and LE are positive and signicant at the 5% level, so we know that
more cost e¢ cient city banks have a higher ratio of the total number of
employees to the number of o¢ ces. This can be interpreted as indicating
that when the ratio of the total number of employees to the number of o¢ ces
is larger, more nely tuned responses can be o¤ered to the borrower rms and
the depositors, so that the banks become more e¢ cient. Below, we attempt
to interpret the impact of cost e¢ ciency based on the above results.
<<Insert Table 4.4.1 about here>>
Tables 4.4.2 and 4.4.3 are the estimation results for Eqs.(32) and (33),
respectively. From these results, the following six points can be inferred.
First, parameter CCRCBj;4 (j = SL;LL;DD), which indicates the impact of
CCRCBi;t in Period IV on the risk-adjustment e¤ects of short-term and
long-term loans and demand deposits, is positive and signicant at the 10%
level,40 so that the injections of public funds carried out from 1998 to 2000
had the e¤ect of improving the risk-adjustment e¤ects of short-term and long-
term loans and demand deposits. The magnitude of CCRCBj;4 (j = SL;LL)
is particularly noteworthy in that CCRCBj;4 (j = SL;LL) is the largest value
for short-term loans, except in Period I, when it is not signicant, and for
long-term loans in all of the periods. This indicates the magnitude of the
impact of the public funds injections. The risk-adjustment e¤ects of short-
term loans had a particularly large impact, inverting the sign from negative
in Periods II and III to positive in Period IV. Thus, the injections of public
funds changed the total impact on the risk-adjustment e¤ects of the capital
stock, the capital surplus reserve, and the corporate bonds from negative to
positive. However, the magnitude of CCRCBDD;4 is not necessarily the largest
value for demand deposits. Compared with short-term and long-term loans,
the impact of the injections of public funds on the risk-adjustment e¤ects
of demand deposits is very small. Second, on the other hand, parameter
CCRCBTD;4 , which shows the impact of CCRCBi;t in Period IV on the risk-
adjustment e¤ects of time deposits, is negative and signicant at the 1%
40More specically, short-term and long-term loans are signicant at the 1% level and
demand deposits are signicant at the 10% level.
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level, so that the injections of public funds had the e¤ect of worsening the
risk-adjustment e¤ects for the time deposits. As shown in Table 4.3.1, we
can conclude from the sign of the GURPs that the fact that short-term and
long-term loans and demand deposits are considered to be outputs, whereas
time deposits are considered to be an input (xed factor), is probably having
an impact. Based on the rst and second results, we can conclude that the
injections of public funds improved the risk-adjustment e¤ects of the outputs
while worsening the risk-adjustment e¤ects of the xed factors. Third, the
parameters Ej (j = SL;LL), which indicate the impact of cost e¢ ciency
(EFi;t) on the risk-adjustment e¤ects of short-term and long-term loans, are
both signicant at the 1% level, and are positive for short-term loans and
negative for long-term loans. As shown in Table 4.4.1, if the loan per case
to small and medium rms is small, then screening and monitoring costs
are small, so that the bank becomes more cost e¢ cient. Furthermore, a
risk reduction e¤ect due to risk dispersion can be expected. However, risk
may increase to the extent that screening and monitoring is not implemented
su¢ ciently. As a result, we can interpret this to mean that 1) the impact
of the improvement of cost e¢ ciency on the risk-adjustment e¤ects will be
positive in the case that the e¤ect of risk reduction due to risk dispersion
is higher than the e¤ect of the rise in risk due to the fact that screening
and monitoring was not implemented su¢ ciently and 2) will be negative if
the e¤ect of risk reduction due to risk dispersion is lower than the e¤ect
of the rise in risk due to the fact that screening and monitoring was not
implemented su¢ ciently. Consequently, it can be concluded that the case of
short-term loans corresponds to the rst case and the case of long-term loans
corresponds to the second case. This indicates that for short-term loans, risk
dispersion is more important than screening and monitoring, and for long-
term loans screening, and monitoring is more important than risk dispersion.
Fourth, the parameters Ej (j = DD;TD), which indicate the impact of cost
e¢ ciency (EFi;t) on the risk-adjustment e¤ects of demand and time deposits,
are both signicant at the 1% level and are negative for demand deposits and
positive for time deposits. As shown in Table 4.4.1, when the ratio of the
total number of employees to the number of o¢ ces is higher, the bank is able
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to o¤er more nely tuned responses to (borrower rms and) depositors, and
so is more cost e¢ cient. However, it can be concluded that the impact of
demand deposits and time deposits on the risks of these types of responses
di¤ers depending on whether the more nely tuned response can be o¤ered
for making a deposit or for direct debit and withdrawal. In the case of
time deposits, liquidity is smaller than the demand deposits, so more nely
tuned responses may be possible for making a deposit than for direct debit
and withdrawal. Therefore, we can interpret this to mean that when the
ratio of the total number of employees to the number of o¢ ces is higher, the
risk declines. However, in the case of demand deposits, liquidity is larger
than the time deposits, so more nely tuned responses are o¤ered for direct
debit and withdrawal as well as for making a deposit. We cannot state a
denitive conclusion about which of these responses is more nely tuned.
However, in terms of the results, we can conclude that the responses o¤ered
for direct debit and withdrawal are more nely tuned than the responses
o¤ered for making a deposit and the risk increased. Fifth, the estimates
for the parameter Rj (j = SL;LL;DD; TD), which indicates the impact of
interest rate (rj;t) on the risk-adjustment e¤ects, indicates that it is positive
and signicant at the 10% level for short-term loans and demand deposits41
and negative and signicant at the 1% level for long-term loans and time
deposits. Thus, a decline in the long-term interest rate improves the risk-
adjustment e¤ects, while a decline in the short-run interest rate worsens
the risk-adjustment e¤ects. This indicates that there is a high likelihood
that a zero interest rate or low-interest policy improves the risk-adjustment
e¤ects of long-term nancial goods (long-term loans and time deposits) and
worsens the risk-adjustment e¤ects of short-run nancial goods (short-term
loans and demand deposits). Sixth, the estimates for the parameter Xj
(j = DD;TD), which indicate the impact of the reserve rate (XDD;t, XTD;t)
on the risk-adjustment e¤ects of deposits, indicate that it is negative and
signicant at the 1% level for both demand and time deposits. Thus, a
monetary easing policy based on a decline in the reserve requirement ratio
for deposits improves the risk-adjustment e¤ects of deposits. Furthermore,
41Demand deposits are signicant at the 1% level.
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the parameter Yj (j = DD;TD), which indicates the impact of insurance
rates (YDD;t, YTD;t) on the risk-adjustment e¤ects of deposits, is negative
and signicant at the 1% level for demand deposits but negative and not
signicant for time deposits. Thus, we know that a decline in insurance rates
improves the risk-adjustment e¤ects of demand deposits.42
<<Insert Table 4.4.2 about here>>
<<Insert Table 4.4.3 about here>>
4.5 Extended Generalized Lerner Indices
As shown in Table 4.3.1, based on the sign of the GURPs, short-term and
long-term loans and demand deposits are considered to be outputs, whereas
time deposits are considered to be an input (xed factor). Here, we narrow
our focus to the output market, which is more important from the perspec-
tive of industrial organization theory, and show the estimation results regard-
ing the EGLIs of the short-term and long-term loans and demand deposits
(Eq.(18)). Table 4.5.1 shows the EGLIs of these nancial goods for the en-
tire period. Consequently, the following ve points can be inferred. First,
the EGLI of short-term loans is not signicantly di¤erent from zero, so that
the short-term loan market observed over the entire period is judged to be
competitive. For demand deposits, the EGLI is negative and signicant at
the 10% level, so that the demand deposit market observed over the entire
period (scal year 1992 onwards) is judged to be competitive.43 In contrast,
the EGLI of long-term loans is large, positive, and signicant at the 1% level,
so that the long-term loan market observed over the entire period is judged to
be uncompetitive. This indicates that short-run nancial goods (short-term
loans and demand deposits) are competitive, while long-term nancial goods
(long-term loans) are uncompetitive. Second, regarding the components of
the EGLIs (in terms of absolute value), the risk-adjustment e¤ects are the
42Interpretation of the results regarding the impact of the loan loss provision rate and
the proportion of loans for small and medium rms on the risk-adjustment e¤ects of short-
term and long-term loans should be a priority going forward.
43The liberalization of the demand deposits market began with the introduction of new
savings deposits in June 1992.
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largest, followed by the equity capital e¤ects, and the market structure and
conduct e¤ects are the smallest. As shown in Table 4.3.1 and Tables 4.3.2
through 4.3.5, this is the same as the results for the GURPs, so there may be
pressure to review conventional competition policy, which considers primar-
ily the market structure and conduct e¤ects. Going forward, a change from
competition policy to risk-adjustment policy is necessary, so specic measures
in risk-adjustment policy that have not been considered before must now be
considered. Third, the risk-adjustment e¤ects of short-term and long-term
loans are positive and signicant at the 1% level. From Eq.(18) in Section 2.3,
this indicates that the risk (variance) of quasi-short-run prot increases due
to the increase in these loans. Therefore, based on Proposition 2, the EGLIs
of these loans increase (the degree of competition decreases) more in this case
than when the risk (variance) of quasi-short-run prot is unchanged or de-
creases. In contrast, the risk-adjustment e¤ects of demand deposits are large
in terms of absolute value, are negative, and are signicant at the 5% level.
This is opposite the results for the case of short-term and long-term loans and
indicates that the risk (variance) of quasi-short-run prot decreases due to an
increase in demand deposits. Therefore, based on Proposition 2, this means
that this reduction is dramatic, so the EGLI of demand deposits decreases
(the degree of competition increases) more dramatically than when the risk
(variance) of quasi-short-run prot is unchanged or increases. As shown in
Table 4.3.1, short-term and long-term loans are risky assets, whereas demand
deposits are safe liabilities. This indicates that, in the case of risky assets,
the risk-adjustment e¤ects work to lower the degree of competition, whereas,
in the case of safe liabilities, the risk-adjustment e¤ects work to raise the
degree of competition. Fourth, the equity capital e¤ects of short-term and
long-term loans are negative and signicant at the 1% level, whereas, for
demand deposits, they are positive and signicant at the 5% level. Based
on Proposition 1 in Section 2.3, in this case, an increase in equity capital in-
creases the EGLIs of short-term and long-term loans (decreases the degree of
competition) and decreases the EGLI of demand deposits (raises the degree
of competition), which indicates that an increase in equity capital makes the
nancial asset market uncompetitive, while making the liability market com-
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petitive. Fifth, based on Proposition 3 in Section 2.3, the risk (variance) of
quasi-short-run prot increases due to an increase in nancial assets, and if
the nancial rm is risk-averse and the risk-adjustment e¤ects are larger than
the absolute value of the equity capital e¤ects, then the EGLI is higher than
the GLI. We know that these facts apply to short-term and long-term loans,
which indicates that there is a high likelihood that estimates of the degree
of competition in the conventional loan market will overestimate the degree
of competition. Furthermore, based on Proposition 4, the risk (variance) of
quasi-short-run prot decreases due to an increase in liabilities, and if the
nancial rm is risk-averse and the absolute value of the risk-adjustment ef-
fects is larger than the equity capital e¤ects, then the EGLI is lower than the
GLI. These facts apply to demand deposits, which indicates that there is a
high likelihood that estimates of the degree of competition in the conventional
demand deposit market will underestimate the degree of competition.
<<Insert Table 4.5.1 about here>>
In Table 4.5.1, the EGLIs of short-term and long-term loans and demand
deposits are shown for the entire period, and the EGLI of long-term loans
is shown below for each sub-period. For short-term loans, the SURP in Pe-
riod IV is negative, so there is a problem whereby the EGLI for this period
cannot be determined. Furthermore, with respect to demand deposits, the
liberalization of the interest rate was started from scal year 1992, so the
period is limited. For these reasons, we do not calculate the EGLIs for short-
term loans and demand deposits in each sub-period. Table 4.5.2 shows the
EGLIs for long-term loans in each sub-period. Consequently, the following
four points can be inferred. First, if we exclude Period IV, the EGLIs have
gradually decreased, so that the degree of competition has been increasing
in the long-term loan market. In particular, in the recent Periods IV and
V, the EGLIs were negative and signicant, which indicates that there were
competitive conditions in these periods. Regarding Period IV, the EGLI is
very large and negative because the risk-adjustment e¤ects are very large
and negative. Based on Eq.(11) in Section 2.2 and Eq.(18) in Section 2.3,
the sign of the risk-adjustment e¤ects of the GURPs and the sign of the
55
risk-adjustment e¤ects of the EGLI are in an inverse relationship. As such,
as shown in Tables 4.4.2 and 4.4.3, we know that the very large negative risk-
adjustment e¤ects in Period IV are caused by the impact of the injections of
public funds. Therefore, we can conclude that the injections of public funds
dramatically improved (decreased) the risk-adjustment e¤ects of the EGLI
for long-term loans and dramatically increased the degree of competition in
the long-term loan market. Second, as stated above, if we exclude Period IV,
the risk-adjustment e¤ects have had a tendency to decrease, which is signi-
cant at the 1% level in all of the periods. The risk-adjustment e¤ects are the
largest component of the EGLI in all of the periods, so that the tendency of
the EGLIs to decrease discussed in the rst result is due to the reduction of
the risk-adjustment e¤ects, which indicates that the risk-adjustment e¤ects of
the EGLI for long-term loans have a tendency to improve (decrease), which
increases the degree of competition in the long-term loan market. Third,
except for Periods II and IV, the equity capital e¤ects are negative and sig-
nicant at the 5% level. As shown in Table 4.5.1, based on Proposition 1 in
Section 2.3, in this case, an increase in equity capital increases the EGLI of
long-term loans (decreases the degree of competition), which indicates that
the results in Table 4.5.1 apply, except in the periods with special circum-
stances (Period II, the bubble period, and Period IV, in which public funds
were injected). Fourth, from Periods I through III, the EGLI is higher than
the GLI, which reinforces the results in Table 4.5.1, but in Periods IV and V,
the EGLI is dramatically lower than the GLI. Based on Proposition 3 in Sec-
tion 2.3, this is because the risk (variance) of quasi-short-run prot greatly
decreases due to an increase in long-term loans, and, as a result, the risk-
adjustment e¤ects are very large and negative, which indicates that there is
a high likelihood that estimates of the degree of competition in the conven-
tional long-term loan market will underestimate the degree of competition in
the recent Periods IV and V.
<<Insert Table 4.5.2 about here>>
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5 Conclusions
In the present study, we applied the GURM presented by Homma (2009)
to Japans banking industry and performed an analysis fusing producer the-
ory and industrial organization theory (applied microeconomics) and nance
(asset pricing theory). Basically, while basing the approach on the GURM,
we derived the GURPs and the EGLIs, organized their theoretical charac-
teristics from an interdisciplinary analytical perspective, applied the GURM
to Japanese city banks, and estimated the GURPs and the EGLIs. These
e¤orts provided material for thinking about the necessity of risk-adjustment
policies as part of the industrial organization policy in the banking industry.
In the following, we describe the major results and present the conclusion of
the present study:
1. Under the assumption that the risk (variance) of quasi-short-run prot
increases due to an increase in nancial assets other than cash and lia-
bilities, if the nancial rm is risk-averse, then the EGLI increases (the
degree of competition decreases), whereas if the risk (variance) is as-
sumed to decrease, then the EGLI decreases (the degree of competition
increases) if the nancial rm is risk-averse. (Proposition 2 in Section
2.3).
2. The estimate for degree of relative risk-aversion for the entire period
is positive and signicant, so managers of city banks were risk-averse
for the entire period. However, in Period II (bubble period: scal year
1987 to scal year 1990) the value was small, so compared to the other
periods, the attitude of the managers was closer to risk-neutral.
3. The signs of the GURPs are all positive, except for the GURP for time
deposits, so that short-term and long-term loans and demand deposits
are considered to be outputs, whereas time deposits are considered to
be a xed factor. In most conventional studies, deposits are assumed to
be input factors, but if deposits are divided into demand deposits and
time deposits, demand deposits tend to provide a settlement service
more strongly and are considered to be an output.
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4. The e¤ects that account for the largest share of the GURPs (in terms of
absolute value) with regard to the components of the GURPs that are
not SURPs are the risk-adjustment e¤ects, and, compared to this share,
the share of the market structure and conduct e¤ects is smaller, except
for time deposits. These results are important from the perspective
of industrial organization theory, and there may be pressure to review
conventional industrial organization policy, which considers primarily
the market structure and conduct e¤ects.
5. Based on the factor analysis of the risk-adjustment e¤ects, the in-
jections of public funds carried out from 1998 to 2000 improved the
risk-adjustment e¤ects of short-term and long-term loans and demand
deposits, while worsening the risk-adjustment e¤ects for the time de-
posits.
6. Based on the estimation results of the EGLIs, the short-term loan mar-
ket and demand deposit market observed over the entire period are
judged to be competitive, whereas the long-term loan market observed
over the entire period is judged to be uncompetitive, which indicates
that short-run nancial goods (short-term loans and demand deposits)
are competitive, whereas long-term nancial goods (long-term loans)
are uncompetitive.
7. Regarding the components of the EGLIs (in terms of absolute value),
the risk-adjustment e¤ects are the largest, followed by the equity capi-
tal e¤ects, and the market structure and conduct e¤ects are the small-
est. This is identical to the results for the GURPs, so that there may
be pressure to review conventional competition policy, which considers
primarily the market structure and conduct e¤ects. Going forward,
a change from competition policy to risk-adjustment policy is neces-
sary, so specic measures in risk-adjustment policy that have not been
considered before must be considered.
8. If we exclude Period IV (nancial crisis and nancial big bang period:
scal year 1996 to scal year 2001), the EGLIs of long-term loans have
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gradually decreased, so that the degree of competition has been increas-
ing in the long-term loan market. In particular, in the recent Periods
IV and V (after the nancial crisis and nancial big bang period: scal
year 2002 to scal year 2007), the EGLIs were negative and signicant,
which indicates that competitive conditions existed in these periods.
Regarding Period IV, the EGLI was dramatically large and negative,
but this is because the risk-adjustment e¤ects were very large and neg-
ative. Based on the factor analysis of the risk-adjustment e¤ects, we
can conclude that the reason for this is the injections of public funds
and that injections of public funds dramatically improved (decreased)
the risk-adjustment e¤ects of the EGLI for long-term loans and dra-
matically increased the degree of competition in the long-term loan
market.
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6 Appendix: Empirical Model Specication
6.1 Exogenous State Variables other than the Compo-
nents of the Stochastic Endogenous Holding-Revenue
Rates and Holding-Cost Rates
As stated in Section 2, the exogenous state variable vector (zi;t) comprises the
vector of exogenous variables (zHi;t 1), which have an impact on the certain or
predictable components of SEHRR and SEHCR, the vector (i;t) comprising
the uncertain or unpredictable components of SEHRR and SEHCR, the gen-
eral price index (pG;t), the input price vector (pi;t), and the variable ( i;t),
which expresses exogenous technical progress. Among these components, pG;t
uses a GDP deator, as indicated in Table 3.1 in Section 3.1.1. Furthermore,
for the data for  i;t, time trend data is created, and the normalized version
of this data is used. The specication of the components of SEHRR and
SEHCR-related zHi;t 1 and i;t and their data creation is discussed in a later
section on the specication of the components of SEHRR and SEHCR and
the corresponding data creation. In this section, the remaining pi;t is dis-
cussed, and, later, taking the estimation of the variable cost function into
account, we discuss the cost of the inputs and creation of data for the inputs.
As stated in the beginning of Section 2 and in Section 3.1.1., we consider
the inputs to be current goods, labor, physical capital, certicates of deposit,
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and other liabilities. Therefore, the input price vector pi;t comprises the
current goods price pV;i;t, the wage pL;i;t, the physical capital price pK;i;t, and
the interest rate of certicates of deposit, and other liabilities pB;i;t. Namely,
pi;t = (pV;i;t; pL;i;t; pK;i;t; pB;i;t)
0 . (6.1)
Below, we discuss the costs related to the creation of data for these input
prices and the creation of data for the inputs.
6.1.1 Current goods
The cost of current goods is determined by subtracting depreciation and
rent of land, buildings, and machinery from non-personnel expenses [source:
Nikkei NEEDS Company (Bank) Data File CD-ROM (Nikkei Media Market-
ing, Inc.), hereinafter referred to as source (a)]. For the current goods price,
we divide the cost of current goods into the cost of advertisements, the cost
of fringe benets, and the cost of other current goods, individually create the
price indices using the weighted average of the logarithm, use these indices
to constitute the multilateral index, and create a bilateral index of the indi-
vidual banks and the virtual representative bank. The ratio of any two of
these indices is a multilateral index.44 The amount (input) of current goods
is found by dividing the cost of the current goods by the current goods price.
The appropriate proxy variable for the price of advertisements is the
advertising service price of the corporate service price (source: Corporate
Service Price Index of the Bank of Japan). For the price of fringe benets,
medical care and education costs are included in comsumer price index data
(for the entire country) (source: Consumer Price Index of the Statistical
Bureau of Director-General for Policy Planning & Statistical Research and
Training Institute, Ministry of Internal A¤airs and Communications). Nev-
ertheless, the advertising service price can only be used from 1985 onward.
For this reason, for 1984 and earlier, we assume that the advertising service
price is identical to the price of other current goods. The appropriate proxy
44For details, see Caves and Diewert (1982). Furthermore, see Fixler and Zieschang
(1993) regarding the application of this index to the banking industry.
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variable for the price of other current goods is the group of items related to
the corporate service price. However, these items can only be used from 1995
onwards, so for 1994 and earlier we use the items of the consumer price index.
The formula used to calculate the price of advertisements is as follows:
pAV;t =
8>><>>:
The advertising service price of the corporate
serviceprice
(1985 onward)
exp
hX6
j=1
wV AP;j  ln pAV;j;t
i
(1984 and earlier)
,
(6.1.1a)
where pAV;j;t (j = 1; : : : ; 6) are the consumer price index items of personal
service, public service, repairs and maintenance, transportation and com-
munication, commodity (other manufacturing), and fuel, light, and water
charges, respectively. Here, wV AP;j is the proportion of the weight of p
A
V;j;t with
respect to the total weight of pAV;j;t (j = 1; : : : ; 6) in the base year.
The price of fringe benets is found as follows:
pBV;t = exp
hX2
j=1
wV BP;j  ln pBV;j;t
i
, (6.1.1b)
where pBV;j;t (j = 1; 2) are the medical care and education components, respec-
tively, from the consumer price index (for the entire country). In the same
manner as in the case of the price of advertisements, wV BP;j is the proportion
of the weight of pBV;j;t with respect to the total weight of p
B
V;j;t (j = 1; 2) in
the base year.
The price of other current goods is given by the following formula:
pCV;t =
8<: exp
hX6
j=2
wV AP;j  ln pAV;j;t +
X12
j=1
wV CP;j  ln pCV;j;t
i
(1995 onward)
exp
hX6
j=1
wV AP;j  ln pAV;j;t
i
(1994 and earlier)
,
(6.1.1c)
where pAV;j;t and w
V A
P;j (j = 1; : : : ; 6) are the same as the price of advertisements
in 1984 and earlier, and pCV;j;t (j = 1; : : : ; 12) are the building maintenance
services, machinery repairment, transportation, communication, information
services, rent paid for real estate (o¢ ce), rent paid for real estate (store),
rent paid for real estate (parking lots), leasing (computers), leasing (com-
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munications equipment), leasing (o¢ ce equipment), and computer rental,
respectively, of the corporate service price. Moreover, wV CP;j is the proportion
of the weight of pCV;j;t with respect to the total weight of p
C
V;j;t (j = 1; : : : ; 12)
in the base year multiplied by the weight wV AP;1 of personal service in the
consumer price index.
From Eqs.(6.1.1a) through (6.1.1c), the current goods price pV;i;t is found
as the bilateral index of these prices, as follows:
pV;i;t = exp
24 X
j2fA;B;Cg
 
wVMj;i;t + w
VM
j
2
!


ln pjV;t   ln pjV
35 , (6.1.1d)
where wVMj;i;t (j 2 fA;B;Cg) are the respective proportions of the cost of
advertisements, the cost of fringe benets, and the cost of other current
goods with respect to the cost of current goods. Here, wVMj is the sample
mean of wVMj;i;t (j 2 fA;B;Cg), and ln pjV is the sample mean of ln pjV;t.
6.1.2 Labor
Personnel expenses (source (a)) are assumed to be the cost of labor. The
amount (input) of labor is created separately for men and women, and dou-
ble these bilateral aggregations is assumed to be the overall amount (input)
of labor xL;i;t. We double the bilateral aggregations because the bilateral ag-
gregates can only express the annual amount (input) of labor of the weighted
geometric mean for gender, so we made the bilateral aggregates equivalent to
the gender total by doubling them. However, since the proportions of men
and women are not known from scal year 1999 onwards, we use the mean
value of the proportions of men and women by rm up to that point (scal
year 1998). Upon conrmation using the data, the di¤erences in the propor-
tions of men and women among rms in the same scal year were larger than
the di¤erences among scal years for the same rm. Furthermore, the wage
pL;i;t is found by dividing the cost of labor by xL;i;t.
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(1) xL;i;t in scal year 1998 and earlier
The amount (input) of labor by gender (xjL;i;t)
= [number of employees of gender j (source (a))]
 [hours worked by gender (for gender j) in the nance and
insurance industry (monthly) (source : Monthly Labour Survey
of the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, referred to
hereinafter as source (b))]
12=1000 (j 2 fM (Males) ; F (Females)g),
(6.1.2a)
xL;i;t = 2  exp
24 X
j2fM;Fg
 
wLMj;i;t + w
LM
j
2
!
 lnxjL;i;t
35 , (6.1.2b)
where wLMj;i;t (j 2 fM;Fg) is given by the following equation:
wLMj;i;t =
pjL;i;t  xjL;i;t
pML;i;t  xML;i;t + pFL;i;t  xFL;i;t
(j 2 fM;Fg) , (6.1.2c)
and pjL;i;t (j 2 fM;Fg) is the amount of salary in cash by gender (for gender
j) in the nance and insurance industry (monthly) (source (b)). Moreover,
wLMj is the sample mean of w
LM
j;i;t . Taking into account the fact that pL;i;t is
found by dividing the cost of labor by xL;i;t, we have not standardized pL;i;t
using lnxjL, the sample mean of lnx
j
L;i;t.
45
(2) xL;i;t in scal year 1999 and onwards The amount (input) of labor
by gender xjL;i;t is obtained using Eq.(6.1.2d) below, and the amount (input)
45In a strict sense, it is no longer the same type of bilateral index as the current goods
price, but considering the facility of the interpretation of the wage, we have not normalized
the geometric mean.
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of labor xL;i;t is obtained in the same manner using Eq.(6.1.2b).
The amount (input) of labor by gender (xjL;i;t)
= [number of total employees (source (a))]
 [mean value by bank for the proportions of men and women
among the number of employees at the end of each period
until scal year 1998 (source (a))]
 [hours worked by gender (for gender j) in the nance and
insurance industry (monthly) (source (d))] 12=1000
(j 2 fM (Males) ; F (Females)g).
(6.1.2d)
6.1.3 Physical capital
Physical capital comprises land and buildings and movable assets. The cost
of physical capital CKi;t is determined by rst calculating the input of land
xLK;i;t and its service price p
L
K;t and the input of buildings and movable assets
xBK;i;t and its service price p
B
K;i;t, and then nding the sum of each input
multiplied by its service price (CKi;t = p
L
K;t xLK;i;t+ pBK;i;t xBK;i;t). The physical
capital price pK;i;t is assumed to be the bilateral index of pLK;t and p
B
K;i;t in
the same manner as with the current goods price, and the amount (input) of
physical capital xK;i;t is determined by dividing CKi;t by pK;i;t.
Here, xLK;i;t and x
B
K;i;t are determined through the following three steps.
First, nd the nominal stocks for land and buildings and movable assets, re-
spectively. The nominal stock for buildings and movable assets is determined
by subtracting the book value of primary land in possessionin source (a)
from land, buildings, and movable assetsin the same source. For the nom-
inal stock for land, we use the book value of primary land in possessionin
source (a), which is unchanged until scal year 1996. For scal year 1997,
the nominal stock for land is determined by subtracting land revaluation
di¤erencein source (a) from this data. From scal year 1998 onwards, the
nominal stock for land is determined by further subtracting the deferred tax
liability in the same source. However, in the case that the obtained value
is negative, we judge that the book value of primary land in possessionis
not accurate, and for scal years from scal year 1997 onwards with posi-
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tive values, we calculate the book value of primary land in possession/(land
revaluation di¤erence + deferred tax liability)for each scal year, determine
the mean value, multiply the mean value by the land revaluation di¤erence
+ deferred tax liabilityin scal years with negative values, and determine
the (adjusted) book value of primary land in possession.We then nd the
nominal stock of land by subtracting the land revaluation di¤erenceand
the deferred tax liability.
We amend the book value of primary land in possessionin this manner
from scal year 1997 onwards because the revaluation of land (revaluation
of previously valuated land using the current price) based on the Act on
Revaluation of Land was carried out from scal year 1997 onwards. The
revaluation di¤erence, namely, the amount obtained by deducting the book
value immediately before the revaluation from the revaluation amount for
the land for which the revaluation was performed, was equal to the land
revaluation di¤erencein scal year 1997, and from scal year 1998 onwards
was approximately equal to this amount with the deferred tax liability
added.46 However, since data on the deferred tax liability in scal year
1998 is unavailable for several banks, for these banks we nd the mean value
of the deferred tax liability/land revaluation di¤erencefor the several years
prior and multiply this value by the land revaluation di¤erencein scal year
1998 to nd the deferred tax liability.
Second, for land and buildings and movable assets, respectively, we cal-
culate the real stock in the oldest scal year for which data is available and
the real ow in each subsequent scal year. The real stock is determined by
deating the nominal stock in the oldest scal year for which data is avail-
able, and the real ow is found by deating the nominal stock calculated
by subtracting the nominal stock in time t   1 from the nominal stock in
time t. For the deators for real stock and real ow, we use the urban land
price index (commercial urban land nationwide) [source: Urban Land Price
Index National Wooden House Market Index (Japan Real Estate Institute),
46Strictly speaking, from scal year 1998 onwards revaluation di¤erence= land reval-
uation di¤erence+ the deferred tax liability related to revaluation.The deferred tax
liabilityincludes minor elements other than the deferred tax liability related to revalu-
ation,but we have conrmed that they are approximately equal.
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referred to hereinafter as source (c)] in the case of land and the deator for
gross capital formation (private non-residential investment) [source: National
Economic Accounting (Cabinet O¢ ce), referred to hereinafter as source (d)]
in the case of buildings and movable assets.
Third, for land and buildings and movable assets, respectively, with the
real stock in the oldest scal year for which data is available as the bench-
mark, we cumulatively add it to the real ow in each subsequent scal year.
Here, pLK;t and p
B
K;i;t are determined using the following formulae:
pLK;t = p
L
D;t  rKt (6.1.3a)
pBK;i;t = p
B
D;t 
"
rKt + d
K
i;t  
pBD;t   pBD;t 1
pBD;t
#
(6.1.3b)
The variables on the right-hand side of the equations are as follows:
 pLD;t : Urban land price index (commercial urban land nationwide)
(source (c))
 rKt : Yield on bank coupon debentures (ve years) (source: Financial
and Economic Statistics Monthly from the Bank of Japan)
 pBD;t : Deator for gross capital formation (private non-residential in-
vestment) (source (d))
 dKi;t : Rate of depreciation= [depreciation (source (a))]=xBK;i;t
Regarding the service price of land, we have not included the rate of
depreciation and capital gains in the calculation formula after taking into
account the following two considerations. First, the depreciation of land is
normally zero. Second, the capital gains during the bubble period (scal
year 1987 to scal year 1990) were extremely large, so that if these gains
are included in the calculation formula, the service price of land will become
negative.
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Using Eqs.(6.1.3a) and (6.1.3b), pK;i;t is found as follows:
pK;i;t = exp
" 
wKML;i;t + w
KM
L
2
!


ln pLK;t   ln pLK

+
 
wKMB;i;t + w
KM
B
2
!


ln pBK;i;t   ln pBK
#
, (6.1.3c)
where wKMj;i;t (j 2 fL;Bg) is given by the following equations:
wKML;i;t =
pLK;t  xLK;i;t
pLK;t  xLK;i;t + pBK;i;t  xBK;i;t
, (6.1.3d)
wKMB;i;t =
pBK;i;t  xBK;i;t
pLK;t  xLK;i;t + pBK;i;t  xBK;i;t
, (6.1.3e)
wKMj (j 2 fL;Bg) is the sample mean of wKMj;i;t (j 2 fL;Bg), and ln pLK and
ln pBK are the sample means of ln p
L
K;t and ln p
B
K;i;t, respectively.
6.1.4 Certicates of deposit and other liabilities
The creation of data for the real amount (input) of certicates of deposit
and other liabilities (qCD;i;t+1) is as stated in Table 3.1 in Section 3.1.1. The
interest rate of certicates of deposit and other liabilities (HRCD;i;t+1) is as
shown in Table 6.1.4 below. Furthermore, nominal costs are found as the
product of pG;t+1  qCD;i;t+1 and HRCD;i;t+1.
<<Insert Table 6.1.4 about here>>
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6.2 Stochastic Endogenous Holding-Revenue Rates and
Holding-Cost Rates
6.2.1 Actual composition of SEHRR and SEHCR and method of
creating data for j;i;t+1
According to Homma (2009, pp.6-9), SEHRR and SEHCR at the end of
scal year t (= the beginning of scal year t + 1) (hj;i;t+1)47 is expressed as
(hj;i;t+1 = hRj;i;t + j;i;t+1), the total of the certain or predictable components
at the beginning of scal year t (hRj;i;t) and the uncertain or unpredictable
components at the end of scal year t (j;i;t+1). Here, we explain in detail
the actual composition of hj;i;t+1 and the method of creating data for j;i;t+1.
First, we use the notation Hj;i;t+1 for the actual holding-revenue rate or
holding-cost rate at the end of scal year t (= the beginning of scal year
t+ 1) and conclude that
Hj;i;t+1 = hj;i;t+1 = h
R
j;i;t + j;i;t+1
(j = SL;LL; S; C; CL;A;DD; TD;CM) . (6.2.1.1)
On this basis, we split up Hj;i;t+1 so that it corresponds to components of
hRj;i;t as follows:
Hj;i;t+1 =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
HRj;i;t+1 +H
Q
j;i;t+1 +H
S
j;i;t+1  HDj;i;t+1 (j = SL;LL)
HRj;i;t+1 +H
S
j;i;t+1 +H
C
j;i;t+1  HDj;i;t+1 (j = S;A)
0 (j = C)
HRj;i;t+1 (j = CL;CM)
HRj;i;t+1 +H
Q
j;i;t+1 + h
I
j;i;t + r
D
i;t  j;i;t  HSj;i;t+1 (j = DD;TD)
.
(6.2.1.2)
Here, the methods of creating the data for the components of Hj;i;t+1 (j =
SL;LL; S; CL;A;DD; TD;CM) and the components of j;i;t+1
47In Section 2 of the present paper and in Homma (2009, pp.6-9), the notation hi;j;t+1
is used. Here, the subscripts j, i, and t indicate nancial goods, nancial rms, and time,
respectively. We switched i and j because this notation is easier to use in the case that
we are specically designating nancial goods as the subject of the discussion. Below, we
also switch i and j in the notation for ri;j;t, r
Q
i;j;t, h
S
i;j;t, h
C
i;j;t, h
D
i;j;t, and h
I
i;j;t.
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(j = SL;LL; S; CL;A;DD; TD;CM) included in Hj;i;t+1 are as follows:
(1) HRj;i;t+1 (j = SL;LL;DD; TD). H
R
j;i;t+1 (j = SL;LL;DD; TD) are
respectively the actual collected interest rate for short-term loans, the actual
collected interest rate for long-term loans, the actual paid interest rate for
demand deposits, and the actual paid interest rate for time deposits at the
end of scal year t (= the beginning of scal year t+1). The components of
hRj;i;t (j = 1; : : : ; NA+NL) correspond to rj;i;t (j = 1; : : : ; NA+NL) in Homma
(2009, pp.6-9). However, in Homma (2009, pp.6-9), it is assumed that there
is no uncertainty in the collected interest rate and the paid interest rate
and that the collected interest rate and the paid interest rate are expressed
by rj;i;t only, whereas, here, we conclude that uncertainty exists. This is
because the data we actually use is not from the beginning, but rather from
the end of scal year t, and, due to data restrictions, we have been forced
to use proxy variables for several exogenous factors that have an impact on
the collected interest rate or paid interest rate. As can be inferred from the
latter point, in Homma (2009, pp.6-9, Denitions 2 and 3) rj;i;t is formulated
endogenously (as a function of a vector of exogenous variables that have an
impact on rj;i;t and the outstanding amount of asset j or the outstanding
amount of liability j in the overall market). Taking this into account, HRj;i;t+1
(j = SL;LL;DD; TD) is formulated as follows:
HRj;i;t+1 = rj;i
 
Qj;t; z
R
j;i;t

+ Rj;i;t+1 (j = SL;LL;DD; TD) , (6.2.1.3)
where Qj;t (j = SL;LL;DD; TD) are respectively the total loans in the
short-term loan market (total loans from all banks), the total loans in the
long-term loan market, the total deposits in the demand deposit market (to-
tal deposits in all banks), and the total deposits in the time deposit market
at the beginning of scal year t (= end of scal year t 1). Furthermore, zRj;i;t
(j = SL;LL;DD; TD) is the vector of exogenous variables, respectively, hav-
ing an impact on the collected interest rate for short-term loans, the collected
interest rate for long-term loans, the paid interest rate for demand deposits,
and the paid interest rate for time deposits during the same time period
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as Qj;t (j = SL;LL;DD; TD). Moreover, 
R
j;i;t+1 (j = SL;LL;DD; TD)
are the components of these collected interest rates and paid interest rates,
which show uncertainty. Here, rj;i
 
Qj;t; z
R
j;i;t

(j = SL;LL;DD; TD) is
one of the components of hRj;i;t (j = SL;LL;DD; TD), and 
R
j;i;t+1 (j =
SL;LL;DD; TD) is one of the components of j;i;t+1 (j = SL;LL;DD; TD).
The specic method of nding Rj;i;t+1 (j = SL;LL;DD; TD) is to consider
Rj;i;t+1 (j = SL;LL;DD; TD) to be the error term of a regression equation,
specify rj;i
 
Qj;t; z
R
j;i;t

(j = SL;LL;DD; TD), and estimate Eq.(6.2.1.3).
(2) HRj;i;t+1 (j = S;A;CL;CM) H
R
j;i;t+1 (j = S;A;CL;CM) are respec-
tively the actual (ex post) interest rate of securities, the interest rate of
other nancial assets, the interest rate of due from banks and call loans,
and the interest rate of call money and borrowed money at the end of s-
cal year t (= beginning of scal year t + 1). Just as in the case of HRj;i;t+1
(j = SL;LL;DD; TD), the components of hRj;i;t (j = 1; : : : ; NA +NL) corre-
spond to rj;i;t (j = 1; : : : ; NA + NL) in Homma (2009, pp.6-9). If we follow
the assumptions of Homma (2009, pp.6-9), there is no uncertainty in these
interest rates, and the interest rates are endogenous (a function of the vector
of exogenous variables having an impact on these interest rates and the out-
standing amount of each asset or each liability in the overall market). How-
ever, from the perspective of industrial organization theory, there is almost
no evidence that the market in which these interest rates are determined is
an imperfect competition market. For this reason, we consider these interest
rates to be exogenous. Consequently, we assume that
HRj;i;t+1 = rj;i;t (j = S;A;CL;CM) (6.2.1.4)
Strictly speaking, in Homma (2009, pp.6-9), rj;i;t is the contractual interest
rate at the beginning of scal year t. However, the data we can actually use
to calculate the interest rate is the data from the end of the scal year, so
we are forced to assume that the interest rates calculated ex post using this
data are equal to the contractual interest rate at the beginning of the scal
year.
74
(3) HQj;i;t+1 (j = SL;LL;DD; TD) H
Q
j;i;t+1 (j = SL;LL;DD; TD) are re-
spectively the actual uncollected interest rate for short-term loans, the actual
uncollected interest rate for long-term loans, the actual unpaid interest rate
for demand deposits, and the actual unpaid interest rate for time deposits at
the end of scal year t (= beginning of scal year t + 1). The components
of hRj;i;t (j = 1; : : : ; NA + NL) correspond to r
Q
j;i;t (j = 1; : : : ; NA + NL) in
Homma (2009, pp.6-9). According to Homma (2009, pp.6-9, Denitions 2
and 3), these uncollected interest rates and unpaid interest rates comprise
the certain or predictable components expressed by rQj;i;t and the uncertain
or unpredictable components, which are some of the components of j;i;t+1
(j = 1; : : : ; NA + NL), and r
Q
j;i;t is expressed as a function of the vector of
exogenous variables having an impact on rQj;i;t, and the outstanding amount
of asset j or the outstanding amount of liability j in the overall market.
Nevertheless, there is no positive reason to conclude that rQj;i;t depends on
the outstanding amount of asset j or the outstanding amount of liability j
in the overall market. Therefore, we consider that rQj;i;t depends only on the
vector of exogenous variables. Consequently, HQj;i;t+1 (j = SL;LL;DD; TD)
is formulated as follows:
HQj;i;t+1 = r
Q
j;i

zQj;i;t

+ Qj;i;t+1 (j = SL;LL;DD; TD) , (6.2.1.5)
where zQj;i;t (j = SL;LL;DD; TD) is the vector of exogenous variables that
have an impact on, respectively, the uncollected interest rate for short-term
loans, the uncollected interest rate for long-term loans, the unpaid interest
rate for demand deposits, and the unpaid interest rate for time deposits at the
beginning of scal year t (= end of scal year t 1). Furthermore, Qj;i;t+1 (j =
SL;LL;DD; TD) are the components of these uncollected interest rates and
unpaid interest rates, which show uncertainty. In the same manner as in the
case of Rj;i;t+1 (j = SL;LL;DD; TD), the specic method of nding 
Q
j;i;t+1
(j = SL;LL;DD; TD) is to consider Qj;i;t+1 (j = SL;LL;DD; TD) to be the
error term of a regression equation, specify rQj;i

zQj;i;t

(j = SL;LL;DD; TD),
and estimate Eq.(6.2.1.5).
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(4)HSj;i;t+1 (j = SL;LL; S;A;DD; TD) H
S
j;i;t+1 (j = SL;LL; S;A;DD; TD)
are respectively the actual service charge rates for short-term loans, long-term
loans, securities, other nancial assets, demand deposits, and time deposits
at the end of scal year t (= beginning of scal year t+1). The components of
hRj;i;t (j = 1; : : : ; NA+NL) correspond to h
S
j;i;t (j = 1; : : : ; NA+NL) in Homma
(2009, pp.6-9). According to Homma (2009, pp.6-9, Denitions 2 and 3), in
the same manner as with HRj;i;t+1 and H
Q
j;i;t+1 (j = SL;LL;DD; TD), the
aforementioned service charge rates comprise the certain or predictable com-
ponents expressed by hSj;i;t and the uncertain or unpredictable components,
which are some of the components of j;i;t+1 (j = 1; : : : ; NA + NL), and the
hSj;i;t is expressed as a function of the vector of exogenous variables having an
impact on hSj;i;t, and the outstanding amount of asset j or the outstanding
amount of liability j in the overall market. However, due to restrictions on the
available data, strict creation of data for HSj;i;t+1 (j = SL;LL; S;A;DD; TD)
matching the assumptions of Homma (2009, pp.6-9) is di¢ cult. For this
reason, we do not formulate hSj;i;t endogenously, and h
S
j;i;t is treated as an
exogenous variable. Consequently, HSj;i;t+1 (j = SL;LL; S;A;DD; TD) is
formulated as follows:
HSj;i;t+1 = h
S
j;i;t + 
S
j;i;t+1 (j = SL;LL; S;A;DD; TD) , (6.2.1.6)
where Sj;i;t+1 (j = SL;LL; S;A;DD; TD) are respectively the components
of actual service charge rates for short-term loans, long-term loans, securi-
ties, other nancial assets, demand deposits, and time deposits that show
uncertainty at the end of scal year t (= beginning of scal year t+ 1). The
specic method of nding these is as follows.
First, from Eq.(6.2.1.6), the conditional expected value ofHSj;i;t+1 with the
exogenous state variable vector zi;t in Homma (2009, p.17) as the condition
is expressed as
E

HSj;i;t+1
 zi;t = hSj;i;t + E Sj;i;t+1 zi;t .
Furthermore, from the relationship between the normal (unconditional) ex-
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pected value and the conditional expected value the following equation is
established:
E

HSj;i;t+1

= E

E

HSj;i;t+1
 zi;t = E hSj;i;t + E Sj;i;t+1 zi;t
= hSj;i;t + E

E

Sj;i;t+1
 zi;t
= hSj;i;t + E

Sj;i;t+1

.
Here, just as in Theorem 1 in Section 2 and Homma (2009, pp.21-22, Theorem
1), we assume that E

Sj;i;t+1
 zi;t = 0. Consequently, we have
E

Sj;i;t+1

= E

E

Sj;i;t+1
 zi;t = E [0] = 0.
Therefore, the following equation is established:
E

HSj;i;t+1

= hSj;i;t (j = SL;LL; S;A;DD; TD) . (6.2.1.7)
From Eqs.(6.2.1.6) and (6.2.1.7), Sj;i;t+1 is expressed as follows:
Sj;i;t+1 = H
S
j;i;t+1   hSj;i;t = HSj;i;t+1   E

HSj;i;t+1

(j = SL;LL; S;A;DD; TD) . (6.2.1.8)
Consequently, if we stipulate the actual calculation method for E

HSj;i;t+1

(= hSj;i;t), we can nd 
S
j;i;t+1. Here, we stipulate this method as follows:
E

HSj;i;t+1

=
HSj;i;t +H
S
j;i;t+1
2
(j = SL;LL; S;A;DD; TD) . (6.2.1.9)
From Eqs.(6.2.1.8) and (6.2.1.9), at this time, Sj;i;t+1 is determined as follows:
Sj;i;t+1 = H
S
j;i;t+1   E

HSj;i;t+1

= HSj;i;t+1  
HSj;i;t +H
S
j;i;t+1
2
=
HSj;i;t+1  HSj;i;t
2
(j = SL;LL; S;A;DD; TD) . (6.2.1.10)
(5) HCj;i;t+1 (j = S;A) H
C
j;i;t+1 (j = S;A) are respectively the actual rates of
capital gains for securities and other nancial assets at the end of scal year
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t (= beginning of scal year t+ 1). The components of hRj;i;t (j = 1; : : : ; NA)
correspond to hCj;i;t (j = 1; : : : ; NA) in Homma (2009, p.7). According to
Homma (2009, p.7), the actual rate of capital gains comprises the certain or
predictable components expressed by hCj;i;t and the uncertain or unpredictable
components, which are some of the components of j;i;t+1 (j = 1; : : : ; NA),
and hCj;i;t is assumed to be exogenous. For this reason, H
C
j;i;t+1 (j = S;A)
is formulated in the same manner as HSj;i;t+1 (j = SL;LL; S;A;DD; TD)
(Eq.(6.2.1.6)):
HCj;i;t+1 = h
C
j;i;t + 
C
j;i;t+1 (j = S;A) , (6.2.1.11)
where Cj;i;t+1 (j = S;A) are respectively the components of the actual rates of
capital gains for securities and other nancial assets that show uncertainty
at the end of scal year t (= beginning of scal year t + 1). The specic
methods of nding hCj;i;t (j = S;A) and 
C
j;i;t+1 (j = S;A) are as follows:
hCj;i;t = E

HCj;i;t+1

=
HCj;i;t +H
C
j;i;t+1
2
(j = S;A) , (6.2.1.12)
Cj;i;t+1 = H
C
j;i;t+1   hCj;i;t = HCj;i;t+1  
HCj;i;t +H
C
j;i;t+1
2
=
HCj;i;t+1  HCj;i;t
2
(j = S;A) , (6.2.1.13)
which are the same as Eqs.(6.2.1.9) and (6.2.1.10), respectively.
(6) HDj;i;t+1 (j = SL;LL) H
D
j;i;t+1 (j = SL;LL) are respectively the actual
default loss rate for the short-term loans and the actual default loss rate
for the long-term loans at the end of scal year t (= beginning of scal
year t + 1). The components of hRj;i;t (j = 1; : : : ; NA) correspond to h
D
j;i;t
(j = 1; : : : ; NA) in Homma (2009, pp.6-9). According to Homma (2009,
pp.6-9, Denitions 2 and 3), in the same manner as with HRj;i;t+1 and H
Q
j;i;t+1
(j = SL;LL), the aforementioned default loss rate comprises the certain or
predictable components expressed by hDj;i;t and the uncertain or unpredictable
components, which are some of the components of j;i;t+1 (j = 1; : : : ; NA),
and the hDj;i;t is expressed as a function of the vector of exogenous variables
having an impact on hDj;i;t, and the short-term or long-term loan balance
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in the overall market. Nevertheless, in the same manner as with rQj;i;t (j =
SL;LL;DD; TD), there is no conrmed reason to conclude that hDj;i;t depends
on the short-term or long-term loan balance in the overall market. Therefore,
we consider that hDj;i;t depends only on the vector of exogenous variables.
Consequently, HDj;i;t+1 (j = SL;LL) is formulated in the same manner as
HQj;i;t+1 (j = SL;LL) (Eq.(6.2.1.5)), as follows:
HDj;i;t+1 = h
D
j;i
 
zDj;i;t

+ Dj;i;t+1 (j = SL;LL) , (6.2.1.14)
where zDj;i;t (j = SL;LL) is the vector of exogenous variables that have an
impact, respectively, on the default loss rate for short-term loans and the
default loss rate for long-term loans at the beginning of scal year t (= end
of scal year t   1). Furthermore, Dj;i;t+1 (j = SL;LL) are the components
of these default loss rates and the rate of provisions and reserve funds that
show uncertainty. The specic method of nding Dj;i;t+1 (j = SL;LL) is the
same as that for Rj;i;t+1 and 
Q
j;i;t+1 (j = SL;LL). Namely, consider 
D
j;i;t+1
(j = SL;LL) to be the error term of a regression equation, specify hDj;i
 
zDj;i;t

(j = SL;LL), and estimate Eq.(6.2.1.14).
(7) HDj;i;t+1 (j = S;A) H
D
j;i;t+1 (j = S;A) are respectively the actual rate
of provisions and reserve funds for securities and the actual rate of provi-
sions and reserve funds for other nancial assets at the end of scal year
t (= beginning of scal year t + 1). In the same manner as with HDj;i;t+1
(j = SL;LL), the components of hRj;i;t (j = 1; : : : ; NA) correspond to h
D
j;i;t
(j = 1; : : : ; NA) in Homma (2009, pp.6-9), and these rates of provisions and
reserve funds comprises the certain or predictable components expressed by
hDj;i;t and the uncertain or unpredictable components, which are some of the
components of j;i;t+1 (j = 1; : : : ; NA). Furthermore, h
D
j;i;t is expressed as a
function of the vector of exogenous variables having an impact on hDj;i;t and
the outstanding amount of securities or other nancial assets in the overall
market. However, there are restrictions on the available data for the vec-
tor of exogenous variables. Therefore, in the same manner as with HSj;i;t+1
(j = SL;LL; S;A;DD; TD) andHCj;i;t+1 (j = S;A), we do not formulate h
D
j;i;t
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endogenously, and hDj;i;t is treated as an exogenous variable. Consequently,
HDj;i;t+1 (j = S;A) is formulated in the same manner as in Eqs.(6.2.1.6) and
(6.2.1.11), as follows:
HDj;i;t+1 = h
D
j;i;t + 
D
j;i;t+1 (j = S;A) , (6.2.1.15)
where Dj;i;t+1 (j = S;A) are respectively the components of the actual rates
of provisions and reserve funds for securities and other nancial assets that
show uncertainty at the end of scal year t (= beginning of scal year t+1).
The specic methods of nding hDj;i;t (j = S;A) and 
D
j;i;t+1 (j = S;A) are the
same as Eqs.(6.2.1.12) and (6.2.1.13), respectively, as follows:
hDj;i;t = E

HDj;i;t+1

=
HDj;i;t +H
D
j;i;t+1
2
(j = S;A) , (6.2.1.16)
Dj;i;t+1 = H
D
j;i;t+1   hDj;i;t = HDj;i;t+1  
HDj;i;t +H
D
j;i;t+1
2
=
HDj;i;t+1  HDj;i;t
2
(j = S;A) . (6.2.1.17)
(8) hIj;i;t (j = DD;TD) h
I
j;i;t (j = DD;TD) are respectively the actual
insurance premium rates for the demand deposits and time deposits at the
beginning of scal year t (= end of scal year t   1). These are the com-
ponents of hRj;i;t (j = NA + 1; : : : ; NA + NL) and are identical to those in
Homma (2009, pp.8-9). According to Homma (2009, pp.8-9, Denition 3), in
the same manner as with HRj;i;t+1 and H
Q
j;i;t+1 (j = DD;TD), the insurance
premium rate comprises the certain or predictable components expressed by
hIj;i;t and the uncertain or unpredictable components, which are some of the
components of j;i;t+1 (j = NA +1; : : : ; NA +NL), and h
I
j;i;t is expressed as a
function of the vector of exogenous variables having an impact on hIj;i;t and
the outstanding amount of demand deposits or time deposits in the overall
market. Nevertheless, Japans deposit insurance rate is stipulated by the
Deposit Insurance Corporation of Japan, which was established through eq-
uity investment by the government, the Bank of Japan, and private nancial
institutions, and so is considered to be exogenous. For this reason, in the
same manner as hSj;i;t (j = DD;TD), we do not formulate h
I
j;i;t endogenously
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and hIj;i;t is treated as an exogenous variable. Furthermore, the uncertain or
unpredictable components are assumed to be zero.
(9) rDi;t r
D
i;t is the subjective discount rate at the beginning of scal year t
(= end of scal year t  1), which is the same as the rate in Homma (2009,
pp.8-9). In the strict sense dened by Homma (2009, pp.8-9), there is no
counterpart to this data, so we estimate this variable as a parameter.
Based on the above consideration, j;i;t+1 (j = SL;LL; S; CL;A;DD; TD;CM)
is found as the total of each component as follows:
j;i;t+1 =
8>>>><>>>>:
Rj;i;t+1 + 
Q
j;i;t+1 + 
S
j;i;t+1   Dj;i;t+1 (j = SL;LL)
Sj;i;t+1 + 
C
j;i;t+1   Dj;i;t+1 (j = S;A)
0 (j = C;CL;CM)
Rj;i;t+1 + 
Q
j;i;t+1 + 
I
j;i;t+1   Sj;i;t+1 (j = DD;TD)
.
(6.2.1.18)
In Homma (2009, pp.7-8, Denition 2), C;i;t+1 is assumed to be nonzero.
However, actually creating the data is extremely di¢ cult and so here it is
assumed to be zero.48 We also assume that j;i;t+1 (j = CL;CM) is zero,
but as stated above, this is because it is thought that there is actually no
uncertainty in HRj;i;t+1, which is a single component of Hj;i;t+1 (j = CL;CM).
6.2.2 Creation of data for components ofHj;i;t+1 (j = SL;LL; S; CL;A;DD; TD;CM)
6.2.2.1 Creation of data for components of Hj;i;t+1 (j = SL;LL)
From Eq.(6.2.1.2), Hj;i;t+1 (j = SL;LL) is composed of Hkj;i;t+1 (j = SL;LL;
k = R;Q; S;D). Furthermore, from Eq.(6.2.1.3), the certain components
of HRj;i;t+1 (j = SL;LL) are expressed as (rj;i
 
Qj;t; z
R
j;i;t

, j = SL;LL), a
function of Qj;t (j = SL;LL) and zRj;i;t (j = SL;LL), and from Eqs.(6.2.1.5)
and (6.2.1.14), the certain components of Hkj;i;t+1 (j = SL;LL; k = Q;D)
are expressed as (rQj;i

zQj;i;t

, hDj;i
 
zDj;i;t

, j = SL;LL), a function of zkj;i;t
(j = SL;LL; k = Q;D). Nevertheless, due to data restrictions, for zkj;i;t
48The creation of data for the uncertain refundment claims and other uncertain exible
payments of deposits and rate of cash equivalents indicated by C;i;t+1 should be a priority
going forward.
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(j = SL;LL; k = R;Q;D), we assume that short-term loans (subscript
j = SL) and long-term loans (subscript j = LL) are identical (subscript
j = L), and we also assume that the collected interest rate (subscript k = R)
and the uncollected interest rate (subscript k = Q) are identical (subscript
k = RQ). Namely, we assume that zkSL;i;t = z
k
LL;i;t
 
= zkL;i;t

(k = R;Q;D)
and zRL;i;t = z
Q
L;i;t

= zRQL;i;t

.49 The data for Hkj;i;t+1 (j = SL;LL; k =
R;Q; S;D), Qj;t (j = SL;LL), and zkL;i;t (k = RQ;D), the data creation,
and the sources of the data are shown in Table 6.2.2.1.
<<Insert Table 6.2.2.1 about here>>
6.2.2.2 Creation of data for components of Hj;i;t+1 (j = S;A) From
Eq.(6.2.1.2), Hj;i;t+1 (j = S;A) is composed of Hkj;i;t+1 (j = S;A; k =
R;S;C;D). From Eqs.(6.2.1.4), (6.2.1.6), (6.2.1.11), and (6.2.1.15), Hj;i;t+1
(j = S;A) is expressed as the sum of the certain components and the uncer-
tain or unpredictable components, but these components are all assumed to
be exogenous. The data, data creation, and sources of the data are shown in
Table 6.2.2.2.
<<Insert Table 6.2.2.2 about here>>
6.2.2.3 Creation of data for components of Hj;i;t+1 (j = CL;CM)
FromEq.(6.2.1.2),Hj;i;t+1 (j = CL;CM) is composed ofHRj;i;t+1 (j = CL;CM)
only. From Eq.(6.2.1.4), Hj;i;t+1 (j = CL;CM) comprises the certain com-
ponents only, which are assumed to be exogenous. The data, data creation,
and sources of the data are shown in Table 6.2.2.3.
<<Insert Table 6.2.2.3 about here>>
6.2.2.4 Creation of data for components of Hj;i;t+1 (j = DD;TD)
FromEq.(6.2.1.2),Hj;i;t+1 (j = DD;TD) is composed ofHkj;i;t+1 (j = DD;TD;
49However, we do not assume that the prime rate, which is an element of zRQL;i;t, is
identical for short-term loans and long-term loans, and we use the short-term prime rate
and the long-term prime rate, respectively.
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k = R;Q; S), hIj;i;t (j = DD;TD), j;i;t (j = DD;TD), and r
D
i;t. Further-
more, from Eq.(6.2.1.3), the certain components ofHRj;i;t+1 (j = DD;TD) are
expressed as (rj;i
 
Qj;t; z
R
j;i;t

, j = DD;TD), a function of Qj;t (j = DD;TD),
and zRj;i;t (j = DD;TD), and from Eq.(6.2.1.5), the certain components of
HQj;i;t+1 (j = DD;TD) are expressed as (r
Q
j;i

zQj;i;t

, j = DD;TD), a func-
tion of zQj;i;t (j = DD;TD). Nevertheless, due to data restrictions, for z
k
j;i;t
(j = DD;TD; k = R;Q), we assume that these are identical for all of
the banks, and that demand deposits (subscript j = DD) and time de-
posits (subscript j = TD) are identical (subscript j = D). We also as-
sume that the paid interest rate (subscript k = R) and the unpaid interest
rate (subscript k = Q) are identical (subscript k = RQ). Namely, we as-
sume that zkDD;i;t = z
k
TD;i;t
 
= zkD;t

(k = R;Q) and zRD;t = z
Q
D;t

= zRQD;t

.
For hIj;i;t (j = DD;TD) and j;i;t (j = DD;TD), we assume h
I
j;i;t = h
I
j;t
and j;i;t = j;t. The data for Hkj;i;t+1 (j = DD;TD; k = R;Q; S), Qj;t
(j = DD;TD), hIj;t (j = DD;TD), j;t (j = DD;TD), and z
RQ
D;t, the data
creation, and the sources of the data are shown in Table 6.2.2.4.
<<Insert Table 6.2.2.4 about here>>
6.2.3 Specication of the endogenous components of SEHRR and
SEHCR
6.2.3.1 Specication of rj;i
 
Qj;t; z
R
j;i;t

in Eq.(6.2.1.3) and rQj;i

zQj;i;t

in Eq.(6.2.1.5) (Subscripts of both functions j = SL;LL;DD; TD)
First, in order to simplify the equations below, we assume that
rj;i
 
Qj;t; z
R
j;i;t

= rRj;i
 
Qj;t; z
R
j;i;t

(j = SL;LL;DD; TD) . (6.2.3.1.1)
From Section 6.2.2.1, we have
zkSL;i;t = z
k
LL;i;t
 
= zkL;i;t

(k = R;Q;D) , zRL;i;t = z
Q
L;i;t

= zRQL;i;t

,
and from Section 6.2.2.4, we have
zkDD;i;t = z
k
TD;i;t
 
= zkD;t

(k = R;Q) , zRD;t = z
Q
D;t

= zRQD;t

.
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Therefore,
rRj;i
 
Qj;t; z
R
j;i;t

= rRj;i

Qj;t; z
RQ
L;i;t

(j = SL;LL) , (6.2.3.1.2a)
rQj;i

zQj;i;t

= rQj;i

zRQL;i;t

(j = SL;LL) , (6.2.3.1.2b)
rRj;i
 
Qj;t; z
R
j;i;t

= rRj;i

Qj;t; z
RQ
D;t

(j = DD;TD) , (6.2.3.1.3a)
rQj;i

zQj;i;t

= rQj;i

zRQD;t

(j = DD;TD) , (6.2.3.1.3b)
For ease of estimation and interpretation of the parameter to be estimated,
we specify the above equations, respectively, as follows:
rRj;i

Qj;t; z
RQ
L;i;t

=
X
i
Rj;i DBi +
 X
s
Rj;s DY As
!
 lnQj;t
+
X
l2f1;2;3;4;6;7;8;9;10;11g
Rj;l  zRQL;l;i;t + Rj;5  ln zRQL;5;i;t
(j = SL;LL) , (6.2.3.1.4a)
rQj;i

zRQL;i;t

=
X
i
Qj;i DBi +
X
l2f1;2;3;4;6;7;8;9;10;11g
Qj;l  zRQL;l;i;t + Qj;5  ln zRQL;5;i;t
(j = SL;LL) , (6.2.3.1.4b)
rRj;i

Qj;t; z
RQ
D;t

=
X
i
Rj;i DBi +
 X
s
Rj;s DY As
!
 lnQj;t + Rj;1  ln zRQD;1;t
+
4X
l=2
Rj;l  zRQD;l;t (j = DD;TD) , (6.2.3.1.5a)
rQj;i

zRQD;t

=
X
i
Qj;i DBi + Qj;1  ln zRQD;1;t +
4X
l=2
Qj;l  zRQD;l;t
(j = DD;TD) , (6.2.3.1.5b)
where DBi is the individual bank dummy variable [which has the value one
(1) in the case of the i-th bank and the value zero (0) otherwise], which takes
into account the existence of the individual e¤ect due to a banks e¤orts to
improve the discrimination and quality (uncollected or unpaid) of its interest
rates through its own initiatives. Regarding improving the quality, examples
include tightening loan screening and monitoring (to the extent possible at
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low cost) and streamlining of the settlement system. Furthermore, DY As is
the period dummy variable in the case that the period covered by the analysis
is split into several sub-periods (the dummy variable is equal to 1 in period
s and 0 in other periods), and Qj;t (j = SL;LL;DD; TD) is a variable for
taking into account market imperfection caused by oligopoly (i.e., total assets
or liabilities in the market). Moreover, zRQL;l;i;t (l = 1  11) is a variable for
controlling various aspects of the impact of the administered interest rate
and the risks of borrowers, and zRQD;l;t (l = 1  4) is a variable to control the
impact of the income of the depositors and the alternative nancial products
to deposits (government bonds, postal savings, and investment trusts).50
From Eqs.(6.2.3.1.1) through (6.2.3.1.5), Eqs.(6.2.1.3) and (6.2.1.5) are
50We took the logarithms of the second and fourth terms of the right-hand side of
Eq.(6.2.3.1.4a), the third term of the right-hand side of Eq.(6.2.3.1.4b), the second and
third terms of the right-hand side of Eq.(6.2.3.1.5a), and the second term of the right-
hand side of Eq.(6.2.3.1.5b) because the units of these variables were not percentages (%)
(unnamed units). Therefore, if we do not take the logarithms, the parameters of these
variables will become dependent on the units. Taking the logarithms has the advantage
that the parameters of these variables can be interpreted as elasticity, and so no longer
depend on the units. The units of all of the variables other than these variables are
percentage (%) (although not multiplied by 100), so this concern does not apply to these
variables.
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expressed as follows:
HRj;i;t+1 =
X
i
Rj;i DBi +
 X
s
Rj;s DY As
!
 lnQj;t
+
X
l2f1;2;3;4;6;7;8;9;10;11g
Rj;l  zRQL;l;i;t + Rj;5  ln zRQL;5;i;t + Rj;i;t+1
(j = SL;LL) , (6.2.3.1.6a)
HQj;i;t+1 =
X
i
Qj;i DBi +
X
l2f1;2;3;4;6;7;8;9;10;11g
Qj;l  zRQL;l;i;t + Qj;5  ln zRQL;5;i;t
+Qj;i;t+1 (j = SL;LL) , (6.2.3.1.6b)
HRj;i;t+1 =
X
i
Rj;i DBi +
 X
s
Rj;s DY As
!
 lnQj;t + Rj;1  ln zRQD;1;t
+
4X
l=2
Rj;l  zRQD;l;t + Rj;i;t+1 (j = DD;TD) , (6.2.3.1.7a)
HQj;i;t+1 =
X
i
Qj;i DBi + Qj;1  ln zRQD;1;t +
4X
l=2
Qj;l  zRQD;l;t + Qj;i;t+1
(j = DD;TD) . (6.2.3.1.7b)
(These equations become the actual estimation equations.)
6.2.3.2 Specication of hDj;i
 
zDj;i;t

(j = SL;LL) in Eq.(6.2.1.14) From
Section 6.2.2.1, zDSL;i;t = z
D
LL;i;t
 
= zDL;i;t

andHDSL;i;t+1 = H
D
LL;i;t+1
 
= HDL;i;t+1

,
and therefore
hDj;i
 
zDj;i;t

= hDL;i
 
zDL;i;t

(j = SL;LL) . (6.2.3.2.1)
In the same manner as with Eq.(6.2.3.1.4a, b) and Eq.(6.2.3.1.5a, b), con-
sidering the easiness of the estimate and the easiness of the interpretation of
the parameter to be estimated, we specify this as follows
hDL;i
 
zDL;i;t

=
X
i
DL;i DBi +
X
l2f1;2;4;5;6;7;8;9;10g
DL;l  zDL;l;i;t + DL;3  ln zDL;3;i;t.
(6.2.3.2.2)
Here, DBi is the same kind of individual bank dummy as in Eq.(6.2.3.1.4a, b)
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and Eq.(6.2.3.1.5a, b) and zDL;l;i;t (l = 1  10) is the variable for controlling
various aspects of the impact of the risks of borrowers in the same manner
as in zRQL;l;i;t (l = 2; 3; 5  11).
Based on Eqs.(6.2.3.2.1) and (6.2.3.2.2), Eq.(6.2.1.14) is expressed as fol-
lows:
HDL;i;t+1 =
X
i
DL;i DBi +
X
l2f1;2;4;5;6;7;8;9;10g
DL;l  zDL;l;i;t+DL;3  ln zDL;3;i;t+ DL;i;t+1,
(6.2.3.2.3)
where DL;i;t+1 (= 
D
SL;i;t+1 = 
D
LL;i;t+1) is the error term. (Equation (6.2.3.2.3)
becomes the actual estimation equation.)
6.3 Variable Cost Function and Cost Share Equations
The important factors in the specication of the variable cost function are
the specication of a functional form that is theoretically exible,51 that
the estimation is comparatively easy, and that stable estimation results can
be obtained. In this section, we attempt to develop such a specication.
Furthermore, as dened in Homma (2009, p.10, Denition 5), we take into
account the impact on the cost structure of (zRQj;i;t; j = L;D) and the quality
variable specied in Tables 6.2.2.1 and 6.2.2.4 and specify the variable cost
function so that the types of impacts of the quality variable on the nancial
goods elasticity of variable cost and cost share and (variable) cost e¢ ciency
can be ascertained. More specically, we attempt to develop the following
type of specication. First, we design the specication so that the variable
cost nancial goods and cost share become a function of the quality variable.
Basically, we specify the rst-order parameters for the nancial goods and
factor prices of the translog variable cost function as a function of the quality
variable. Second, we add an individual dummy variable so that we can
estimate cost e¢ ciency. When doing so, we specify this dummy variable so
that cost e¢ ciency depends on time. Basically, we specify the individual
51Regarding the denition of exibility, see Barnett (1983), Diewert and Wales (1987,
1988), and Barnett, Geweke, and Wolfe (1991). Here, we have in mind exibility in the
sense meant by Diewert and Wales (1987), namely, second-order exibility.
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dummy coe¢ cient as a function of the exogenous technical progress (time
trend) variable.
Taking into account the above considerations, we specify the variable cost
function dened in Homma (2009, p.10, Denition 5) and used in Section 2.1
as follows:
ln
 
CVi;t

pV;i;t

=
X
i
ai
 
DMAi ; 

t
 DBi + X
j2fSL;LLg
aj

zRQGL;i;t

 ln qj;i;t
+
X
j2fDD;TDg
aj

zRQGD;t

 ln qj;i;t +
X
j2fS;C;CL;A;CMg
aj  ln qj;i;t
+
X
j2fL;K;Bg
aj

zRQG;i;t

 ln  pj;i;t pV;i;t + j
+
1
2

XX
bjh  ln qj;i;t  ln qh;i;t
j;h2fSL;LL;S;C;CL;A;DD;TD;CMg
+
1
2

X X
j;h2fL;K;Bg
bjh  ln
 
pj;i;t

pV;i;t + j
  ln  ph;i;t pV;i;t + h
+
XX
bjh  ln qj;i;t  ln
 
ph;i;t

pV;i;t + h

j2fSL;LL;S;C;CL;A;DD;TD;CMg;h2fL;K;Bg
+
X
bjT  ln qj;i;t   t
j2fSL;LL;S;C;CL;A;DD;TD;CMg
+
X
j2fL;K;Bg
bjT  ln
 
pj;i;t

pV;i;t + j
   t
+i;t, (6.3.1a)
ai
 
DMAi ; 

t

= ai + aiMA DMAi + aiT   t + aiTT  ( t )2 + aiTTT  ( t )3 , (6.3.1b)
where CVi;t ( pV;i;t xV;i;t+pL;i;t xL;i;t+pK;i;t xK;i;t+pB;i;t xB;i;t) is the variable
cost, pV;i;t is the current good price, xV;i;t is the amount (input) of current
goods, pL;i;t is the wage, xL;i;t is the amount (input) of labor, pK;i;t is the
physical capital price, xK;i;t is the amount (input) of physical capital, pB;i;t is
the interest rate of certicates of deposit and other liabilities, and xB;i;t is the
outstanding amount of certicates of deposit and other liabilities. Moreover,
j (j = L;K;B) is a parameter added in order to ensure that the variable
cost function in Eq.(6.3.1a) satises the concavity condition for the factor
prices for a larger sample. We created this parameter with reference to the
prior a¢ ne transformation presented by Barnett (1985) and we stipulated
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it as j = [minimum value of pj;i;t

pV;i;t    0:991]. Furthermore, in order
to facilitate interpretation of the parameter, we standardize the nancial
goods qj;i;t (j = SL;LL; S; C; CL;A;DD; TD;CM) and factor prices p

j;i;t
(j = V; L;K;B) by dividing by the mean value for the total data. Moreover,
DMAi is the M&A dummy variable [a variable that has the value one (1) after
an M&A and the value zero (0) before that],  t is the technical progress
variable (time trend,  t = 1   1992), DBi is the individual bank dummy
variable [a variable that has the value one (1) in the case of the i-th bank
and the value zero (0) otherwise], and i;t is the error term. We dene
the coe¢ cients al

zRQGL;i;t

(l 2 fSL;LLg), al

zRQGD;t

(l 2 fDD;TDg), and
al

zRQG;i;t

(l 2 fK;L;Bg) as a function of the quality variable
zRQGL;i;t 

zRQL;4;i;t; z
RQ
L;5;i;t; z
RQ
L;8;i;t; z
RQ
L;10;i;t; z
RQ
L;11;i;t;
0
, zRQGD;t 

zRQD;2;t; z
RQ
D;3;t; z
RQ
D;4;t
0
,
zRQG;i;t 

zRQL;2;i;t; z
RQ
L;6;i;t; z
RQ
L;7;i;t; z
RQ
D;2;t; z
RQ
D;3;t
0
,
specifying them as follows:
al

zRQGL;i;t

= al +
X
j2f4;5;8;10;11g
aZLlj  zRQL;j;i;t (l 2 fSL;LLg) , (6.3.1c)
al

zRQGD;t

= al +
4X
j=2
aZDlj  zRQD;j;t (l 2 fDD;TDg) , (6.3.1d)
al

zRQG;i;t

= al +
X
j2f2;6;7g
aZLlj  zRQL;j;i;t +
3X
j=2
aZDlj  zRQD;j;t
(l 2 fK;L;Bg) . (6.3.1e)
By taking the partial derivative of the translog cost function in Eq.(6.3.1a)
with respect to ln (pj;i;t /pV;i;t ) (j = L;K;B), we can derive the cost share
equations of labor, physical capital, and certicates of deposit and other
liabilities. By simultaneously estimating these cost share equations with the
variable cost function in Eq.(6.3.1a), we can obtain a more e¢ cient estimate
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than if we estimate Eq.(6.3.1a) alone.
Shi;t =
ph;i;t
ph;i;t + h  pV;i;t

24ah zRQG;i;t+ X
j2fL;K;Bg
bjh  ln
 
pj;i;t

pV;i;t + j

+
X
bjh  ln qj;i;t
j2fSL;LL;S;C;CL;A;DD;TD;CMg
+ bhT   t
35+ "hi;t (h 2 fK;L;Bg) ,
(6.3.2)
where Shi;t (h 2 fK;L;Bg) is the cost share of each input factor (= (pj;i;t  xj;i;t)/CVi;t
= @ ln
 
CVi;t

pV;i;t
 
@ ln
 
pj;i;t

pV;i;t

, where xj;i;t is the input of the j-th
factor), and "hi;t is the error term.
7 Appendix: Estimation Results of the EGURM
7.1 Loan Rate and Deposit Rate Functions
The estimation results of Eqs.(6.2.3.1.6a, b), (6.2.3.1.7a, b), and (6.2.3.2.3)
are shown in Tables 7.1.1 through 7.1.8.
<<Insert Table 7.1.1 about here>>
<<Insert Table 7.1.2 about here>>
<<Insert Table 7.1.3 about here>>
<<Insert Table 7.1.4 about here>>
<<Insert Table 7.1.5 about here>>
<<Insert Table 7.1.6 about here>>
<<Insert Table 7.1.7 about here>>
<<Insert Table 7.1.8 about here>>
7.2 Variable Cost Function
The estimation results of Eqs.(6.3.1a) and (6.3.2) are shown in Table 7.2.1,
and the estimation results of ai
 
DMAi ; 

t

are shown in Table 7.2.2.
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<<Insert Table 7.2.1 about here>>
<<Insert Table 7.2.2 about here>>
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Table 3.1: Financial Goods Data and its Service Function 
Table 3.1: Financial Goods Data and Corresponding Service Function  
 Variable  Name  Service function  Data and creation of the data Source 
(Note 1)  
 
, 1G tp   General price index  
― GDP deflator (b) 
, , 1SL i tq   Short-term loans  
Settlement of 
accounts  
[Loans for a period of one year or less, or with no 
period stipulated (= overdraft + bankers’ 
acceptances and discounted bills + loans on 
bills)]/ , 1G tp   
(a) 
, , 1LL i tq   Long-term loans  
Financial 
intermediation  
[Loans for a period in excess of one year (= loans on 
deeds)]/ , 1G tp   
(a) 
, , 1S i tq   Securities  Financial intermediation  
[Trading assets (trading securities) + trading assets 
(derivatives of trading securities) + trading assets 
(securities) + trading assets (derivatives of 
securities) - trading liabilities (trading securities sold 
for short sales) - trading liabilities (derivatives of 
trading securities) - trading liabilities (securities 
related to trading transactions sold for short sales) - 
trading liabilities (derivatives of securities related to 
trading transactions) + total trading securities + 
total securities + depreciation of bonds - retirement 
of government bonds, etc. + write-offs of stocks and 
other securities]/ , 1G tp   
(a) 
, , 1C i tq   Cash  Settlement of accounts  Cash/ , 1G tp   
(a) 
, , 1CL i tq   Due from banks and 
call loans  
Settlement of 
accounts  [Due from banks + call loans]/ , 1G tp   
(a) 
F
in
an
cial A
ssets  
, , 1A i tq   Other financial 
assets  
Financial 
intermediation  
[Money held in trust + bills bought + monetary 
claims and bills bought + foreign bills bought + 
foreign bills receivable + due to foreign banks + due 
from foreign banks + (total other assets - accrued 
income - financial derivative instruments (asset) and 
credit relevant to derivatives) - foreign bills sold - 
foreign bills payable]/ , 1G tp   
(a) 
, , 1DD i tq 
 
Demand 
deposits  
Settlement of 
accounts  
[Current deposits + ordinary deposits + savings 
deposits + deposits at notice + installment 
savings]/ , 1G tp   
(a) 
, , 1TD i tq   Time deposits  
Financial 
intermediation 
(Note 2)  
[Time deposits]/ , 1G tp   (a) 
L
iabilities  
, , 1CM i tq 
 
Call money 
and 
borrowed 
money  
Settlement of 
accounts  [Call money + borrowed money]/ , 1G tp   
(a) 
V
ariable In
p
u
t 
, , 1CD i tq   Certificates of deposit 
and other 
liabilities  
Financial 
intermediation  
[Certificates of deposit + bonds + bills sold + 
payables under repurchase agreements + 
commercial paper + due to foreign banks + due from 
foreign banks + corporate bonds + convertible bonds 
+ (total other liabilities - accrued expenses - financial 
derivative instruments (liability) and obligation 
relevant to derivatives)]/ , 1G tp   
(a) 
(Note) 1. The sources of the data are as follows: (a) The Nikkei NEEDS Company 
(Bank) Data File CD-ROM (Nikkei Media Marketing, Inc.) and (b) The National 
Economic Accounting (Cabinet Office). 
2. However, time deposits with a period of less than six months for which the 
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depositor is not an individual provide a settlement service. 
 
Table 4.1: Estimation Results of Stochastic Euler Equations 
Table 4.1: Estimation Results of Stochastic Euler Equations 
Parameter Estimate Standard 
Error 
t-statistic p-value 
Utility Function 
7586 (1975-1986) 0.709058 0.029679 23.8907 0.000 
8789 (1987-1989) 0.943351 0.031458 29.9877 0.000 
9095 (1990-1995) 0.766062 0.016985 45.1031 0.000 
9601 (1996-2001) 0.804701 0.733752 310  1096.69 0.000 
0207 (2002-2007) 0.676386 0.444245 210  152.255 0.000 
,7586e  
(1975-1986) 
0.303715 210  0.112171 210  2.70760 0.007 
,8789e  
(1987-1989) 
-0.284524 210  0.434088 210  -0.655454 0.512 
,9095e  
(1990-1995) 
0.717981 210  0.227717 210  3.15295 0.002 
,9601e  
(1996-2001) 
0.129797 210  0.400666 210  0.323953 0.746 
,0207e  
(2002-2007) 
0.209067 210  0.292592 310  7.14534 0.000 
  0.213931  810 3395.22 6300.95 0.000 
e  40427.0 0.137324 810  0.294391  1410 0.000 
Subjective Rate of Time Preference 
S  0.099778 0.046006 2.16878 0.030 
, 1 , 1 ,
QS
i t i t i tE u     z   (Eqs. (29a), (29b), (31a), and (31b)) 
,1
MU
Lb (( )) ,1, ,
RQ
L i tz -0.771490 0.724347 -1.06508 0.287 
,2
MU
Lb (( ,2, ,
RQ
L i tz )) 0.133409 0.082446 1.61814 0.106 
,4
MU
Lb (( ,4, ,
RQ
L i tz )) -0.071821 0.196516 -0.365473 0.715 
93 
 
,5
MU
Lb (( )) ,5, ,ln
RQ
L i tz 0.931507
210  0.757295 210  1.23004 0.219 
,6
MU
Lb (( ,6, ,
RQ
L i tz )) -0.100290 0.043959 -2.28142 0.023 
,7
MU
Lb (( ,7, ,
RQ
L i tz )) 0.087812 0.048622 1.80600 0.071 
,8
MU
Lb (( )) ,8, ,
RQ
L i tz 0.175797 0.065302 2.69204 0.007 
,9
MU
Lb (( )) ,9, ,
RQ
L i tz 0.179860 0.051997 3.45901 0.001 
,10
MU
Lb (( )) ,10, ,
RQ
L i tz -0.093373 0.065219 -1.43169 0.152 
,11
MU
Lb (( )) ,11, ,
RQ
L i tz -0.050878 0.039563 -1.28600 0.198 
,1
MU
Db (( ,1,ln
RQ
D tz )) -0.033642 0.014189 -2.37101 0.018 
,2
MU
Db (( ,2,
RQ
D tz )) -0.324335 0.386155 -0.839909 0.401 
,3
MU
Db (( ,3,
RQ
D tz )) 0.926474 0.482166 1.92148 0.055 
,4
MU
Db (( ,4,
RQ
D tz )) 0.389739
510  0.535758 510  0.727453 0.467 
MU
Sb (( )) , ,S i tr -0.172327 0.189028 -0.911650 0.362 
MU
CLb (( )) , ,CL i tr -0.026669 0.067848 -0.393061 0.694 
MU
Ab (( , ,A i tr )) 0.032341 0.017352 1.86380 0.062 
MU
CMb (( )) , ,CM i tr 0.057061 0.063390 0.900159 0.368 
MU
CDb (( , ,B i tp )) -0.063213 0.021828 -2.89596 0.004 
MU
Ib (( )) , 1
I
TD th  -30.7625 24.0484 -1.27919 0.201 
MUb (( )) , 1TD t  -1.61975 0.763286 -2.12208 0.034 
2
MUa  
(Shinsei Bank) 
1.39800 0.177104 7.89368 0.000 
3
MUa  
(Aozora Bank) 
1.37495 0.183106 7.50900 0.000 
4
MUa  
(Mizuho Bank) 
1.43167 0.182540 7.84306 0.000 
5
MUa  
(Sakura Bank) 
1.43656 0.183102 7.84570 0.000 
6
MUa  1.42263 0.182074 7.81349 0.000 
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(Mizuho 
Corporate Bank) 
7
MUa  
(Bank of 
Tokyo-Mitsubishi 
UFJ) 
1.42719 0.182652 7.81369 0.000 
8
MUa  
(Asahi Bank) 
1.42200 0.184491 7.70772 0.000 
9
MUa  
(UFJ Bank) 
1.42701 0.181834 7.84787 0.000 
10
MUa  
(Sumitomo 
Mitsui Banking 
Corp.) 
1.42889 0.181983 7.85181 0.000 
11
MUa  
(Resona Bank) 
1.44148 0.181327 7.94959 0.000 
12
MUa  
(Tokai Bank) 
1.42914 0.181707 7.86506 0.000 
13
MUa  
(Hokkaido 
Takushoku Bank) 
1.44099 0.182963 7.87584 0.000 
14
MUa  
(Taiyo Kobe 
Bank) 
1.42849 0.182427 7.83049 0.000 
15
MUa  
(Bank of Tokyo) 
1.32040 0.187119 7.05647 0.000 
16
MUa  
(Saitama Bank) 
1.42827 0.182019 7.84678 0.000 
Conjectural Derivative 
,7586SL  
(1975-1986) 
0.711132 0.783290 0.907878 0.364 
,8789SL  
(1987-1989) 
-0.935697 8.40830 -0.111283 0.911 
,9095SL  
(1990-1995) 
2.38858 5.14496 0.464257 0.642 
,9601SL  
(1996-2001) 
0.082899 4.12871 0.020079 0.984 
,0207SL  0.187808 4.10336 0.045769 0.963 
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(2002-2007) 
,7586LL  
(1975-1986) 
1.00442 1.47666 0.680193 0.496 
,8789LL  
(1987-1989) 
0.086713 7.16856 0.012096 0.990 
,9095LL  
(1990-1995) 
2.93477 4.43296 0.662033 0.508 
,9601LL  
(1996-2001) 
0.710611 6.69762 0.106099 0.916 
,0207LL  
(2002-2007) 
0.551783 3.63936 0.151616 0.879 
,9295DD  
(1992-1995) 
-0.999456 21.9468 -0.045540 0.964 
,9601DD  
(1996-2001) 
-0.949747 35.9673 -0.026406 0.979 
,0207DD  
(2002-2007) 
-0.960432 25.2971 -0.037966 0.970 
,8589TD  
(1985-1989) 
1.02627 0.574045 1.78779 0.074 
,9095TD  
(1990-1995) 
0.595449 0.743474 0.800901 0.423 
,9601TD  
(1996-2001) 
1.01543 0.829179 1.22462 0.221 
,0207TD  
(2002-2007) 
1.02608 0.697260 1.47159 0.141 
Number of 
Observations 
349 
Order of MA for  
the Error Term 
1 
Test for 
Overidentification 
[p-value] 
176.260 
[0.999] 
Value Function 0.505044 
Note: 1. The exogenous state variables in double parentheses represent the elements of 
 in Eqs. (29a) and (29b).  ,i tz
2. The GMM estimates take into account the heteroskedasticity of an unknown 
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form in error terms and autocorrelation, in which case we specify a first-order 
moving average process. Bartlett kernels were specified for the kernel density 
to insure positive definiteness of the covariance matrix of the orthogonal 
conditions, when the number of autocorrelation terms is positive. 
 
 
Table 4.2.1: Estimation Results of the Relative Risk-Aversion 
Table 4.2.1: Estimation Results of the Relative Risk-Aversion 
Relative Risk-Aversion Estimates 
75861   0.290942  [0.000]  (9.80287)
87891   0.056649 (1.80079) [0.072] 
90951   0.233938 (13.7735) [0.000] 
96011   0.195299 (266.165) [0.000] 
02071   0.323614 (72.8459) [0.000] 
1 s represents the relative risk-aversion in period s, where s  Note: 1. is the risk 
a e parameter. For example, 96011ttitud   represents e relative 
risk-aversion in the period of 1996-2001. 
he numbers in parentheses represent asym
th
2. T ptotic t-values. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. The numbers in brackets represent estimated p-values. 
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 Table 4.2.2: Estimation Results of the Reference Rate (Risk-Free Rate) 
Table 4.2.2: Estimation Results of the Reference Rate (Risk-Free Rate) 
Periods Reference Rate 
(Risk-Free Rate) 
Call Rate 
1975-20 riods) 0.010 00] 07 (all pe 233 (5.79772) [0.0 0.042973 
1975-1986 0.011917 (4.28790) [0.000] 0.067114 
1987-1989 0.0088886 (4.48890) 
[0.000] 
0.043786 
1990-1995 0.017572 (4 000] 0.041338 .00431) [0.
1996-2001 0.0051072 (7.88712) [0.000] 0.  0025722
 0.003511996-1998 03 (1.55825) [0.119] 0.0041639 
 1999-2001 0.0069940 (2.16013) [0.031] 0.00061879 
2002-2007 -0.0044852 (-1.13645) 
[0.256] 
0.0012408 
Note: 1. The numbers in parentheses r asymptotic t-values. 
2. The numbers in brackets represent estimated p-values. 
 
epresent 
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Table 4.3.1: Estimation Results of SURPs, CURPs, and GURPs 
PsTable 4.3.1: Estimation Results of SURPs, CURPs, and GUR  
GURP and  
Components
Time 
 
Short-Term 
Loans 
Long-Term 
Loans 
Demand 
Deposits Deposits 
GURP 
(= Marginal  
Variable Cost) 
0.02250 0.02051 0.01058 -0  .02537
Risk-Adjustment -0.005315 
(-2.707) 
((-0.2363)) 
-0.02117 
(-11.12) 
((-1.032)) 
0.008916 
(4.623) 
((0.8425)) 
0.02586 
(12.14) 
((-1.019)) 
Effect 
[0.007] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Equity Capital  
Effect 
((0.1894)) ((0.2077)) (( ) 
-  
((0.1679)) 
0  
(5.191) 
.004260
[0.000] 
0  
(5.191) 
.004260
[0.000] 
-  
(-5.191) 
0.004260
[0.000] 
-0.4025)
0.004260
(-5.191) 
[0.000] 
CURP 0  0.02355 
(16.47) 
[0.000] 
0.03742 
(30.16) 
[0.000] 
.005927
(4.453) 
[0.000] 
-0.04697 
(-30.76) 
[0.000] 
Market 
Structure and  
  
-0 9 
((- ) 
-0.001369 
((-0.06675)) 
-0.
(-0.002769) 
8] 
-  
((0.1942)) 
Conduct
Effect 
.000652
(-1.000) 
[0.317] 
0.02902)
(-2.027) 
[0.043] 
1386 10´ 5-  
[0.99
((-0.000131)) 
0.004928
(-7.684) 
[0.000] 
SURP 0
((1.076)) 
0  
((0.5602)) 
.02420 
(14.69) 
[0.000] 
0.03878 
(23.18) 
[0.000] 
((1.891)) 
.005928
(3.795) 
[0.000] 
-0.04204 
(-25.40) 
[0.000] 
((1.657)) 
Note: 1. The numbers in parentheses rep mptotic  
 
 
resent asy  t-values.
2. The numbers in brackets represent estimated p-values. 
3. The numbers in double parentheses represent proportions with respect to
GURPs. 
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Table 4.3.2: Estimation Results of SURPs, CURPs, and GURPs of 
on Results of SURPs, CURPs, and GURPs of Short-Term Loan
Short-Term Loans 
Table 4.3.2: Estimati s 
GURP and
C
  
omponents 
1975-1986 1987-1989 1990-1995 1996-2001 2002-2007 
GURP 
(= Marginal  
Variable Cost) 
0.04605 0.006121 0.001394 0.005163 0.002211 
Risk-Adjustment 0.002825 
(2.188) 
((0.06135)) 
-0.02138 
(-6.802) 
-0.01952 
(-4.589) 
((-14.00)) 
0.01075 
(1.984) 
((2.083)) 
-0.01342 
(-3.398) 
((-6.068)) 
Effect 
[0.029] [0.000] 
((-3.493)) 
[0.000] [0.047] [0.001] 
Equity Capital  
Effect 
((0.1218)) (
0
(2.605) 
.005611 
[0.009] 
-  
(-0.6533) 
0.002981
[0.514] 
(-0.4870)) 
0.01072 
(3.173) 
[0.002] 
((7.692)) ((1.673)) 
0
(0.3239) 
.001841 
[0.746] 
((0.3565)) 
0.003699 
(7.382) 
[0.000] 
CURP 0 -0.03762 
(16.25) 
[0.000] 
.03048 
(9.724) 
[0.000] 
0.01019 
(2.912) 
[0.004] 
0.007431 
(-2.705) 
[0.007] 
0.01193 
(3.202) 
[0.001] 
Market 
Structure  
ct 
-0 0 
((-0.0114)) 
-0 8 
(- )
and  
Conduct Effe
.000526
(-2.180) 
[0.029] 
.000021
0.007648
-0.001474  
(-0.6574) 
-0
(-0.2623) 
-0 1
[0.511] 
((-1.058)) 
.0005721 
[0.793] 
((-0.1108)) 
.000801
 
[0.994] 
((-0.0036)) 
(-0.2893) 
(
[0.772] 
(-0.3623)) 
SURP 0.03814 
(16.00) 
[0.000] 
((0.8282)) ((4.984)) ((8.370)) 
-0  
((-1.328)) ((3.022)) 
0.03050 
(15.77) 
[0.000] 
0.01167 
(2.609) 
[0.009] 
.006859
(-10.55) 
[0.000] 
0.01273 
(3.374) 
[0.001] 
Note: 1. The numbers these t asy t-valu
2. The number es. 
3. The numbers in double parentheses represent proportions with respect to 
GURPs. 
 
 in paren s represen mptotic es. 
s in brackets represent estimated p-valu
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Table 4.3.3: Estimation Results of SURPs, CURPs, and GURPs of 
ion Results of SURPs, CURPs, and GURPs of Long-Term Loan
Long-Term Loans 
Table 4.3.3: Estimat s 
GURP and
C
  
omponents 
1975-1986 1987-1989 1990-1995 1996-2001 2002-2007 
GURP 
(= Marginal  
Variable Cost) 
0.01780 0.02031 0.01609 0.02637 0.03101 
Risk-Adjustment -0.04335 
(-28.33) 
((-2.436)) 
-0.02434 
(-8.806) 
-0.01263 
(-2.918) 
((-0.7851))
Effect 
[0.000] [0.000] 
((-1.199)) 
[0.004] 
0.02171 
(7.538) 
((0.8231)) 
0.008846 
(4.036) 
(
[0.000] [0.000] 
(0.2852))  
Equity Capital  
Effect 
((0.3152)) 
-0.005611 
(2.605) 
[0.009] 
0.002981 
(-0.6533) 
[0.514] 
((-0.1468)) 
0.01072 
(3.173) 
[0.002] 
((0.6666)) 
0.001841 
(0.3239) 
[0.746] 
((0.06981)) 
0.003699 
((0.1193)) 
(7.382) 
[0.000] 
CURP 0.05554 0  
(20.760) 
[0.000] 
0.04763 
(13.13) 
[0.000] 
0.01799 
(3.956) 
[0.000] 
.002825
(0.4861) 
[0.627] 
0.01847 
(8.158) 
[0.000] 
Market 
Structure  
ct 
-  
((-0.0419)) 
-0 5
and  
Conduct Effe
0.0007453
(-1.359) 
[0.174] 
.000530  
(-0.1516) 
[0.880] 
-0.002546 -
(-0.2554) 
((-0.0552)) 
-00.001456 
[0.798] 
.001693 
(-0.8866) 
[0.375] 
((-0.1583)) 
(-0.4258) 
(
[0.670] 
(-0.0546))((-0.0261))  
SURP 0.05628 
(23.12) 
[0.000] 
((3.162)) 
0  
((0.1623)) ((0.6501)) 
0.04816 
(24.46) 
[0.000] 
((2.371)) 
0.02054 
(4.553) 
[0.000] 
((1.277)) 
.004280
(6.513) 
[0.000] 
0.02016 
(5.302) 
[0.000] 
Note: 1. The numbers these nt as t-val
 
 
 in paren s represe ymptotic ues. 
2. The numbers in brackets represent estimated p-values. 
3. The numbers in double parentheses represent proportions with respect to
GURPs. 
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Table 4.3.4: Estimation Results of SURPs, CURPs, and GURPs of Demand 
.4: Estimation Results of SURPs, CURPs, and GURPs of Demand Deposit
Deposits 
Table 4.3 s 
GURP and
C
  
omponents 
1975-1986 1987-1989 1990-1995 1996-2001 2002-2007 
GURP 
(= Marginal  
Variable Cost) 
-0.01662 0.04078 0.06767 0.009432 -0.003034 
Risk-Adjustmen -0.01468 
(-11.95) 
((0.8835)) 
0.03191 
(6.434) 
((0.7825))
t Effect 
[0.000] [0.000] 
0.06033 
(12.53) 
((0.8915))
[0.000] 
0.006491 
(2.472) 
((0.6882)) 
0.006007 
(3.164) 
((-1.980)) 
[0.013] [0.002] 
  
Equity Capital  
Effect 
-0.005611 
((0.3376)) 
0  
(
(-2.605) 
[0.009] 
.002981
(0.6533) 
[0.514] 
(0.0731)) 
-0.01072 
(-3.173) 
[0.002] 
-  
((-0.1952)) 
-0.003699 0.001841
(-0.3239) 
[0.746] 
(-7.382) 
[0.000] 
((1.219)) ((-0.1585)) 
CURP 0  -  ― ― 0.01807 
(4.995) 
[0.000] 
.004782
(1.065) 
[0.287] 
0.005342
(-2.888) 
[0.004] 
Market 
Structure  
ct 
― ― 
and  
Conduct Effe
-0.2855
410  
( )-0.02281  
[0.982] 
((-0.000422)) 
-0.6229
510  
(- ) 
[0.999] 
(- )0.001397
((-0.00066)) 
-0.5425
510  
0.001564  
[0.999] 
((0.001788)) 
SURP 0.003675 
(1.665) 
((-0.221)) 
0.005888
[0.096] 
 
(3.196) 
(
[0.001] 
(0.1444)) 
0.01811 
(4.179) 
[0.000] 
0  
((0.5077)) 
-0.005336 .004789
(7.346) 
[0.000] 
(-1.425) 
[0.154] 
((1.759)) ((0.2674)) 
Note: 1. The number the sent ic t-va
 
 
s in paren ses repre asymptot lues. 
2. The numbers in brackets represent estimated p-values. 
3. The numbers in double parentheses represent proportions with respect to
GURPs. 
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Table 4.3.5: Estimation Results of SURPs, CURPs, and GURPs of Time 
.3.5: Estimation Results of SURPs, CURPs, and GURPs of Time Deposits
Deposits 
Table 4  
GURP and
Com
  
ponents 
1975-1986 1987-1989 1990-1995 1996-2001 2002-2007 
GURP 
(= Marginal  
Variable Cost) 
-0.02603 -0.02315 -0.02034 -0.02886 -0.02876 
Risk-Adjustment 0.03380 
(26.51) 
((-1.299)) 
0.04478 
(9.136) 
((-1.934)) 
0.03126 
(6.879) 
((-1.537)) 
-0.004289 
(-1.132) 
((0.1486)) 
0.005587 
(2.274) 
((-0.1943))
Effect 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.257] [0.023] 
 
Equity Capital  
Effect 
-0.005611 
((0.2155)) 
0  
((-0.1288))
(-2.605) 
[0.009] 
.002981
(0.6533) 
[0.514] 
 
-0.01072 
(-3.173) 
[0.002] 
((0.5274)) 
-  
((0.06378)) 
-0.0036990.001841
(-0.3239) 
[0.746] 
 
(-7.382) 
[0.000] 
((0.1286)) 
CURP - -  - -0.02273 0.05422 
(-22.64) 
[0.000] 
0.07092
(-27.53) 
[0.000] 
0.04087 
(-10.20) 
[0.000] 
(-4.693) 
[0.000] 
-0.03065 
(-12.00) 
[0.000] 
Market 
Structure  
ct 
-0.0008696 
((0.03341)) 
-
and  
Conduct Effe
(-12.210) 
[0.000] 
0.006781 
(-3.533) 
[0.000] 
-0.006806 
(-2.156) 
[0.031] 
((0.2929)) ((0.3347)) 
-0.01063 
(-2.428) 
[0.015] 
((0.3684)) (
-0.01239 
(-2.933) 
[0.003] 
(0.4307)) 
SURP -0.05335 
(-22.34) 
[0.000] 
((2.050)) 
-0.06414 
(-32.30) 
[0.000] 
((2.770)) 
-  -
((0.4192)) 
-
((0.6349))
0.03406
(-7.474) 
[0.000] 
((1.675)) 
0.01210 
(-18.26) 
[0.000] 
0.01826 
(-4.811) 
[0.000] 
 
Note: 1. The numbers these nt as t-val
 
 
 in paren s represe ymptotic ues. 
2. The numbers in brackets represent estimated p-values. 
3. The numbers in double parentheses represent proportions with respect to
GURPs. 
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Table 4.4.1: Estimation Results of Factors in the Cost Efficiency 
Table 4.4.1: Estimation Results of Factors in the Cost Efficiency 
Independ
Variab
ent 
les 
Equation (35) Equation (36) Equation (37) 
(Parameters) 
-0.000865114 
(-8.294 ]01) [0.000
Loan  and s for Small  ― -0.00101886 
(-7.19252) [0.000]
Medium Firms per 
Case ( LSMFC , LE )   
Employees per  
Branch ( EB , LE ) 
― 0.00228688 
(2.36606) [0.018] (2.37936) [0.017] 
0.00268288 
Constant m Ter  
( LSMFC , EB , LE ) 
0.790926 
(50.47 00] (11.9524) [0.000] (11.6606) [0.000] 47) [0.0
0.649631 0.659662 
Ad  R qu djusted -s are  0.085668 0.067564 0.143802 
Number of 
Observations 
331 349 331 
Ord  the 
Err
er of MA for
or Term 
6 11 12 
Test for 
Overidentification  
[
20.2516 19.3177 19.4499 
p-value] 
[0.122] [0.153] [0.148] 
Value Function 0. 0. 0.061183 055352 058761 
N rs in par epresent est lues. 
2. The numbers in brackets represent estimated p-values. 
3. The GMM estimates take into account the heteroskedasticity of an unknown 
form in error terms and autocorrelation, in which case we specify a moving 
average process. Bartlett kernels were specified for the kernel density to insure 
positive definiteness of the covariance matrix of the orthogonal conditions, 
when the number of autocorrelation terms is positive. 
 
ote: 1. The numbe entheses r imated t-va
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Table 4.4.2: Estimation Results of Factors in the Risk-Adjustment Effects: 
4.2: Estimation Results of Factors in the Risk-adjustment Effects: Eq.(32
Eq.(32) 
Table 4. ) 
Independent Short-Term Long-Term Demand Time 
Variables Loans Loans Deposits Deposits 
(Parameters) 
Sho
Prime Rate 
r
( R
t-Term 
SL ) 
0  
(1.75009) 
.103561
[0.080] 
― ― ― 
Long-Term 
Prime Rate ( RLL ) 
― -0.325332 
(-8.35438) 
― ― 
[0.000] 
Interest Rate
Ordinary  
 of 
Savings ( RDD ) 
― 0.403824 
(3.23753) 
― ― 
[0.001] 
Yield on 
Governme Bnt onds 
( RTD ) 
― ― -0.103763 
(-3.70091) 
― 
[0.000] 
Cost Efficiency 
( Ej ) 
0.034107 
(5.62417) 
-0.031586 
(-9.92534) 
-0.123998 
(-14.7751) (9.68613) 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
0.034251 
[0.000] 
Sum of 
Capital, Capital  
and  
 
Reserve, 
Corporate Bonds 
1975-1986( ,1
CC
j RCB ) 
0.167385 
710  
(  
[0.594] 
0.533470)
-0.156691 
710  
(-0.856728) 
[0.392] 
-0.103373 
610  
(-2.42135) 
[0.015] [0.000] 
0.172116 
610  
(10.6106) 
Sum of  
Capital, Cap
-  
[0.000] 
0  0.354500
710  
(-4.08585) 
.214590
710  
(6.00490) 
[0.000] 
0  .683509
710  
(4.40654) 
ital  
and  Reserve, 
Corporate Bonds 
1987-1989( ,2
C
j CRCB ) 
[0.000] 
0.627868 
[0.000] 
710  
(12.6811) 
Sum of  
Capital, Cap
-0.676627 
[0.153] 
810  
(-1.42962) 
0.223194 
710  
(12.1135) 
[0.000] 
0  .381060
710  
(4.99995) 
ital  
and  Reserve, 
Corporate Bonds 
1990-1995( ,3
C
j CRCB ) 
[0.000] 
0
[0.000] 
.170082 
710  
(8.40000) 
Sum of  
Capital, Cap
0  
[0.000] 
.149083
710  
(5.14175) 
0.275788 
710  
(18.3361) 
[0.000] 
0  .505048
810  
(1.68851) 
ital  
and  Reserve, 
Corporate Bonds 
1996-2001( C ,4j CRCB ) 
[0.091] 
-  
[0.000] 
0.227016
710  
(-13.5353) 
Sum of  
Capital, Capital  
and  
[0.000] 
Reserve, 
Corporate Bonds 
0.138375 
710  
(9.12397) 
0.101391 
710  
(12.7794) 
[0.000] 
-  0.829159
810  
(-6.46714) 
[0.000] 
-  
[0.000] 
0.863491
810  
(-12.0423) 
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2002-2007( CC ,5j RCB ) 
Constant Term 
( j ) 
-  
(-8.77938) 
0.  
(2.84436) 
0  
(15.4961) 
0.  
(3.13376) 
0.043483
[0.000] 
00641773
[0.004] 
.094781
[0.000] 
00761250
[0.002] 
R- u d sq are 0.067048 0.395511 0.089365 0.414411 
Number of 
bservationsO  
348 
Order of MA for the 
Error Term 
3 
Test for 
Overidentification 
84.8697 
[0.860] 
[p-value] 
V 0  alue Function .243879
Note: 1. The numbers in parentheses represent est lues. 
asticity of an unknown 
 
imated t-va
2. The numbers in brackets represent estimated p-values. 
3. The GMM estimates take into account the heterosked
form in error terms and autocorrelation, in which case we specify a third-order 
moving average process. Bartlett kernels were specified for the kernel density 
to insure positive definiteness of the covariance matrix of the orthogonal 
conditions, when the number of autocorrelation terms is positive. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
106 
 
Table 4.4.3: Estimation Results of Factors in the Risk-Adjustment Effects: 
.4.3: Estimation Results of Factors in the Risk-adjustment Effects: Eq.(33
Eq.(33) 
Table 4 ) 
Independent Short-Term Long-Term Demand Time 
Variables Loans Loans Deposits Deposits 
Loa
Provi
n Loss  
sion Rate 
( XSL , XLL ) 
-1.44926 
(-12.3975) (11.2065) 
[0.000] 
0.459855 
[0.000] 
― ― 
Proportion of 
Loans for Small and 
 
Medium  
Firms ( YSL , YLL ) 
0  
(9.22319) 
0
(2.84891) 
― ― .055029
[0.000] 
.012583 
[0.004] 
Reserve 
Requirement Ratio 
osits 
for 
Demand  
Dep ( XDD ) 
-1.23148 
(-4.44735) 
― ― ― 
[0.000] 
Reserve 
Requirement Ratio 
 for Time 
Deposits ( XTD ) 
― ― ― -2.11247 
(-6.48245) 
[0.000] 
Insurance Rate 
of Demand 
 
 
Deposits ( YDD ) 
― ― -147.359 
(-14.9518) 
― 
[0.000] 
Insurance Rate  
of Time  
Deposits ( YTD ) 
― ― -4.46603 
(-1.10332) 
― 
[0.270] 
Cost Efficiency 
( Ej ) 
0.018361 
(2.83705) 
-0.035260 
(-10.2094) 
-0.136206 
(-12.6037) (9.67045) 
[0.005] [0.000] [0.000] 
0.038820 
[0.000] 
Sum of 
Capital, Capital  
and  
 
Reserve, 
Corporate Bonds 
RC1975-1986( ,1
CC
j B ) 
0.463533 
710  
(1.46696) 
[0.142] 
-0.673060 
710  
(-3.83759) 
[0.000] 
-0.344566 
610  
(-7.06632) 
[0.000] [0.000] 
0.146316 
610  
(7.74527) 
Sum of  
Capital, Cap
-0  
[0.000] 
.526508
710  
(-4.54695) 
0.259310 
710  
(7.01765) 
[0.000] 
0.144838 
710  ital  
and  Reserve, 
Corporate Bonds 
1987-1989( ,2
C
j CRCB ) 
(  
[0.432] 
0.679238 
[0.000] 
0.785960)
710  
(10.7775) 
Sum of  
Capital, Capital  
-  0.257833 0.205441
710  710  
-0.969975 
810  
0  .773087
810  
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Reserve, and  
Corporate Bonds 
1990-1995( C ,3j CRCB ) 
(-4.29046) 
[0.000] [0.000] 
(-0.953017) 
[0.341] [0.002] 
(13.8478) (3.04340) 
Sum of  
Capital, Cap
0  
[0.000] 
.201500
710  
(7.75083) 
0.315587 
710  
(22.3626) 
[0.000] 
0.667186 
810  
(2.07836) 
ital  
and  Reserve, 
Corporate Bonds 
1996-2001( C ,4j CRCB ) 
[0.038] 
-0.264939 
[0.000] 
710  
(-17.4616) 
Sum of  
Capital, Cap
0
[0.000] 
.168504 
710  
(10.3703) 
0.101240 
710  
(17.0855) 
[0.000] 
0  .298375
810  
(1.38738) 
ital  
and  Reserve, 
Corporate Bonds 
2002-2007( CC ,5j RCB ) 
[0.165] 
-  
[0.000] 
0.856891
810  
(-10.4196) 
Constant Term 
( j ) 
-0.049166 
(-9.34123) 
-0.017647 
(-4.20234) 
0.186376 
(14.3085) 
0.034050 
(5.51701) 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
R- ua d sq re 0.272264 0.400180 0.089128 0.432594 
Number of 
ervationsObs  
348 
Order of MA for the 
Error Term 
3 
Test for 
Overidentification 
85.4652 
[0.771] 
[p-value] 
V 0  alue Function .245590
Note: 1. The numbers in parentheses represent est lues. 
asticity of an unknown 
 
imated t-va
2. The numbers in brackets represent estimated p-values. 
3. The GMM estimates take into account the heterosked
form in error terms and autocorrelation, in which case we specify a third-order 
moving average process. Bartlett kernels were specified for the kernel density 
to insure positive definiteness of the covariance matrix of the orthogonal 
conditions, when the number of autocorrelation terms is positive. 
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Table 4.5.1: Estimation Results of Extended Generalized Lerner Indices 
Table 4.5.1: Estimation Results of Extended Generalized Lerner Indices 
EGLI and 
Compon
 
ents 
Short-Term Loans Long-Term Loans Demand Deposits 
EGLI 0.070561 
(1.11518) (20.6544) (-1.66912) 
[0.265] 
0.471201 
[0.000] 
-0.785097 
[0.095] 
Risk-Adjustment 
Effects (3.25441) 
((1.15819)) 
(  
0.219585 
[0.001] 
((3.112)) 
0.545741 
(17.7974) 
[0.000] 
-1.50390 
-2.12183)
[0.034] 
((1.91556)) 
Equity Capital  
Effects 
-0.175998 
(-6.25764) 
((-2.49428)) 
-0.109838 
(  ((-0.915264)) 
[0.000] 
(-5.90248) 
[0.000] 
(-0.233102))
0.718570 
(2.41594) 
[0.016] 
Market Structure  
and Conduct  
0  
((
0  
((0.074911)) 
0.0 9 
((
Effects 
(GLI) 
.026973
(1.03405) 
[0.301] 
0.382273)) 
.035298
(2.16751) 
[0.030] 
0023383
(0.00277038) 
[0.998] 
-0.000297847)) 
Note: 1. The numbers in pare represent asy alues. 
. The numbers in b ent estim . 
3. The numbers in double parentheses represent proportions to extended 
generalized Lerner indices. 
 
ntheses mptotic t-v
2 rackets repres ated p-values
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Table 4.5.2: Estimation Results of Extended Generalized Lerner Indices of 
imation Results of Extended Generalized Lerner Indices of 
Long-Term Loans 
Table 4.5.2: Est  
Long-Term Loans 
EGLI a
Components 
nd  1975-1986 1987-1989 1990-1995 1996-2001 2002-2007 
EGLI 0.6838 
(50.00) (33.54) (1.260) (-5.456) 
[  
(-1.855) 
[0.000] 
0.5783 
[0.000] 
0.2168 
[0.208] 
-5.161 
0.000]
-0.5383 
[0.064] 
Risk-Adjustment 
Effects 
((0.8739)) ((2.836)) 
[0.003] 
((0.9826)) (
0.7702 
(25.60) 
[0.000] 
((1.126)) 
0.5054 
(9.978) 
[0.000] 
0.6149 
(4.603) 
[0.000] 
-5.071 
(-2.968) 
-0.4388 
(-2.707) 
[0.007] 
(0.8151)) 
Equity Capital  
Effects 
-0.09969 
(  ((0.1070)) (
(-2.374) 
[0.018] 
(-0.1458))
0.06190 
(0.6525) 
[0.514] 
-0.5221 
(-2.525) 
[0.012] 
(-2.408)) 
-0.4301 
(-0.3349) 
[0.738] 
((0.0833)) 
-0.1835 
(-9.935) 
[0.000] 
((0.3409)) 
Market 
Structure  
duct  
((0.01937)) ((0.01905))
and Con
Effects 
(GLI) 
0.01324 
(1.330) 
[0.184] 
0.01101 
(0.1518) 
[0.879] 
 
0.1240 
(0.9248) 
[0.355] 
((0.5718)) 
0.3401 
(0.2541) 
[0.799] 
((-0.06590)) ((-0.1560))
0.08398 
(0.4557) 
[0.649] 
 
Note: 1. The numbe e  a
numbers in brackets represent estimated p-val es. 
3. The numbers in double parentheses represent proportions to extended 
generalized Lerner indices. 
 
rs in parenth ses represent symptotic t-values. 
2. The u
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Table 6.1.4: Data for and Creation of the Data 
Data
, , 1
R
CD i tH   
Table 6.1.4:  for , , 1
RHCD i t  and Creation of the Data 
Variable  Data a
 
Source Quantity  nd Creation of the Data 
(Note)  
, , 1CD i tI   
R Int  
certificates of 
 
Interest ns for 
nstallment Savings + Interest Paid on Bills 
erest paid on
deposit and 
other liabilities
Paid on CDs + Provisio
I
Sold + Interest Paid on REPO Sale Transactions 
+ Interest on Commercial Paper + Interest Paid 
on Corporate Bonds + Interest Paid on 
Convertible Bonds + Interest Paid on Bonds + 
Amortization of Discount on Debentures + 
Other Interest Paid + Amortization of Bond 
Issue Expenses + Other Business Expenses 
(a) 
, , 1
R
CD i tH   Interest rate of 
certificates of 
  
deposit and 
other liabilities
 , , 1 , 1 , , 1RCD i t G t CD i tI p q    (a),(b) 
(Note) The e data are as follows: (a) The Nikkei NEEDS Company (Bank) 
Data File C Media Marketing, Inc.) and (b) The National Economic 
sources of th
D-ROM (Nikkei 
Accounting (Cabinet Office). 
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Table 6.2.2.1: Data for , , 1j i tH  ( ,j SL LL ) and Creation of the Data  
Table 6.2.2.1: Data for , , 1j i tH  ( ,j SL LL ) and Creation of the Data 
Variable  Quantity  Data and Creation of the Data 
 
Source 
(Note)  
, , 1
Q
SL i tI   Accrued 
interest on 
short-term 
loans 
Accrued Income (Interest on Loans and Bills 
Discounted)   , , 1
, , 1 , , 1
SL i t
SL i t LL i t
q
q q

 
 
(a) 
, , 1
R
SL i tI   Collected 
interest on 
short-term 
loans 
Contracted Interest Rate for Short-Term Loans 
 Loans on Bills + Discounts on Bills + 
Overdraft Interest Rate 

  Overdraft 
(a),(b) 
, , 1
S
SL i tI   Service 
charge 
revenue 
from 
short-term 
loans 
(Other Income on Service Transactions  
Other Expenses on Service Transactions)  

 , , 1 , , 1 , , 1 , , 1 , , 1 , , 1SL i t SL i t LL i t S i t DD i t TD i tq q q q q q          
(a) 
, , 1
D
SL i tI   Default loss 
on 
short-term 
loans 
[Provisions for Possible Loan Loss Reserve + 
Bad Debts Written-off + Other Ordinary 
Expenses (until fiscal year 1999) + Transfer to 
Reserve for Possible Losses on Sales of Loans 
 , , 1SL i t
q (fiscal year 2000 onwards)] 
, , 1 , , 1SL i t LL i tq q 
 
(a) 
, , 1
R
SL i tH   Collected 
te 
t-term 
interest ra
for 
shor
loans 
 , , 1 , 1 , , 1RSL i t G t SL i tI p q     (a),(b), (c) 
, , 1
Q
SL i tH   Uncollected 
t-term 
interest rate 
for 
shor
loans 
 , , 1 , 1 , , 1QSL i t G t SL i tI p q     (a),(c) 
, , 1
S
SL i tH   Service 
ate 
t-term 
charge r
for 
shor
loans 
 , , 1 , 1 , , 1SSL i t G t SL i tI p q     (a),(c) 
, , 1
D
SL i tH   Default loss 
m 
rate for 
short-ter
loans 
 , , 1 , 1 , , 1DSL i t G t SL i tI p q     (a),(c) 
, , 1
R
LL i tI   Collected 
 
Interest on Loans and Bills Discounted - 
interest on
long-term 
loans 
, , 1
R
SL i tI   
(a),(b) 
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, , 1
Q
LL i tI   Accrued 
n 
Accrued Income (Interest on Loans and Bills 
Discounted) 
interest o
long-term 
loans 
  , , 1LL i tq 
, , 1 , , 1SL i t LL i tq q 
 
(a) 
, , 1
S
LL i tI   Service 
 
erm 
(Other Income on Service Transactions 
charge 
revenue
from 
long-t
loans 
  
Other Expenses on Service Transactions)   , , 1 , , 1 , , 1 , , 1 , , 1 , , 1LL i t SL i t LL i t S i t DD i t TD i tq q q q q q        
 
(a) 
, , 1
D
LL i tI   Default loss 
-term 
[Provisions for Possible Loan Loss Reserve + 
on 
long
loans  
Bad Debts Written-off + Other Ordinary 
Expenses (until fiscal year 1999) + Transfer to 
Reserve for Possible Losses on Sales of Loans 
(fiscal year 2000 onwards)]   , , 1LL i tq
q q

, , 1 , , 1SL i t LL i t 
(a) 
  
, , 1
R
LL i tH   Collected 
interest rate 
s 
for 
long-term 
loan
 , , 1 , 1 , , 1RLL i t G t LL i tI p q     (a),(b), (c) 
, , 1
Q
LL i tH   Uncollected 
t rate 
s 
interes
for 
long-term 
loan
 , , 1 , 1 , , 1QLL i t G t LL i tI p q     (a),(c) 
, , 1
S
LL i tH   Service 
charge rate 
s 
for 
long-term 
loan
 , , 1 , 1 , , 1SLL i t G t LL i tI p q     (a),(c) 
, , 1
D
LL i tH   
(=
s 
r 
, ,
D
SL i tH 1 ) 
Default los
rate fo
long-term 
loans 
 , , 1 , 1 , , 1DLL i t G t LL i tI p q     (a),(c) 
,SL tQ  Amount of 
stock in the 
rket 
Total of for all of the banks included in 
the analysis 
(a) 
overall 
short-term 
loan ma
, ,SL i tq  
,LL tQ  Amount of 
stock in the 
overall 
long-term 
loan market 
Total of for all of the banks included in 
the analysis 
(a) 
, ,LL i tq  
, ,
RQ
L i tz  ,1, ,
RQ
L i tz  Prime rate For long-term loans, the long-term prime rate, 
and for short-term loans, the short-term prime 
(a),(b) 
rate 
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,2, ,
RQ
L i tz  Capital 
ratio of 
borrower 
firms  
Weighted average of the equity capital ratio by 
corporate firm industry type, weighted by the 
proportion of loans in each industry 
(a),(d) 
,3, ,
RQ
L i tz  Ratio of 
operating 
profit to 
total capital 
of borrower 
firms  
Weighted average of the ratio of operating 
profit to total capital by corporate firm industry 
type, weighted by the proportion of loans in 
each industry 
(a),(d) 
,4, ,
RQ
L i tz  Loan loss 
provision 
rate  
[Possible Loan Losses] 
/[ , , , , ,G t SL i t G t LL i tp q p q ,   ] 
(a) 
,5, ,
RQ
L i tz  Loan per 
case  
[ , , , , ,G t SL i t G t LL i tp q p q ,   ] 
/[Number of Borrowers] 
(a) 
,6, ,
RQ
L i tz  Proportion 
of loans for 
small and 
medium 
firms 
[Loans and Discounts for Small Business] 
/[ , , , , ,G t SL i t G t LL i tp q p q ,   ] 
(a) 
,7, ,
RQ
L i tz  Herfindahl 
index of 
loan 
proportions 
classified by 
industry  
Herfindahl index using loan proportions 
classified by industry 
(a) 
,8, ,
RQ
L i tz  Herfindahl 
index of 
loan 
proportions 
classified by 
mortgage  
Herfindahl index using loan proportions 
classified by mortgage 
(a) 
,9, ,
RQ
L i tz  Proportion 
of loans for 
real estate 
business 
[Loans for Real Estate Business]/[Total Loans 
Classified by Industry] 
(a) 
,10, ,
RQ
L i tz  Proportion 
of loans 
secured by 
real estate 
[Loans Secured by Real Estate]/[Total Lending 
by Type of Collateral] 
(a) 
,11, ,
RQ
L i tz  Proportion 
of loans 
without 
collateral 
and without 
warranty 
[Loans without Collateral and without 
Warranty]/[Total Lending by Type of 
Collateral] 
(a) 
, ,
D
L i tz  ,1, ,
D
L i tz  Capital 
ratio of 
borrower 
firms  
Same as . ,2, ,
RQ
L i tz (a),(d) 
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,2, ,
D
L i tz  Ratio of 
operating 
profit to 
total capital 
of borrower 
firms  
Same as . ,3, ,
RQ
L i tz (a),(d) 
,3, ,
D
L i tz  Loan per 
case  
Same as . ,5, ,
RQ
L i tz (a) 
,4, ,
D
L i tz  Proportion 
of loans for 
small and 
medium 
firms 
Same as . ,6, ,
RQ
L i tz (a) 
,5, ,
D
L i tz  Herfindahl 
index of 
loan 
proportions 
classified by 
industry  
Same as . ,7, ,
RQ
L i tz (a) 
,6, ,
D
L i tz  Herfindahl 
index of 
loan 
proportions 
classified by 
mortgage  
Same as . ,8, ,
RQ
L i tz (a) 
,7, ,
D
L i tz  Proportion 
of loans for 
real estate 
business 
Same as .  ,9, ,
RQ
L i tz (a) 
,8, ,
D
L i tz  Proportion 
of loans 
secured by 
real estate 
Same as . ,10, ,
RQ
L i tz (a) 
,9, ,
D
L i tz  Proportion 
of loans 
without 
collateral 
and without 
warranty 
Same as . ,11, ,
RQ
L i tz (a) 
,10, ,
D
L i tz
 
Dummy for 
unusual 
default loss 
rate  
Dummy variable = 1 if , , 1
D
SL i tH   (= ) > 
0.008 and = 0 if 
, , 1
D
LL i tH 
, , 1
D
SL i tH   is  0.008.  
(a),(c) 
(Notes) The sources of the data are as follows: (a) The Nikkei NEEDS Company (Bank) 
Data File CD-ROM (Nikkei Media Marketing, Inc.), (b) Economic Statistics Annual 
from the Bank of Japan, (c) The National Economic Accounting (Cabinet Office), and 
(d) Corporate Enterprise Annual Statistics from the Ministry of Finance. 
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Table 6.2.2.2: Data for (, , 1j i tH  ,j S A ) and Creation of the Data 
Table 6.2.2.2: Data for , , 1j i tH  ( ,j S A ) and Creation of the Data  
Variable  Quantity Data and Creation of the Data 
 
Source 
(Note)  
, , 1
R
S i tI   Net revenue 
from 
management 
of securities 
Interest and Dividends on Securities + (Gains 
from Trading Securities   Expense on Trading 
Securities) + (Gains from Specified-Trade 
Securities  Expense on Specified-Trade 
Securities) + (Profits on Redemptions of 
Government Bonds, etc.  Losses on 
Redemptions of Government Bonds, etc.)  
(a) 
, , 1
S
S i tI   Service charge 
revenue from 
securities  
(Other Income on Service Transactions  Other 
Expenses on Service Transactions) 

   , , 1 , , 1 , , 1 , , 1 , , 1 , , 1S i t SL i t LL i t S i t DD i t TD i tq q q q q q          
(a) 
, , 1
C
S i tI   Capital gain 
from 
securities 
(Profit on Trading in Trading Securities   
Losses on Trading in Trading Securities) + 
(Profits on Sales of Government Bonds, etc.   
Losses on Sales of Government Bonds, etc.) + 
(Profits on Sales of Stocks and Other Securities  
Losses on Sales of Stocks and Other Securities  
Write-offs of Stocks and Other Securities) 


(a) 
, , 1
D
S i tI   Securities 
provisions and 
reserve funds 
(Transfer to Reserves for Price Fluctuations of 
Government Bonds   Reversal from Reserves 
for Price Fluctuations of Government Bonds) + 
(Transfer to Reserves against Possible Losses on 
Trading in Trading Securities   Reversal from 
Reserves for Possible Losses on Trading in 
Trading Securities) + (Transfer to Securities 
Transaction Liability Reserve   Reversal from 
Securities Transaction Liability Reserve)  
(a) 
, , 1
R
A i tI   Net revenue 
from 
management 
of other 
financial 
assets 
(Gains on Money Trusts   Losses on Money 
Trusts) + Interest on Bills Bought + Interest from 
REPO purchase transactions + Interest Received 
on Interest Rate Swaps + Other Interest Received 
(a) 
, , 1
S
A i tI   Service charge 
revenue from 
other financial 
assets  
(Exchange Commissions Earned   Exchange 
Commissions Paid)   ((Foreign Bills Bought + 
Foreign Bills Receivable   Foreign Bills Sold  
Foreign Bills Payable)/(Current Deposits + 
Ordinary Deposits + Foreign Bills Bought + 
Foreign Bills Receivable 

  Foreign Bills Sold  
Foreign Bills Payable))  

(a) 
, , 1
C
A i tI   Capital gain 
from other 
financial 
assets 
(Gains from Financial Derivative Instruments  
Expense on Financial Derivative Instruments) + 
(Gains from Other Specified Trades 

  Expense 
on Other Specified Trades) + (Profits on Foreign 
(a) 
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Exchange Transactions   Losses on Foreign 
Exchange Transactions) + (Other Business 
Income - Other Business Expenses ) 
, , 1
D
A i tI   Provisions 
and reserve 
funds for 
other financial 
assets 
(Transfer to Reserve for Possible Losses on Sales 
of Loans   Reimbursement to Reserve for 
Possible Losses on Sales of Loans) + (Transfer to 
Liability Reserves for Financial Futures 
Transactions   Reversal from Liability Reserves 
for Financial Futures Transactions)  
(a) 
, , 1
R
S i tH   Interest rate 
of securities 
 , , 1 , 1 , , 1RS i t G t S i tI p q     (a),(b) 
, , 1
S
S i tH   Service charge 
rate for 
securities 
 , , 1 , 1 , , 1SS i t G t S i tI p q     (a),(b) 
, , 1
C
S i tH   Rate of 
capital gains 
for securities 
 , , 1 , 1 , , 1CS i t G t S i tI p q     (a),(b) 
, , 1
D
S i tH   Rate of 
provisions and 
reserve funds 
for securities 
 , , 1 , 1 , , 1DS i t G t S i tI p q     (a),(b) 
, , 1
R
A i tH   Interest rate 
of other 
financial 
assets  
 , , 1 , 1 , , 1RA i t G t A i tI p q     (a),(b) 
, , 1
S
A i tH   Service charge 
rate for other 
financial 
assets 
 , , 1 , 1 , , 1SA i t G t A i tI p q     (a),(b) 
, , 1
C
A i tH   Rate of 
capital gains 
for other 
financial 
assets 
 , , 1 , 1 , , 1CA i t G t A i tI p q     (a),(b) 
, , 1
D
A i tH   Rate of 
provisions and 
reserve funds 
for other 
financial 
assets 
 , , 1 , 1 , , 1DA i t G t A i tI p q     (a),(b) 
(Note) The sources of the data are as follows: (a) The Nikkei NEEDS Company (Bank) 
Data File CD-ROM (Nikkei Media Marketing, Inc.) and (b) The National Economic 
Accounting (Cabinet Office). 
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Table 6.2.2.3: Data for (, , 1j i tH  ,j CL CM ) and Creation of the Data 
Table 6.2.2.3: Data for , , 1j i tH  ( ,j CL CM ) and Creation of the Data 
Variable  Quantity  Data and Creation of the Data 
 
Source 
(Note)  
, , 1
R
CL i tI   Interest on due 
from banks and 
call loans 
Interest on Due from Banks + Interest on Call 
Loans 
(a) 
, , 1
R
CM i tI   Interest on call 
money and 
borrowed 
money 
Interest on Borrowed Money + Interest on Call 
Money 
(a) 
, , 1
R
CL i tH   Interest rate of 
due from banks 
and call loans  
 , , 1 , 1 , , 1RCL i t G t CL i tI p q    (a),(b) 
, , 1
R
CM i tH   Interest rate of 
call money and 
borrowed 
money  
 , , 1 , 1 , , 1RCM i t G t CM i tI p q    (a),(b) 
(Note) The sources of the data are as follows: (a) The Nikkei NEEDS Company (Bank) 
Data File CD-ROM (Nikkei Media Marketing, Inc.) and (b) The National Economic 
Accounting (Cabinet Office). 
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Table 6.2.2.4: Data for (, , 1j i tH  ,j DD TD ) and Creation of the Data 
Table 6.2.2.4: Data for , , 1j i tH  ( ,j DD TD ) and Creation of the Data 
Variable  Quantity Data and Creation of the Data 
 
Source 
(Note)  
, , 1
Q
DD i tI   Unpaid 
interest on 
demand 
deposits 
Accrued Expenses (Interest Paid on Deposits) 
  , , 1
, , 1 , , 1
DD i t
DD i t TD i t
q
q q

 
 
(a) 
, , 1
R
DD i tI   Paid interest 
on demand 
deposits 
○ (June 21, 1992 and earlier) 
Mean Annual Interest Rate for Ordinary 
Deposits   Ordinary Deposits + Mean Annual 
Interest Rate for Installment Savings   
(Installment Savings + Savings Deposits) + 
Mean Annual Interest Rate for Deposits at 
Notice   Deposits at Notice 
○ (From June 22, 1992 to October 16, 1994) 
Mean Annual Interest Rate for Ordinary 
Deposits   Ordinary Deposits + Mean Annual 
Interest Rate for Installment Savings   
Installment Savings + Mean Annual Interest 
Rate for Savings Deposits   Savings Deposits 
+ Mean Annual Interest Rate for Deposits at 
Notice   Deposits at Notice 
○ (October 17, 1994 onwards) 
Mean Annual Interest Rate for Ordinary 
Deposits   (Ordinary Deposits + Deposits at 
Notice) + Mean Annual Interest Rate for 
Installment Savings   Installment Savings + 
Mean Annual Interest Rate for Savings 
Deposits   Savings Deposits 
(a),(b) 
, , 1
S
DD i tI   Service 
charge 
revenue from 
demand 
deposits 
(Exchange Commissions Earned ― Exchange 
Commissions Paid)   ((Current Deposits + 
Ordinary Deposits)/(Current Deposits + 
Ordinary Deposits + Foreign Bills Bought + 
Foreign Bills Receivable ― Foreign Bills Sold ― 
Foreign Bills Payable)) + (Other Income on 
Service Transactions ― Other Expenses on 
Service Transactions)    , , 1 , , 1 , , 1 , , 1 , , 1 , , 1DD i t SL i t LL i t S i t DD i t TD i tq q q q q q          
(a) 
, , 1
R
TD i tI   Paid 
interest 
on time 
deposits 
Interest Paid on Deposits ― , , 1RDD i tI   (a),(b) 
, , 1
Q
TD i tI   Unpaid 
interest on 
time deposits 
Accrued Expenses (Interest Paid on Deposits) 
  , , 1
, , 1 , , 1
TD i t
DD i t TD i t
q
q q

 
 
(a) 
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, , 1
S
TD i tI   Service 
charge 
revenue from 
time 
deposits  
(Other Income on Service Transactions ― 
Other Expenses on Service Transactions)   , , 1 , , 1 , , 1 , , 1 , , 1 , , 1TD i t SL i t LL i t S i t DD i t TD i tq q q q q q          
(a) 
, , 1
R
DD i tH   Paid 
interest 
rate for 
demand 
deposits 
 , , 1 , 1 , , 1RDD i t G t DD i tI p q     (a),(b), (c) 
, , 1
Q
DD i tH   Unpaid 
interest 
rate for 
demand 
deposits 
 , , 1 , 1 , , 1QDD i t G t DD i tI p q     (a),(c) 
, , 1
S
DD i tH   Service 
charge 
rate for 
demand 
deposits 
 , , 1 , 1 , , 1SDD i t G t DD i tI p q     (a),(c) 
,DD tQ  Amount of 
stock in 
the overall 
demand 
deposit 
market 
Total of , ,DD i tq  for all banks included in the 
analysis 
(a) 
,
I
DD th  Insurance 
rate of 
demand 
deposits 
○ (Fiscal year 2000 and earlier) 
Insurance rates (1) 
○ (From fiscal year 2001 to fiscal year 2002) 
Specified Deposit Insurance Rate   Current 
Deposits/(Current Deposits + Ordinary 
Deposits + Savings Deposits + Deposits at 
Notice + Installment Savings) + Insurance 
Rates for Other Deposits, etc.   (Ordinar  
Deposits + Savings Deposits + Deposits at 
Notice + Installment Savings)/(Current 
Deposits + Ordinary Deposits + Savings 
Deposits + Deposits at Notice + Installment 
Savings) 
y
○ (From fiscal year 2003 onwards) 
Deposit Insurance Rate Used in Settlement 
of Accounts   Current Deposits/(Current 
Deposits + Ordinary Deposits + Savings 
Deposits + Deposits at Notice + Installment 
Savings) + Insurance Rates for General 
Deposits, etc.   (Ordinary Deposits + Savings 
Deposits + Deposits at Notice + Installment 
Savings)/(Current Deposits + Ordinary 
Deposits + Savings Deposits + Deposits at 
Notice + Installment Savings) 
(d) 
,DD t  Reserve 
requirement 
Reserve rate of “Other Deposits” (e) 
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ratio for 
demand 
deposits  
, , 1
R
TD i tH   Paid interest 
rate for time 
deposits 
 , , 1 , 1 , , 1RTD i t G t TD i tI p q     (a),(b), (c) 
, , 1
Q
TD i tH   Unpaid 
interest rate 
for time 
deposits 
 , , 1 , 1 , , 1QTD i t G t TD i tI p q     (a),(c) 
, , 1
S
TD i tH   Service 
charge rate 
for time 
deposits 
 , , 1 , 1 , , 1STD i t G t TD i tI p q     (a),(c) 
,TD tQ  Amount of 
stock in the 
overall time 
deposit 
market 
Total of  for all banks included in the 
analysis 
, ,TD i tq (a) 
,
I
TD th  Insurance 
rate of time 
deposits 
○ (Fiscal year 2000 and earlier) 
Insurance rates (1) 
○ (From fiscal year 2001 to fiscal year 2002) 
Insurance rates for other deposits, etc. 
○ (From fiscal year 2003 onwards) 
Insurance rates for general deposits, etc. 
(d) 
,TD t  Reserve 
requirement 
ratio for time 
deposits  
Reserve rate of “time and savings deposits 
(including certificates of deposit)”  
(e) 
,1,
RQ
D tz
 
Depositor’s 
Income 
Disposable income for workers’ households 
(except farmers) 
(f) 
,2,
RQ
D tz
 
Yield on 
government 
bonds  
○ Fiscal year 1984 and earlier: Subscribers’ 
yield on 10-year interest-bearing government 
bonds 
○ Fiscal year 1985 onwards: Yield on 10-year 
government bonds  
(g) 
,3,
RQ
D tz
 
Postal 
savings 
interest rate  
For demand deposits, use the interest rate of 
ordinary savings, and for time deposits, use the 
interest rate of postal savings certificates. 
(h) 
,
RQ
D tz  
,4,
RQ
D tz
 
Benchmark 
index of 
Japanese 
stock 
investment 
trust  
TOPIX (i) 
(Note) The sources of the data are as follows: (a) The Nikkei NEEDS Company (Bank) 
Data File CD-ROM (Nikkei Media Marketing, Inc.), (b) Economic Statistics Annual 
from the Bank of Japan, (c) The National Economic Accounting (Cabinet Office), (d) 
Deposit Insurance Corporation of Japan web site 
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(http://www.dic.go.jp/shikumi/hoken/suii.html), 
(e) Bank of Japan web site (reserve rate in the reserve requirement regime)  
(http://www.boj.or.jp/statistics/boj/other/reservereq/junbi.htm),  
(f) Family Income and Expenditure Survey from the Ministry of Internal Affairs and 
Communications, (g) Bank of Japan web site [Financial Markets (interest rate, yield, 
foreign exchange rate etc.)] 
(http://www.stat-search.boj.or.jp/ssi/cgi-bin/famecgi2?cgi=$nme_a000&lstSelectio
n=5),  
(h) Financial and Economic Statistics Monthly from the Bank of Japan, and (i) Monthly 
Statistics Report from the Tokyo Stock Exchange. 
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Table 7.1.1: Estimation Results of  , , , ,,R RSL i SL t L i tr Q z Q ,  , , ,Q RQSL i L i tr z , and   , , ,D DL i L i th z
Table 7.1.1: Estimation Results of  , , , ,,R RQSL i SL t L i tr Q z ,  , , ,Q RQSL i L i tr z , and  , , ,D DL i L i th z  
Parameters 
(Independent 
Variables) 
 , , , ,,R RSL i SL t L i tr Q z Q  
Eq. (6.2.3.1.6a) 
 , , ,D DL i L i th z  
Eq. (6.2.3.2.3) 
 , , ,Q RQSL i L i tr z  
Eq. (6.2.3.1.6b) 
,7479
R
SL (1974-1979) 
( ) 7479 ,ln
YA
SL tD Q
-0.00539692 
(-3.97349) 
[0.000] 
― ― 
,8089
R
SL (1980-1989) 
( ) 8089 ,ln
YA
SL tD Q
-0.00513776 
(-3.69835) 
[0.000] 
― ― 
,9099
R
SL (1990-1999) 
( ) 9099 ,ln
YA
SL tD Q
-0.00533830 
(-3.85038) 
[0.000] 
― ― 
,0008
R
SL (2000-2008) 
( ) 0008 ,ln
YA
SL tD Q
-0.00553183 
(-4.00099) 
[0.000] 
― ― 
,1
R
SL , ,1QSL  
( ) ,1, ,
RQ
L i tz
0.719494 
(34.4448) 
[0.000] 
― 0.183150 
(4.44216) 
[0.000] 
,2
R
SL , ,1DL , ,2QSL  
( ,2, ,
RQ
L i tz (= ,1, ,
D
L i tz )) 
-0.059027 
(-5.80004) 
[0.000] 
-0.033388 
(-1.79080) 
[0.073] 
-0.023599 
(-5.79168) 
[0.000] 
,2
D
L , ,3QSL  
( ,3, ,
RQ
L i tz (= ,2, ,
D
L i tz )) 
― -0.200552 
(-2.58120) 
[0.010] 
0.097171 
(2.49030) 
[0.013] 
,4
Q
SL  
( ,4, ,
RQ
L i tz ) 
― ― -0.025640 
(-5.11739) 
[0.000] 
,5
R
SL , ,3DL  
( (= )) ,5, ,ln
RQ
L i tz ,3, ,ln
D
L i tz
0.00182022 
(1.95662) 
[0.050] 
0.00588197 
(2.08485) 
[0.037] 
― 
,6
R
SL  
( ) ,6, ,
RQ
L i tz
-0.010473 
(-2.82976) 
[0.005] 
― ― 
,7
R
SL , ,5DL  
( (= )) ,7, ,
RQ
L i tz ,5, ,
D
L i tz
0.014693 
(1.68028) 
[0.093] 
0.035407 
(1.40357) 
[0.160] 
― 
,8
Q
SL  ― ― 0.014968 
(2.18983) 
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( ) ,8, ,
RQ
L i tz [0.029] 
,9
R
SL  
( ) ,9, ,
RQ
L i tz
-0.022102 
(-2.64681) 
[0.008] 
― ― 
,10
R
SL ,  ,10QSL
( ) ,10, ,
RQ
L i tz
0.029020 
(2.44053) 
[0.015] 
― 0.00954082 
(2.27924) 
[0.023] 
,9
D
L , ,11QSL  
( (= )) ,11, ,
RQ
L i tz ,9, ,
D
L i tz
― -0.032238 
(-3.38761) 
[0.001] 
-0.00981033 
(-2.73508) 
[0.006] 
,10
D
L  
( ,10, ,
D
L i tz ) 
― 0.020505 
(5.69358) 
[0.000] 
― 
R-squared: 
 and  , , , ,,RSL i SL t L i tr Q zRQ
 , , ,D DL i L i th z  
Adjusted R-squared:  , , ,Q RQSL i L i tr z  
0.861057 0.257976 0.733298 
Number of 
Observations 
448 102 
Log likelihood  2609.23 592.464 
Schwarz B.I.C. -2442.68 -548.526 
Note: 1. The numbers in parentheses represent estimated t-values. 
2. The numbers in brackets represent estimated p-values. 
3.  and  , , , ,,RSL i SL t L i tr Q zRQ  , , ,D DL i L i th z  are estimated simultaneously, and 
 is a single-equation estimation.  , , ,Q RQSL i L i tr z
4. The multivariate regression estimates take into account the heteroskedasticity 
of an unknown form in error terms. 
5. The estimation results of ,
R
SL i , ,QSL i , and ,DL i  are shown in Table 7.1.2. 
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Table 7.1.2: Estimation Results of ,
R
SL i , ,QSL i , and ,DL i  
Table 7.1.2: Estimation Results of ,
R
SL i , ,QSL i , and ,DL i  
Japanese City Bank 
,
R
SL i  
Eq. (6.2.3.1.6a) 
,
D
L i  
Eq. (6.2.3.2.3) 
,
Q
SL i  
Eq. (6.2.3.1.6b) 
Industrial Bank of 
Japan (i=1) 
0.105828 
(4.11640) 
[0.000] 
-0.015572 
(-0.954195) 
[0.340] 
-0.000791411 
(-0.509539) 
[0.610] 
Shinsei Bank (i=2) 0.107240 
(4.18584) 
[0.000] 
-0.012851 
(-0.821137) 
[0.412] 
0.00281340 
(2.18442) 
[0.029] 
Aozora Bank (i=3) 0.104387 
(4.06457) 
[0.000] 
-0.00495902 
(-0.288033) 
[0.773] 
0.000300601 
(0.153119) 
[0.878] 
Mizuho Bank (i=4) 0.110798 
(4.23591) 
[0.000] 
-0.00508457 
(-0.424924) 
[0.671] 
-0.000853029 
(-0.511385) 
[0.609] 
Sakura Bank (i=5) 0.111644 
(4.29092) 
[0.000] 
-0.00330963 
(-0.288725) 
[0.773] 
-0.00102476 
(-0.576457) 
[0.564] 
Mizuho Corporate 
Bank (i=6) 
0.110756 
(4.28312) 
[0.000] 
-0.00354779 
(-0.299047) 
[0.765] 
0.000442613 
(0.283002) 
[0.777] 
Bank of 
Tokyo-Mitsubishi 
UFJ (i=7) 
0.110904 
(4.23356) 
[0.000] 
-0.00322535 
(-0.280109) 
[0.779] 
0.000156616 
(0.095779) 
[0.924] 
Asahi Bank (i=8) 0.112751 
(4.30187) 
[0.000] 
-0.00356939 
(-0.306152) 
[0.759] 
-0.00214404 
(-1.10582) 
[0.269] 
UFJ Bank (i=9) 0.113227 
(4.38058) 
[0.000] 
-0.00173841 
(-0.152750) 
[0.879] 
-0.0000880687 
(-0.057607) 
[0.954] 
Sumitomo Mitsui 
Banking Corp. 
(i=10) 
0.111767 
(4.31481) 
[0.000] 
-0.00300916 
(-0.260263) 
[0.795] 
-0.0000840831 
(-0.052320) 
[0.958] 
Resona Bank (i=11) 0.113674 
(4.37639) 
[0.000] 
0.000132742 
(0.012389) 
[0.990] 
-0.00170537 
(-0.955591) 
[0.339] 
Tokai Bank (i=12) 0.111702 
(4.28367) 
[0.000] 
-0.00179301 
(-0.153308) 
[0.878] 
-0.000867956 
(-0.535349) 
[0.592] 
Hokkaido 
Takushoku Bank 
(i=13) 
0.112073 
(4.30772) 
[0.000] 
-0.0000664859 
(-0.00671755) 
[0.995] 
― 
Taiyo Kobe Bank 
(i=14) 
0.111295 
(4.24939) 
[0.000] 
-0.00514575 
(-0.431044) 
[0.666] 
― 
Bank of Tokyo 0.106130 -0.016327 ― 
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(i=15) (4.18833) 
[0.000] 
(-0.753708) 
[0.451] 
Saitama Bank 
(i=16) 
0.113803 
(4.34190) 
[0.000] 
-0.00207611 
(-0.198379) 
[0.843] 
― 
Note: 1. The numbers in parentheses represent estimated t-values. 
2. The numbers in brackets represent estimated p-values. 
3. ,
R
SL i  in  and  , , , ,,RSL i SL t L i tr Q zRQ ,DL i  in  , , ,D DL i L i th z  are estimated 
simultaneously, and ,
Q
SL i  in  , , ,RQi tQSL i Lr z  is a single-equation estimation. 
4. The multivariate regression estimates take into account the heteroskedasticity 
of an unknown form in error terms. 
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Table 7.1.3: Estimation Results of  , , , ,,RLL i LL t L i tr Q zRQ  and  , , ,Q RQLL i L i tr z  
Table 7.1.3: Estimation Results of  , , , ,,RLL i LL t L i tr Q zRQ  and  , , ,Q RQLL i L i tr z  
Parameters 
(Independent Variables) 
 , , , ,,R RLL i LL t L i tr Q z Q  
Eq. (6.2.3.1.6a) 
 , , ,Q RQLL i L i tr z  
Eq. (6.2.3.1.6b) 
,7479
R
LL (1974-1979) 
( 7479 ,ln
YA
LL tD Q ) 
-0.00905938 
(-2.03434) 
[0.042] 
― 
,8089
R
LL (1980-1989) 
( 8089 ,ln
YA
LL tD Q ) 
-0.00858125 
(-1.96984) 
[0.049] 
― 
,9099
R
LL (1990-1999) 
( 9099 ,ln
YA
LL tD Q ) 
-0.00880228 
(-2.07408) 
[0.038] 
― 
,0008
R
LL (2000-2008) 
( 0008 ,ln
YA
LL tD Q ) 
-0.00888071 
(-2.05718) 
[0.040] 
― 
,1
R
LL , ,1QLL  
( ,1, ,
RQ
L i tz ) 
0.668557 
(13.8069) 
[0.000] 
0.140912 
(9.05467) 
[0.000] 
,2
R
LL , ,2QLL  
( ,2, ,
RQ
L i tz ) 
-0.049139 
(-3.37685) 
[0.001] 
-0.017122 
(-4.97399) 
[0.000] 
,3
Q
LL  
( ) ,3, ,
RQ
L i tz
― 0.071643 
(1.99960) 
[0.046] 
,4
Q
LL  
( ) ,4, ,
RQ
L i tz
― -0.021977 
(-3.67949) 
[0.000] 
,5
R
LL  
( ) ,5, ,ln
RQ
L i tz
0.00432024 
(1.72046) 
[0.085] 
― 
,8
Q
LL  
( ,8, ,
RQ
L i tz ) 
― 0.016339 
(2.44910) 
[0.014] 
,9
R
LL , ,9QLL  
( ,9, ,
RQ
L i tz ) 
-0.031469 
(-2.84537) 
[0.004] 
-0.00699254 
(-1.82942) 
[0.067] 
,10
R
LL ,  ,10QLL
( ,10, ,
RQ
L i tz ) 
0.025684 
(2.70080) 
[0.007] 
0.010726 
(2.54720) 
[0.011] 
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,11
Q
LL  
( ) ,11, ,
RQ
L i tz
― -0.00970290 
(-2.74949) 
[0.006] 
Adjusted R-squared 0.887837 0.801220 
Number of 
Observations 
447 102 
Log likelihood  1491.26 608.073 
Schwarz B.I.C. -1414.98 -561.823 
Note: 1. The numbers in parentheses represent estimated t-values. 
2. The numbers in brackets represent estimated p-values. 
3.  and  , , , ,,RLL i LL t L i tr Q zRQ  , , ,Q RQLL i L i tr z  are single-equation estimations. 
4. The multivariate regression estimates take into account the heteroskedasticity 
of an unknown form in error terms. 
5. The estimation results of ,
R
LL i  and ,QLL i  are shown in Table 7.1.4. 
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Table 7.1.4: Estimation Results of ,
R
LL i  and ,QLL i  
Table 7.1.4: Estimation Results of ,
R
LL i  and ,QLL i  
Japanese City Bank 
,
R
LL i  
Eq. (6.2.3.1.6a) 
,
Q
LL i  
Eq. (6.2.3.1.6b) 
Industrial Bank of Japan 
(i=1) 
0.167674 
(2.40975) 
[0.016] 
-0.00195328 
(-0.818185) 
[0.413] 
Shinsei Bank (i=2) 0.168859 
(2.39566) 
[0.017] 
0.00253025 
(1.11594) 
[0.264] 
Aozora Bank (i=3) 0.163590 
(2.36871) 
[0.018] 
-0.000136780 
(-.043790) 
[0.965] 
Mizuho Bank (i=4) 0.170699 
(2.32423) 
[0.020] 
-0.00197716 
(-0.797511) 
[0.425] 
Sakura Bank (i=5) 0.173797 
(2.35649) 
[0.018] 
-0.00203239 
(-0.758987) 
[0.448] 
Mizuho Corporate Bank 
(i=6) 
0.172682 
(2.35545) 
[0.019] 
-0.000711376 
(-0.305304) 
[0.760] 
Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi 
UFJ (i=7) 
0.175499 
(2.38312) 
[0.017] 
-0.000876271 
(-0.358605) 
[0.720] 
Asahi Bank (i=8) 0.171636 
(2.31842) 
[0.020] 
-0.00344413 
(-1.24691) 
[0.212] 
UFJ Bank (i=9) 0.175272 
(2.36347) 
[0.018] 
-0.000890028 
(-0.372343) 
[0.710] 
Sumitomo Mitsui Banking 
Corp. (i=10) 
0.176032 
(2.38834) 
[0.017] 
-0.00106245 
(-0.435798) 
[0.663] 
Resona Bank (i=11) 0.171298 
(2.30680) 
[0.021] 
-0.00246548 
(-0.894499) 
[0.371] 
Tokai Bank (i=12) 0.171962 
(2.33095) 
[0.020] 
-0.00196218 
(-0.804173) 
[0.421] 
Hokkaido Takushoku Bank 
(i=13) 
0.168216 
(2.25946) 
[0.024] 
― 
Taiyo Kobe Bank (i=14) 0.172075 
(2.34489) 
[0.019] 
― 
Bank of Tokyo (i=15) 0.186070 ― 
129 
 
(2.75036) 
[0.006] 
Saitama Bank (i=16) 0.173640 
(2.34006) 
[0.019] 
― 
Note: 1. The numbers in parentheses represent estimated t-values. 
2. The numbers in brackets represent estimated p-values. 
3. ,
R
LL i  in  and  , , , ,,RLL i LL t L i tr Q zRQ ,QLL i  in  , , ,Q RQLL i L i tr z  are single-equation 
estimations. 
4. The multivariate regression estimates take into account the heteroskedasticity 
of an unknown form in error terms. 
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Table 7.1.5: EstimationResults of  , , ,,R RQDD i DD t D tr Q z  and  , ,Q RQDD i D tr z  
Table 7.1.5: EstimationResults of  , , ,,R RQDD i DD t D tr Q z  and  , ,Q RQDD i D tr z  
Parameters 
(Independent Variables) 
 , , ,,R RQDD i DD t D tr Q z  
Eq. (6.2.3.1.7a) 
 , ,Q RQDD i D tr z  
Eq. (6.2.3.1.7b) 
,9299
R
DD (1992-1999) 
( 9299 ,ln
YA
DD tD Q ) 
0.00115203 
(10.0592) 
[0.000] 
― 
,0008
R
DD (2000-2008) 
( 0008 ,ln
YA
DD tD Q ) 
0.00112227 
(9.84849) 
[0.000] 
― 
,1
R
DD , ,1QDD  
( ,1,ln
RQ
D tz ) 
0.000751220 
(1.08466) 
[0.278] 
0.017431 
(2.64896) 
[0.008] 
,2
R
DD , ,2QDD  
( ,2,
RQ
D tz ) 
-0.039622 
(-21.6787) 
[0.000] 
0.220839 
(3.10781) 
[0.002] 
,3
R
DD , ,3QDD  
( ,3,
RQ
D tz ) 
0.167194 
(19.3166) 
[0.000] 
-0.041205 
(-0.137432) 
[0.891] 
,4
R
DD , ,4QDD  
( ,4,
RQ
D tz ) 
0.00000150663 
(13.8124) 
[0.000] 
-0.00000207429 
(-1.21812) 
[0.223] 
Adjusted R-squared 0.873870 0.738942 
Number of 
Observations 
179 100 
Log likelihood  1149.79 515.486 
Schwarz B.I.C. -1097.92 -478.645 
Note: 1. The numbers in parentheses represent estimated t-values. 
2. The numbers in brackets represent estimated p-values. 
3.  , , ,,R R ,QDD i DD t D i tr Q z  and  , , ,Q RQDD i D i tr z  are single-equation estimations. 
4. The multivariate regression estimates take into account the heteroskedasticity 
of an unknown form in error terms. 
5. The estimation results of ,
R
DD i  and ,QDD i  are shown in Table 7.1.6. 
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Table 7.1.6: Estimation Results of ,
R
DD i  and ,QDD i  
Table 7.1.6: Estimation Results of ,
R
DD i  and ,QDD i  
Japanese City Bank 
,
R
DD i  
Eq. (6.2.3.1.7a) 
,
Q
DD i  
Eq. (6.2.3.1.7b) 
Industrial Bank of Japan 
(i=1) 
-0.031867 
(-2.95886) 
[0.003] 
-0.223239 
(-2.61834) 
[0.009] 
Shinsei Bank (i=2) -0.031762 
(-2.94986) 
[0.003] 
-0.218483 
(-2.57068) 
[0.010] 
Aozora Bank (i=3) -0.031774 
(-2.95103) 
[0.003] 
-0.221177 
(-2.60334) 
[0.009] 
Mizuho Bank (i=4) -0.031915 
(-2.96410) 
[0.003] 
-0.226857 
(-2.66662) 
[0.008] 
Sakura Bank (i=5) -0.031570 
(-2.93119) 
[0.003] 
-0.227315 
(-2.66521) 
[0.008] 
Mizuho Corporate Bank 
(i=6) 
-0.031956 
(-2.96790) 
[0.003] 
-0.225878 
(-2.65547) 
[0.008] 
Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi 
UFJ (i=7) 
-0.031930 
(-2.96544) 
[0.003] 
-0.226176 
(-2.65862) 
[0.008] 
Asahi Bank (i=8) -0.031921 
(-2.96384) 
[0.003] 
-0.227036 
(-2.66288) 
[0.008] 
UFJ Bank (i=9) -0.031643 
(-2.93863) 
[0.003] 
-0.226045 
(-2.65155) 
[0.008] 
Sumitomo Mitsui Banking 
Corp. (i=10) 
-0.031625 
(-2.93712) 
[0.003] 
-0.226180 
(-2.65866) 
[0.008] 
Resona Bank (i=11) -0.031929 
(-2.96534) 
[0.003] 
-0.226120 
(-2.65796) 
[0.008] 
Tokai Bank (i=12) -0.031759 
(-2.94877) 
[0.003] 
-0.226756 
(-2.65830) 
[0.008] 
Hokkaido Takushoku Bank 
(i=13) 
-0.032041 
(-2.97577) 
[0.003] 
― 
Bank of Tokyo (i=15) -0.031675 
(-2.94159) 
[0.003] 
― 
Note: 1. The numbers in parentheses represent estimated t-values. 
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2. The numbers in brackets represent estimated p-values. 
3. ,
R
DD i  in  , , ,,R RQDD i DD t D tr Q z  and ,QDD i  in  , ,Q RQDD i D tr z  are single-equation 
estimations. 
4. The multivariate regression estimates take into account the heteroskedasticity 
of an unknown form in error terms. 
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Table 7.1.7: Estimation Results of  , , ,,RTD i TD t D tr Q zRQ  and  , ,Q RQTD i D tr z  
Table 7.1.7: Estimation Results of  , , ,,R RTD i TD t D tr Q z Q  and  , ,Q RQTD i D tr z  
Parameters 
(Independent Variables) 
 , , ,,R RTD i TD t D tr Q z Q  
Eq. (6.2.3.1.7a) 
 , ,Q RQTD i D tr z  
Eq. (6.2.3.1.7b) 
,8589
R
TD (1985-1989) 
( ) 8589 ,ln
YA
TD tD Q
0.048967 
(3.02812) 
[0.002] 
― 
,9099
R
TD (1990-1999) 
( ) 9099 ,ln
YA
TD tD Q
0.049397 
(3.06009) 
[0.002] 
― 
,0008
R
TD (2000-2008) 
( ) 0008 ,ln
YA
TD tD Q
0.049017 
(3.00460) 
[0.003] 
― 
,1
R
TD , ,1QTD  
( ,1,ln
RQ
D tz ) 
-0.212727 
(-17.5762) 
[0.000] 
0.017852 
(3.06240) 
[0.002] 
,2
R
TD , ,2QTD  
( ,2,
RQ
D tz ) 
1.48008 
(2.25947) 
[0.024] 
0.065037 
(1.27768) 
[0.201] 
,3
R
TD , ,3QTD  
( ,3,
RQ
D tz ) 
-0.948063 
(-2.07614) 
[0.038] 
0.141353 
(1.65651) 
[0.098] 
Adjusted R-squared 0.764764 0.730451 
Number of 
Observations 
288 100 
Log likelihood  754.957 513.294 
Schwarz B.I.C. -692.664 -478.756 
Note: 1. The numbers in parentheses represent estimated t-values. 
2. The numbers in brackets represent estimated p-values. 
3.  and  , , ,,R RTD i TD t D tr Q z Q  , ,Q RQTD i D tr z  are single-equation estimations. 
4. The multivariate regression estimates take into account the heteroskedasticity 
of an unknown form in error terms. 
5. The estimation results of ,
R
TD i  and ,QTD i  are shown in Table 7.1.8. 
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Table 7.1.8: Estimation Results of ,
R
TD i  and ,QTD i  
Table 7.1.8: Estimation Results of ,
R
TD i  and ,QTD i  
Japanese City Banks 
,
R
TD i  
Eq. (6.2.3.1.7a) 
,
Q
TD i  
Eq. (6.2.3.1.7b) 
Industrial Bank of Japan 
(i=1) 
1.89404 
(6.29853) 
[0.000] 
-0.229450 
(-3.01426) 
[0.003] 
Shinsei Bank (i=2) 1.86632 
(6.21498) 
[0.000] 
-0.224554 
(-2.96479) 
[0.003] 
Aozora Bank (i=3) 1.86000 
(6.19393) 
[0.000] 
-0.227295 
(-3.00094) 
[0.003] 
Mizuho Bank (i=4) 1.84822 
(6.15472) 
[0.000] 
-0.233002 
(-3.07072) 
[0.002] 
Sakura Bank (i=5) 1.85808 
(6.18062) 
[0.000] 
-0.233481 
(-3.06776) 
[0.002] 
Mizuho Corporate Bank 
(i=6) 
1.85458 
(6.17591) 
[0.000] 
-0.232053 
(-3.05774) 
[0.002] 
Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi 
UFJ (i=7) 
1.85119 
(6.16462) 
[0.000] 
-0.232321 
(-3.06175) 
[0.002] 
Asahi Bank (i=8) 1.83934 
(6.11661) 
[0.000] 
-0.233247 
(-3.06414) 
[0.002] 
UFJ Bank (i=9) 1.85981 
(6.18729) 
[0.000] 
-0.232118 
(-3.05393) 
[0.002] 
Sumitomo Mitsui Banking 
Corp. (i=10) 
1.86936 
(6.22512) 
[0.000] 
-0.232325 
(-3.06180) 
[0.002] 
Resona Bank (i=11) 1.84492 
(6.14371) 
[0.000] 
-0.232265 
(-3.06102) 
[0.002] 
Tokai Bank (i=12) 1.84408 
(6.13402) 
[0.000] 
-0.232955 
(-3.05905) 
[0.002] 
Hokkaido Takushoku Bank 
(i=13) 
1.83464 
(6.10522) 
[0.000] 
― 
Taiyo Kobe Bank (i=14) 1.83493 
(6.13111) 
[0.000] 
― 
Bank of Tokyo (i=15) 1.85656 ― 
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(6.17851) 
[0.000] 
Saitama Bank (i=16) 1.83327 
(6.11931) 
[0.000] 
― 
Note: 1. The numbers in parentheses represent estimated t-values. 
2. The numbers in brackets represent estimated p-values. 
3. ,
R
TD i  in  and  , , ,RTD i TD t D tr Q z ,RQ ,QTD i  in  , ,Q RQTD i D tr z  are single-equation 
estimations. 
4. The multivariate regression estimates take into account the heteroskedasticity 
of an unknown form in error terms. 
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Table 7.2.1: Estimation Results of the Variable Cost Function 
Table 7.2.1: Estimation Results of the Variable Cost Function 
Parameter Estimate Standard 
Error 
t-statistic p-value 
SLa  -0.011206 0.239196 -0.046847 0.963 
4
ZL
SLa  -11.6033 3.14913 -3.68461 0.000 
5
ZL
SLa  -0.184740
310  0.137525 310  -1.34332 0.179 
8
ZL
SLa  -1.11255 0.455395 -2.44303 0.015 
10
ZL
SLa  2.02776 0.549019 3.69342 0.000 
11
ZL
SLa  1.52882 0.273827 5.58318 0.000 
LLa  1.26480 0.218511 5.78828 0.000 
4
ZL
LLa  4.71197 2.14691 2.19477 0.028 
5
ZL
LLa  0.882228
410  0.656615 410  1.34360 0.179 
8
ZL
LLa  -0.106242 0.467884 -0.227069 0.820 
10
ZL
LLa  -1.69642 0.371399 -4.56763 0.000 
11
ZL
LLa  -0.693534 0.245140 -2.82914 0.005 
DDa  -0.022146 0.108309 -0.204473 0.838 
2
ZD
DDa  -2.06570 0.915970 -2.25521 0.024 
3
ZD
DDa  0.765345 1.23080 0.621829 0.534 
4
ZD
DDa  -0.919990
410  0.296553 410  -3.10228 0.002 
TDa  -1.08579 0.155710 -6.97313 0.000 
2
ZD
TDa  -1.83598 1.78093 -1.03091 0.303 
3
ZD
TDa  5.85375 1.22509 4.77820 0.000 
4
ZD
TDa  0.412465
410  0.443486 410  0.930052 0.352 
Sa  0.496511 0.048925 10.1485 0.000 
Ca  -0.166379 0.040742 -4.08368 0.000 
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CLa  0.255867 0.022429 11.4076 0.000 
Aa  0.236199 0.022881 10.3228 0.000 
CMa  -0.063213 0.034544 -1.82994 0.067 
Va  0.255440 0.026890 9.49946 0.000 
2
ZL
Va  -0.716688 0.135220 -5.30016 0.000 
6
ZL
Va  0.072278 0.028910 2.50010 0.012 
7
ZL
Va  0.215569 0.067368 3.19988 0.001 
2
ZD
Va  -0.749582 0.303758 -2.46770 0.014 
3
ZD
Va  -0.043256 0.330054 -0.131058 0.896 
La  0.157626 0.013451 11.7189 0.000 
2
ZL
La  -0.096172 0.047677 -2.01714 0.044 
6
ZL
La  -0.129324
210  0.013063 -0.099000 0.921 
7
ZL
La  -0.071534 0.025802 -2.77236 0.006 
2
ZD
La  0.480177 0.123027 3.90303 0.000 
3
ZD
La  -0.937174 0.117866 -7.95117 0.000 
Ka  0.092660 0.586729 210  15.7927 0.000 
2
ZL
Ka  -0.162895 0.024853 -6.55423 0.000 
6
ZL
Ka  -0.015779 0.704377
210  -2.24012 0.025 
7
ZL
Ka  -0.026061 0.013245 -1.96760 0.049 
2
ZD
Ka  0.016179 0.103760 0.155925 0.876 
3
ZD
Ka  0.114420 0.104338 1.09663 0.273 
Ba  0.235496 0.041520 5.67192 0.000 
2
ZL
Ba  1.19495 0.150962 7.91557 0.000 
6
ZL
Ba  -0.045887 0.029426 -1.55937 0.119 
7
ZL
Ba  0.025276 0.071147 0.355265 0.722 
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2
ZD
Ba  -0.638782 0.537247 -1.18899 0.234 
3
ZD
Ba  2.52677 0.494030 5.11461 0.000 
SLSLb  -1.47055 0.294867 -4.98716 0.000 
LLLLb  -1.08123 0.197197 -5.48297 0.000 
DDDDb  -1.24676 0.161810 -7.70507 0.000 
TDTDb  -1.76445 0.378900 -4.65679 0.000 
SSb  -0.656476 210  0.225511 -0.029111 0.977 
CCb  -0.065978 0.048952 -1.34782 0.178 
CLCLb  0.091475 0.022578 4.05142 0.000 
AAb  -0.060973 0.055820 -1.09232 0.275 
CMCMb  -0.962882 210  0.091021 -0.105787 0.916 
VVb  -0.227582 0.013938 -16.3277 0.000 
LLb  0.019327 0.941528 310  20.5271 0.000 
KKb  0.966178 210  0.320038 310  30.1895 0.000 
BBb  0.032094 0.231916 210  13.8387 0.000 
SLLLb  -0.873397 0.219979 -3.97037 0.000 
SLDDb  1.52270 0.188276 8.08759 0.000 
SLTDb  1.73086 0.316586 5.46726 0.000 
SLSb  -0.158785 0.151180 -1.05030 0.294 
SLCb  -0.210447 0.082195 -2.56034 0.010 
SLCLb  -0.640909 0.061893 -10.3551 0.000 
SLAb  -0.320640 0.083123 -3.85740 0.000 
SLCMb  0.451752 0.110794 4.07739 0.000 
SLVb  -0.091221 0.016964 -5.37739 0.000 
SLLb  -0.019416 0.624015 210  -3.11141 0.002 
SLKb  -0.030497 0.397615 210  -7.66996 0.000 
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SLBb  0.185538 0.024408 7.60149 0.000 
SLTb  -0.055993 0.018282 -3.06270 0.002 
LLDDb  0.466088 0.220156 2.11709 0.034 
LLTDb  0.965165 0.363802 2.65299 0.008 
LLSb  0.629322 0.217121 2.89849 0.004 
LLCb  0.078096 0.150987 0.517240 0.605 
LLCLb  -0.201644 0.064712 -3.11604 0.002 
LLAb  -0.156343 0.078716 -1.98618 0.047 
LLCMb  0.576515 0.105673 5.45567 0.000 
LLVb  -0.016882 0.013102 -1.28845 0.198 
LLLb  -0.038619 0.682434 210  -5.65899 0.000 
LLKb  -0.015244 0.433582 210  -3.51581 0.000 
LLBb  0.145998 0.021645 6.74502 0.000 
LLTb  0.040227 0.019948 2.01658 0.044 
DDTDb  -0.818347 0.186413 -4.38996 0.000 
DDSb  0.331611 0.153354 2.16239 0.031 
DDCb  0.119250 0.077988 1.52908 0.126 
DDCLb  0.242269 0.048537 4.99142 0.000 
DDAb  0.140885 0.056163 2.50848 0.012 
DDCMb  -0.589384 0.082608 -7.13467 0.000 
DDVb  0.084136 0.956180 210  8.79914 0.000 
DDLb  0.032771 0.397289 210  8.24864 0.000 
DDKb  0.026201 0.261646 210  10.0140 0.000 
DDBb  -0.210376 0.014582 -14.4270 0.000 
DDTb  0.022634 0.015522 1.45816 0.145 
TDSb  -0.183707 0.225123 -0.816029 0.414 
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TDCb  -0.143542 0.139289 -1.03053 0.303 
TDCLb  0.457348 0.080497 5.68158 0.000 
TDAb  0.272595 0.083695 3.25701 0.001 
TDCMb  -0.890801 0.142120 -6.26795 0.000 
TDVb  0.093025 0.021330 4.36124 0.000 
TDLb  0.019627 0.847581 210  2.31568 0.021 
TDKb  0.029807 0.526647 210  5.65986 0.000 
TDBb  -0.186969 0.032767 -5.70596 0.000 
TDTb  0.012623 0.024541 0.514366 0.607 
SCb  -0.058117 0.123426 -0.470867 0.638 
SCLb  -0.166232 0.053943 -3.08163 0.002 
SAb  0.065569 0.071412 0.918179 0.359 
SCMb  -0.295337 0.111978 -2.63745 0.008 
SVb  0.068341 0.014805 4.61621 0.000 
SLb  -0.013442 0.568928 210  -2.36269 0.018 
SKb  0.015362 0.380729 210  4.03476 0.000 
SBb  -0.050027 0.021535 -2.32305 0.020 
STb  -0.047570 0.015040 -3.16301 0.002 
CCLb  0.017835 0.027596 0.646288 0.518 
CAb  -0.061494 0.027014 -2.27641 0.023 
CCMb  0.149164 0.050393 2.96002 0.003 
CVb  -0.019176 0.649752 210  -2.95121 0.003 
CLb  0.012193 0.374187 210  3.25857 0.001 
CKb  -0.101293 210  0.168215 210  -0.602162 0.547 
CBb  -0.014152 0.010502 -1.34749 0.178 
CTb  -0.026172 0.011009 -2.37741 0.017 
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CLAb  0.493614 210  0.023666 0.208578 0.835 
CLCMb  0.162353 0.035312 4.59761 0.000 
CLVb  -0.858860 210  0.654258 210  -1.31272 0.189 
CLLb  -0.022244 0.226021 210  -9.84146 0.000 
CLKb  -0.674786 210  0.142739 210  -4.72741 0.000 
CLBb  0.080223 0.831269 210  9.65068 0.000 
CLTb  0.338154 210  0.513763 210  0.658190 0.510 
ACMb  0.064009 0.039211 1.63244 0.103 
AVb  -0.067210 0.895921 210  -7.50176 0.000 
ALb  -0.019397 0.395244 210  -4.90754 0.000 
AKb  -0.021864 0.177890 210  -12.2909 0.000 
ABb  0.150221 0.011823 12.7063 0.000 
ATb  0.930652 210  0.601327 210  1.54766 0.122 
CMVb  -0.040144 0.906286 210  -4.42952 0.000 
CMLb  0.034518 0.369895 210  9.33187 0.000 
CMKb  0.845882 210  0.285323 210  2.96465 0.003 
CMBb  -0.069294 0.015397 -4.50054 0.000 
CMTb  0.025861 0.882351 210  2.93087 0.003 
VLb  0.282542 0.012666 22.3072 0.000 
VKb  0.012236 0.297915 210  4.10724 0.000 
VBb  -0.067195 0.471773 210  -14.2432 0.000 
VTb  -0.010363 0.192058 210  -5.39583 0.000 
LKb  -0.161413 210  0.775926 310  -2.08026 0.038 
LBb  0.013725 0.152633 210  8.99189 0.000 
LTb  0.287794 210  0.858119 310  3.35378 0.001 
KBb  0.230691 210  0.415997 310  5.54551 0.000 
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KTb  -0.744554 310  0.544210 310  -1.36814 0.171 
BTb  0.307274 210  0.237181 210  1.29553 0.195 
Variable Cost Function 0.990899 
Share of Labor 0.428258 
Share of Physical Capital 0.300492 
R-squared 
Share of Certificate of Deposit and 
Other Liabilities 
0.673045 
Number of 
Observations 
349 
Order of MA  
for the Error  
Term 
3 
Test for 
Overidentification 
[p-value] 
87.7852 
[0.986] 
Value Function 0.251534 
Note: 1. The GMM estimates take into account the heteroskedasticity of an unknown 
form in error terms and autocorrelation, in which case we specify a 
third-order moving average process. Bartlett kernels were specified for the 
kernel density to insure positive definiteness of the covariance matrix of the 
orthogonal conditions, when the number of autocorrelation terms is positive. 
2. The estimates of ，Va
ZL
Vja ( 2,6,7j  ), ZDVja ( 2,3j  ), (j = SL, LL, DD, TD, 
S, C, CL, A, CM), and (
jVb
Vjb , , , ,j V L K B T ) are calculated from the condition 
of linear homogeneity with respect to factor prices. 
3. To improve the precision of estimation, we use different instrumental 
variables for each equation. More specifically, we use the following 
instrumental variables: 
-Instruments for all of the equations: , BiD
, , 1ln j i tq

 (j=SL,LL,DD,TD,S,C,CL,A,CM), and  , , , ,ln j i t V i t jp p    (j=L,K,B), 
  -Instruments for the variable cost function: Bi tD   ,  2Bi tD   ,  3Bi tD   , 
B M
i iD D A S(i=4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11), , 7 7B MAD D ,1, , , , 1lnRQL i t j i tz q  (j=SL,LL), 
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, , , 1 , , 1ln
RQ
L h i t j i tz q

   (h=4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11, j=SL,LL), 
, , , , , 1ln
RQ
D h i t j i tz q

 ( h=2,3,4, j=DD,TD),  ,2, , , , , ,lnRQL i t j i t V i t jz p p    (j=L,K,B), 
 , , , 1 , , , ,lnRQL h i t j i t V i t jz p p     (h=6,7,j=L,K,B), 
, , , , , , ,lnRQ D h i t j i t V i t jz p p   

(h=2,3,j=L,K,B), 
, , 1 , , 1ln lnj i t h i tq q
 
  (j,h=SL,LL,DD,TD,S,C,CL,A,CM), 
 , , 1 , , , ,ln lnj i t h i t V i t hq p p      (j=SL,LL,DD,TD,S,C,CL,A,CM,h=L,K,B), 
, , 1ln j i t tq     ( j= SL,LL,DD,TD,S,C,CL,A,CM), 
  , , , , , , , ,ln ln j i t V i t j h i t V i t hp p p p       (j,h= L,K,B), and 
 , , , ,ln j i t V i t j tp p       ( j= L,K,B), and 
  -Instruments for the (respective) cost share equations: , (h=6,7), ,2, ,
RQ
L i tz , , , 1
RQ
L h i tz 
, , ,
RQ
D h i tz (h=2,3),  ,2, , , , , ,lnRQL i t j i t V i t jz p p    (j=L,K,B), 
 , , , 1 , , , ,lnRQL h i t j i t V i t jz p p     (h=6,7,j=L,K,B), and 
 , , , , , , ,lnRQD h i t j i t V i t jz p p    (h=2,3,j=L,K,B), 
where 7
MASD  is an M&A dummy variable for the Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi 
UFJ (taking a value of one for 2006-2007). 
4. The estimation results of  ,MAi i ta D    are shown in Table 7.2.2. 
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Table 7.2.2: Estimation Results of  ,MAi i ta D    
Table 7.2.2: Estimation Results of  ,MAi i ta D    
Parameter Estimate Standard 
Error 
t-statistic p-value 
Shinsei Bank (i=2) 
2a  12.0325 0.903239 13.3215 0.000 
2Ta  0.010383 0.064288 0.161505 0.872 
Aozora Bank (i=3) 
3a  16.3822 1.79836 9.10952 0.000 
3Ta  -0.574088 0.315962 -1.81695 0.069 
3TTa  0.021069 0.014057 1.49880 0.134 
Mizuho Bank (i=4) 
4a  13.7382 0.071789 191.369 0.000 
4MAa  0.650187 0.124072 5.24041 0.000 
4Ta  -0.024588 0.839652 210  -2.92841 0.003 
4TTa  -0.607976 210  0.132949 210  -4.57302 0.000 
4TTTa  -0.402154 410  0.401993 410  -1.00040 0.317 
Sakura Bank (i=5) 
5a  13.1582 0.057950 227.059 0.000 
5MAa  0.326917 0.066247 4.93485 0.000 
5Ta  -0.053796 0.010761 -4.99914 0.000 
5TTa  -0.459135 210  0.183520 210  -2.50183 0.012 
5TTTa  -0.200960 410  0.748695 410  -0.268413 0.788 
Mizuho Corporate Bank (i=6) 
6a  13.5991 .075167 180.920 0.000 
6MAa  -0.398321 0.608196 -0.654922 0.513 
6Ta  -0.032742 0.764325 210  -4.28377 0.000 
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6TTa  -0.658587 210  0.159246 210  -4.13566 0.000 
6TTTa  -0.704059 410  0.503883 410  -1.39727 0.162 
Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ (i=7) 
7a  13.7309 .076644 179.151 0.000 
7MAa  0.070990 0.079451 0.893513 0.372 
7MASa  0.520363 0.146318 3.55639 0.000 
7Ta  -0.019294 0.898381 210  -2.14760 0.032 
7TTa  -0.693826 210  0.174065 210  -3.98603 0.000 
7TTTa  -0.588682 410  0.426836 410  -1.37918 0.168 
Asahi Bank (i=8) 
8a  13.1972 0.078997 167.060 0.000 
8MAa  0.716199 0.097796 7.32338 0.000 
8Ta  -0.050684 0.011955 -4.23956 0.000 
8TTa  -0.221147 210  0.207396 210  -1.06630 0.286 
8TTTa  0.124025 310  0.591536 410  2.09666 0.036 
UFJ Bank (i=9) 
9a  13.3014 0.054305 244.938 0.000 
9MAa  -0.171003 0.047189 -3.62375 0.000 
9Ta  -0.032396 0.759889 210  -4.26328 0.000 
9TTa  -0.405901 210  0.144980 210  -2.79969 0.005 
9TTTa  0.479170  410 0.429516 410  1.11561 0.265 
Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corp. (i=10) 
10a  13.1813 0.050658 260.203 0.000 
10MAa  -0.333155 0.132440 -2.51551 0.012 
10Ta  -0.036398 0.768179 210  -4.73819 0.000 
10TTa  -0.302973 210  0.114768 210  -2.63988 0.008 
10TTTa  0.116457  310 0.227719 410  5.11407 0.000 
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Resona Bank (i=11) 
11a  13.3363 .059718 223.322 0.000 
11MAa  -0.370582 0.097146 -3.81469 0.000 
11Ta  0.618331  210 0.013618 0.454048 0.650 
11TTa  -0.226607 210  0.125251 210  -1.80922 0.070 
11TTTa  -0.276875 410  0.335602 410  -0.825008 0.409 
Tokai Bank (i=12) 
12a  13.3907 0.046530 287.787 0.000 
12Ta  -0.037937 0.879949 210  -4.31122 0.000 
12TTa  -0.569933 210  0.140497 210  -4.05656 0.000 
12TTTa  -0.717537 510  0.426065 410  -0.168410 0.866 
Hokkaido Takushoku Bank (i=13) 
13a  13.5225 0.093070 145.295 0.000 
13Ta  0.023954 0.019965 1.19975 0.230 
13TTa  -0.127579 210  0.325717 210  -0.391687 0.695 
13TTTa  -0.354720 410  0.110732 310  -0.320343 0.749 
Taiyo Kobe Bank (i=14) 
14a  13.1387 0.239284 54.9085 0.000 
14Ta  -0.194461 0.081987 -2.37186 0.018 
14TTa  -0.021787 0.921062 210  -2.36540 0.018 
14TTTa  -0.491910 310  0.283143 310  -1.73732 0.082 
Bank of Tokyo (i=15) 
15a  13.8651 0.110427 125.558 0.000 
15Ta  0.343690 210  0.022740 0.151137 0.880 
15TTa  -0.879911 210  0.291351 210  -3.02011 0.003 
15TTTa  -0.392879 310  0.105301 310  -3.73100 0.000 
Saitama Bank (i=16) 
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16a  12.6929 0.145549 87.2070 0.000 
16Ta  -0.181020 0.049607 -3.64907 0.000 
16TTa  -0.015181 0.579630 210  -2.61904 0.009 
16TTTa  -0.320842 310  0.180024 310  -1.78222 0.075 
Note: 1. The GMM esti
e 
 estimation, we use different instrumental variables 
       for 
3. 
mates take into account the heteroskedasticity of an unknown 
form in error terms and autocorrelation, in which case we specify a 
third-order moving average process. Bartlett kernels were specified for the 
kernel density to insure positive definiteness of the covariance matrix of th
orthogonal conditions, when the number of autocorrelation terms is positive. 
2. To improve the precision of
   each equation. 
7MASa  is an M&A dummy coefficient for the Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ 
(2006-2007). 
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